Saturday, July 11, 2015

Colonel Cassad: The misery lies in the fact that Moscow thinks of the war as a business as usual, as a continuation of business

In a good spirit of post-Hegelians who mastered the art and tactic of taking a "third position" between two posited positions (neither this, nor that, but one which is a dialectical synthesis of both and above), Boris Rozhin tries to answer and dodge the question about taking a stance on the question of what Moscow has done to Novorossiya by Minsk. However, how much he tries, despite protestations to the contrary, his commitment to Novorossiya and analytical honesty does show. This comes out especially in these passages of his long answer, in which he tries to repeat some of his safety statements from before and twist and dodge before the so politically charged and critical question:

5. Train with these [great] opportunities [from 2014[ had gone. You can of course complain ... or blindly deny the existence of these wasted chances, but the situation is now somewhat different and is no longer offering us those squandered opportunities from Spring 2014. ...
6. Will Donbass be surrendered to the junta? In my opinion no. It is possible that Donbass would have been surrendered [betrayed], but our agents for sticking Donbass back into Ukraine cannot synchronize this anyway with the plans of the US for this conflict, so due to the objective circumstances [= US other war plans?], the war will continue. ...
10. Then, the main question - will we win or not? In my opinion, it is too early to bury us. The situation is difficult for us, as we are surrounded by enemies, and, at times, neither the country nor the government shows a clear understanding of how to respond to this unexpected [25 years in making] situation. ...
From the perspective of [the Kremlin's] business pragmatists who do not think in terms of ideological dogmas (as the US imperialists) and superpower priorities, [the hitherto attempts of Moscow] were [seen as] logical business decisions, which they are seeking even now. [By treating politics and the problem of the junta] as a [business] problem, [and] as a local crisis, they believe that it is possible to solve this by means of crisis management and by pouring money on the problem. And they looked on Donbass as a possible instrument for implementing some Ukrainian perestroika. But this is also where lies the misery of such cunning plans."

With respect to giving a diagnosis to the nearly taboo (for many) questions as to whether Moscow's Minsk policy constituted surrender or treason, Rozhin's most relevant answer hides in point 6, right here: " In my opinion no. It is possible that Donbass would have been surrendered [betrayed], but our agents for sticking Donbass back into Ukraine cannot synchronize this anyway with the plans of the US for this conflict ..." Rozhin says here nothing less than, yes, indeed, Moscow's "agents for sticking Donbass back into Ukraine" did try to do just that (surrender; treason). However, the only reason why they did not succeed was that, in Rozhin's view, this result (and hence thus particular form of surrender and treason) was not enough for the US. The US political plans and goals want something more and bigger still. Thus it was not exactly for the lack of willingness or trying on the part of these obliging personages in Moscow. But rather because this obliging is and was still not good enough for the US.

Rozhin just not just indicates, but very much says directly that Moscow tried and was willing to "return" (surrender, betray) Donbass to Kiev or the US. But betraying Donbass only was not and is not enough for the US.  The betrayal and capitulation out to be much bigger still. Anyone who can read the Minsk Agreements can actually see that they do spell it out very clearly--in them Moscow agreed to return (surrender, betray) Donbass to Kiev and the US.

Under Minsk, the Russian government committed itself to returning Donbass (Novorossiya in making) under the sovereignty of the Kiev regime. The difference between "returning" and surrendering and betraying is a matter of intelligence, ethical principles and conscience in that order. As Boris Rozhin indicated (and not just yesterday, but for some time now), the problem was/is that, for the US, the surrender and betrayal of Donbass was not enough. Crimea is demanded too and much else. 

Rozhin's original text in Russian:

5. Поезд с этими шансами уже ушел. Можно конечно ныть, что теперь то все пропало или наоборот слепо отрицать наличие упущенных шансов, но ситуация уже несколько иная и поэтому только к упущенным возможностям весны 2014 не сводится.
6. Будет ли слит Донбасс хунте? На мой взгляд нет. Может быть его бы и слили, но наши адпеты запихивания Донбасса на Украину никак не стыкуются с планами США на этот конфликт, поэтому по объективным обстоятельствам война продолжится.
10.Ну и главный вопрос - мы победим или нет? На мой взгляд, хоронить нас рано. Ситуация для нас тяжелая, враги так сказать окружают, да и в стране как у властей, так и общества порой не видно четкого понимания как реагировать на эту неожиданную ситуацию.
С точки зрения бизнес-прагматиков, которые не мыслят категориями идеологических догматов (как американские империалисты) и сверхдержавными приоритетами, это ведь было логичным бизнес-решением, которое и сейчас ищут, представляя себе эту проблему, как локальный кризис, который можно решить кризисным менеджементом с залитием проблемы деньгами. А на Донбасс смотрели как на возможный инструмент реализации переобустройства Украины. Но тут и зарыта беда подобных хитрых планов.

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