The material is presented in the way in which I was able to pen it relying on my self only in the mid 1990s:
Hardly ever has modern history
recorded a demise of a state brought about so 'gratis' or with such ease. On
the surface, it appeared merely as a result of an irreconcilable personality
clash between two stubborn national prime ministers - Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir
Meciar, to whose political ideologies Czechoslovakia had to be sacrificed. Their collaboration and mutual understanding
in dismantling the country was at that time portrayed as a 'natural' outcome of
the particular meanness of Meciar complemented by the nonchalant generosity of
Klaus. Out of curiosity, one may wish to pose a question of how many minutes or
hours it took for a couple of republican leaders to settle the termination of a
state. Recently, an advisor to Meciar claimed that it was a matter of merely a
several-minute phone call, during which Klaus congratulated Meciar on his
election victory.[1] Another
version argues that 40 minutes of discussion between Klaus and Meciar was
necessary to reach such a conclusion.[2]
Interestingly enough, it was Vaclav
Klaus, the Czech Prime Minister, who drew attention to the ostensible
connection or continuity of the breakup and previous crucial events in recent
Czech history. In rejecting the popular demand for holding a referendum, he
compared the breaking up of the state with the years 1918, 1938, 1948, 1968 and
1989, when no referenda had been called either ...[3]
Earlier, Havel only admitted the apparent when he stated that "the
attempts to divide the state constitute a high-powered play of politicians and
do not reflect the interests of ordinary people."[4] This
was, however, done deliberately. On September 15, 1992, Milan Uhde, the then
president of the Czech parliament and one of key figures in carrying out the
split of the country, explained the
sidetracking of the federal parliament of Czechoslovakia and rejection of referendum
in the following way:
[Referendum] is an obsession with
another democracy than with the parliamentary one ... It is an obsession that
tries to arouse in people ... an impression that it is the citizen that can consider best all
the questions of the state ...[5]
By January 1992, over 2,500,000
citizens' signatures had been collected for a petition calling for a
referendum. It was simply ignored by the political elite whose very leaders
used this form of appeal during their dissident past (for example, the petition
of Charter 77 "Few Sentences" from early 1989 received a wide
international attention and was supported by some 30,000 signatures).[6] Dusan
Slobodnik, a Slovak political observer and witness of the breakup, argued that
the "play" in which the state was at stake had its
"scenario" that "can be substantiated factually" as it
chronologically unfolded. At the beginning, he said, it was to anger the Czechs
and insult the Slovaks, where a key role was played by the media, especially
the ex-dissident Lidove noviny and
ex-Communist-youth Mlade fronty Dnes,
and the leaders of the Civic Forum (J. Ruml, Forejt, Liska, J. Hanak, L.
Vaculik). The purpose was to stir or imitate artificially the tension and
conflict; a reaction in Slovakia aroused by this manipulation was then
presented to the Czechs by the "play directors" an alleged effort of
the Slovaks to have a divorce. In this way, the handling of the breakup by the
media is once more evidence that the initiative and drive to cut the state
apart came from the Czech [or Böhmisch] side. Moreover, this campaign was
strangely also supported by the European media who also contributed to the
creation of images of the "inevitability of the breakup" that was
actually decided by a rather narrow group of politicians. At the same time, the
Slovak newspapers and their distribution in the Czech Republic were, according
to Slobodnik, deliberately curtailed - only 80 (!) issues of the newspaper Narodna obroda were daily distributed in
the Czech Republic. The real position of Slovakia was also played down, distorted
or silenced by the federal television network controlled by the people from
Charter 77 (Kanturek and others). Despite all this, the vast majority of the
Slovaks still kept identifying themselves with the idea of Czechoslovakia,
while the group of Czech politicians linked to and supported by Havel adopted
arbitrary measures that were damaging Slovak workers (an arbitrary conversion
of the military industry in Slovakia, distancing themselves from the problem of
a hydro-power station Gabcikovo as allegedly an internal matter between
Slovakia and Hungary).[7]
The examination of the process of
the breakup seem to confirm a great deal of Slobodnik's conclusions that
however lack a notion of the very important foreign context of the
"play." Nevertheless, Slobodnik's concept of political technology as
theatre (for the stupid Last Men) is noteworthy with regard to the phenomenal
part of the breakup, as it was in relation to the Velvet Revolution resembling
a kind of revolving theatrical stage (or "refoolation" as suggested
above).[8]
The beginning of the whole process
of dissolving and "delegitimizing" the common state could be traced
to as early as November 1989, when the thesis of the
"non-authenticity" of the existing federation had been launched and
then intensively promoted - paradoxically, especially by the Czech side (Havel,
Pithart, Klaus).[9] Paradoxically, the authorship of
unauthenticity of the state was claimed by its "authentic" head,
Vaclav Havel. This was certainly an
unprecedented phenomenon when such a high official supposed to draw his powers
from one political entity asserts that the entity itself which he is to
represent is "unauthentic" or "unnatural."[10]
Apparently, it is, therefore, to be seen as another evidence of the gravity of
the nihilistic sickness.
On 25 January 1990, in the Polish
Parliament, Havel reminded the audience that he is an "author of absurd
plays with inconspicuously bad ends."[11] On
January 23, 1990, Havel "ambushed," as Jicinsky characterized it, the
state and the parliament with his unified package of provocative proposals on
the change of the state name and symbols. According to Jicinsky, Havel did not
reveal his intentions or the content of his proposals to any representative of
parliament before his speech. He only insisted that his proposals be
immediately accepted. This speech by Havel made the Czecho-Slovak conflict and
separation a matter of public politics and initiated the notorious 'hyphenated'
war over the new name of the state and state symbols that was, therefore, but
an artificial product of politicking presented as a seeming failure or error.[12] To this
effect, Havel claimed that "perceiving Czechoslovak statehood and
identifying themselves with it" were to be viewed as "a deformed
perception."[13]
Justifying this initiative, Havel acknowledged that the creation of new state
symbols and related quarrels represented a "drastic intervention into the
national and state consciousness," that Havel, however, posted as
necessary; "because of different reasons," Havel said, "I consider this period to be the
beginning of a new historic era that deserves such a radical expression [of new
symbols]."[14] Besides
dealing with the allegedly "deformed" perception of the people, this
battle over 'a hyphen' actually became a beginning of dismantling the state.[15] The
prevailing mood among the Czechoslovak populace at the time was a feeling of
bewilderment and bafflement over the scolasticism and ostensible lack of reason
on the part of the parliament and leadership. Shortly after, in Toronto on
February 19, 1990, Havel announced a "very important task to separate the
consciousness [of the people] in the Czech lands from the consciousness of
Czechoslovak statehood" because, "in the consciousness of the Czechs,
Czech statehood had been dangerously integrated with Czechoslovak
statehood;" and "it would be wonderful for both nations to have their
own national organizations and structures," including "political ones
at least."[16] On the
same occasion, during a meeting with Czech emigrants, Havel stated as a matter
of fact that Slovakia would break away.[17] At that
time, perhaps only a very small number of the ordinary citizens would suspect
or imagine anything similar to happen in the near time to come. On February 25,
1990, Havel explained the puzzling decision of the elite to have another
election again in two years (1992) in the following way: "In two years ...
new and more natural territorial breakup of the country will be created ... I,
however, recommend that [democracy] be checked up in two years to make it
certain."[18]
In addition to heading the drive of the new
political elite in claiming the Heideggerian "unauthenticity" of the
federation (or what would be its alleged "irrationality" and, thus,
"unreality" in a Hegelian sense), Havel basked in a rhetoric that was
defaming the nature of the state which he represented.[19] This
was quite unusual and unprecedented a political practice when a highest state
official openly questions the legitimacy and sensibility of the state. Havel's
comments were as much hyperbolically abusive as false:
We behave towards members of
other nations or ethnic groups that live with us in way that to do the same
with regard a black co-citizen would be inconceivable to any white in New York
... Many Slovaks consider the Czechs as their colonizers, and many Czechs
consider the Slovaks as an appendix which complicates their life.[20]
A summary and review of these
derogatory statements are presented in Havel's Summer Meditations (1992). Havel renders there his
"understanding to the aversion of the Slovaks to be ruled from somewhere
outside [Prague]." Havel emphasizes
this even further by claiming that in their history the Slovaks "have been
always under somebody's else rulership," thus dismissing the Czechoslovak
federation and his own presidency as being also shared by the Slovaks.[21] In this
regard, Havel, effectively fomenting a Slovak alienation, went to assert that
"for many Slovaks it is less important if they are under a good or bad
rule, with their participation or without it, with or without a consideration
of their interests (sic), than a bare fact that is from somewhere else."[22] In
making these inflammatory statements, Havel hid himself behind his references
to alleged Slovak opinions or gossips and was putting in the mouth of the
Slovaks what he apparently could not promote as his own conviction in a more
open and direct way. In addition, these
Slovak "views" were usually blown out of proportion, torn away from the historical context or
represented as the position of the whole nation while, as in the case of the
separatist demands, they were shared only about some fifteen per cent of the
Slovaks until the very moment of the split, so that this was creating an
impression as if Havel was acting as their unacknowledged spokesperson.[23] So, for
example, referring to the Slovaks, Havel spoke about perceiving the federation
as a Czech trick and invention (despite all the recent historical data) that intended to restrict Slovak
sovereignty. Similarly, the Slovaks were presented by Havel as "always
neglected, overlooked" and "condemned to live in the shadow of their
bigger and stronger brother."[24] Havel
himself explained his depreciating of the common state, asserting that "it
is not from the sociological or political point of view important to what
extent and when these feelings were correct, but it is important that they
simply existed and exist."[25] As M.
Neudorfl stated, Havel was thereby "actually encouraging in his speeches
the Slovak nationalist sentiment and ignored the positive achievements of the
two nations in Czechoslovakia."[26] This
attitude-tactics was also observed by Theodor Draper who noted that Havel was
positing as a fact his idea that it was a Czech "egoism" and
"contempt" that "forced the Slovaks to cease considering Czechoslovakia
as their country."[27]
Further, Havel also initiated and
legitimized the ignoring of the federal parliament, later a subject of his open
attacks, and of the federal constitution in the process of the breakup by
summoning both republican governments
without the federal one to a "common working session" to his
residence in Lany on April 11, 1990. There, it was established that the
"primacy, sovereignty and integrity of the national republics"
(versus the federation), being de facto an
unconstitutional act, be the decisive principle for all the subsequent
negotiations. This was justified by claiming that the hitherto state
arrangement and, thus, also the valid constitution "did not respect
fully" some undefined "authentic principles of the federation."[28] This
was later followed by other meetings of the governments, including then the
federal executive, organized or sponsored by Havel who thereby
"transferred the debate on unconstitutional fora, away from the Federal
Assembly."[29] In
September 1990, Havel had to admit publicly that the presidentially sponsored
negotiations on the division of powers in the federation, held in the summer of
1990, "led to suspicions and sometimes even to doubts about the future of
our federal state."[30] By
enforcing the issue of the split, the political elite de facto ambushed with this agenda the two nations: only 12 per
cent of the Slovaks and 11 per cent of Czechs thought in September 1990 that
Slovakia and Bohemia should separate.[31] The
rationale of the 'hastily made' decision to hold elections as early as two
years after those in 1990 is also pertinent in the light of the subsequent
termination of the state. The validity of available indications that the Czech
part had been heading for separation as early as 1990, was later also
reconfirmed by Meciar.[32] Later,
Meciar also announced that, at least since December 1990, the Czech had already
a secret timetable for separating the state programmed with a precision even up
to concrete days and hours.
The population was unable to
understand their own leaders. Two years later, when most citizens demanded a
referendum, it was the leaders who could not come to terms with the rationality
of such national will. They argued that holding a referendum would be 'too
expensive,' 'untimely', 'too complicated' or that "a man from the street
cannot decide such an important question,"[33] and
that it would be impossible to compose the right question and even to rightly
decipher the people's [right] answer. When the fate of Czechoslovakia was
decided from above, only 16 percent of people in both republics favoured the
same.[34]
Finally, it was simply proclaimed that a referendum on the future of
Czechoslovakia "no longer made any sense" (Havel).[35]
Moreover, in foreshadowing his forthcoming resignation, Havel claimed against
all the facts to the contrary that he "cannot impose the federation on a
nation [the Slovaks] which does not want to live in it,"[36] while
preventing the same nation from expressing its true position.
Clearly, it was not the nation which
did not want the common state, but importantly the political elite. In
addition, Havel himself was aware that the breakup ordered from above was not
only contrary to the will of both the Czechs and Slovaks but was a negation and
denial of the whole previous national being of both nations and their
statehood: "The divorce would be a denial of the will of all the previous
generations, denial of the common work of our Czech and Slovak predecessors and
rejection of the ideals that stood at the foundation of our common state."[37] This
slighting of reason by the political representation probably made Dienstbier
denote the split as "inevitable irrationality."[38] And
curiously, as Young noted, "there seemed to have been little pressure from
abroad to settle the issue through a referendum."[39]
A very important impetus for
widening and legitimizing the mood for separation was brought about by Havel's
'address to the Slovaks' in Bratislava, the Slovak capital, which was delivered
on March 14, 1991, on the anniversary of the 14th of March 1939, when the "Slovak Independent
State" was declared under the patronage of Hitler.[40] In a
relatively short speech (covering slightly over two pages), Havel stated that
the Slovaks had "a unique chance to make freely for the first time in their history their own decision [my italics]" about their own state and
national sovereignty; and, according to Havel, such a chance "should not
be wasted away":
It is not up to anybody else but
only to you, citizens of the Slovak
Republic, how you decide that you
fulfill your longing for national
sovereignty ... There is much
[evidence] that a majority of the Slovaks wish just such a development - a
majority that is perhaps less loud, but is considerate and thinks in a long
term perspective.[41]
The whole speech of Havel boiled
down to a steady reiteration of this appeal. Havel's urging that the Slovaks
"should make such a decision" was stressed fifteen times. The same
message was additionally reinforced by another fifteen similarly worded
imperatives; at the same time, the word "Czechoslovak" was completely
avoided and was not uttered at all. Havel further described the federation as
"pseudofederation," "necessary evil," "a brake on the
development of its members," "a burden" and "a source of
complications." Havel then offered to extend a prior full consent to a
Slovak decision to separate from the Czechs. He wound up his speech with a
prophetic: "God is watching you, and I hope that we will not ask him to
forgive us in years to come."[42]
Interestingly, the then Czech
Minister of Finance (then Federal Deputy Finance Minister under Klaus), I.
Kocarnik, ordered stamps for the separation of a single Czechoslovak currency
as early as 1991.[43] In May
1991, upon its own initiative, the Czech National Council discussed the
scenarios for separation. The Slovak part followed suit. By mid-1991 both
republican governments had separation plans
ready, detailed down to the division of federal assets.[44] In this
regard, a Canadian analyst, Robert Young, argued that normally the state
authorities "cannot readily acknowledge the possibility of fragmentation
before it occurs, even to the point of commissioning reports and contemplating
scenarios."[45] On July
17, 1991, M. Macek, the then vice-chairman of the later ruling Civic Democratic
Party and Czechoslovak vice-premier, indicated that the ruling Civic Democratic
Party identified itself with the separation of the state.[46] On
November 17, 1991, Havel launched a direct appeal to the citizens to support
his own position against the powers of the parliament and government, tying
this together with his apparent concern about the federation.[47] Shortly
beforehand, Havel implied that the citizens should be "given an
opportunity" to speak their mind at
least as far as the broadening of his own powers is concerned.[48] This
untimely and isolated action on Havel's part aroused and also effectively
pre-emptied people's sincere enthusiasm and involvement. The parliament,
government and Havel himself ignored the result of this initiative, as said above,
manifested in over 2,500,00 signatures. Understandably, the effect was a
dissuasion and discouragement of the misled people. Such a tactic is known from
ancient times. As an ancient Chinese strategist stressed:
Bravery in battle is a matter of
energy. Once energy is drummed up, a second try makes it wane, and it
disappears at the third. They were exhausted while we were full, so we overcame
them.[49]
This is also exactly what happened.
When people's resistance and energy was needed most - in the summer of 1992 -
it was coincidentally a time of vacations, and their previous lesson was a
sheer uselessness of their action. Admittedly, at that time, most people shared
a high trust in Havel and relied on his guidance. This prevented them from an
effective independent resistance (compare the section on war strategy below).
Furthermore, on the part of the elite, there was nobody of any serious clout or
interest who was in a position to organize and direct people's counter-action.
On May 12, 1992, speaking to Slovak
citizens in Bratislava during the fatal election campaign of 1992, Havel again
stated that it was better to separate than to indulge in a "never-ending
confusion caused by the cowardly inability of politicians to say what they are
up to."[50] On June
25, 1992, when the split was already being openly negotiated by Klaus and
Meciar, Havel resorted to an unspecified looming threat when, speaking in the
Czechoslovak Parliament, he warned against
"all forms of resistance" because otherwise:
we will all and everybody have to
pay for it very dearly and very soon, when the interest charged will be so high
that you will be shocked ... A serious and profound historical process is
involved here; it has a thousand aspects that you could understand only after a
certain time ... It is about matters that are too serious ...[51]
In the meantime, Havel had to
dispense somehow with his oath sworn to the Czechoslovak state. He used the
Slovak formal manifestation of sovereignty, adopted on July 17, 1992, as the
opportunity to resign prematurely, thus clearing the scene - within an hour
after the Slovak Assembly's vote.[52] His
resignation, Havel expressly justified by his inability to stand up to his oath
to the state and the constitution because it would not be "any longer in
accordance with his [private] nature, conviction and conscience."[53] In this
way, his responsibility and obligation towards the state was sacrificed
relatively easily and somewhat opportunely for the sake of his own private
preferences. On this occasion, Havel also lauded his own character: he resigned
because "simply, the society has not been able to stand up to [his own]
moral mirror."[54] Shortly
afterwards, , Havel stated in an interview for Time (August 3, 1992) that "he does not have any emotional bounds
towards the Czechoslovak state.[55] As
Young stressed, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus "encouraged and welcomed
the resignation of Havel as the last prominent Czech leader at the federation
level."[56] In this
connection, it is worth recalling what Vilem Hejl wrote in 1989 with regard to
the disassociation of the head of state, Edvard Benes, during the Munich deal:
What is an oath? ... to give to
the God one's soul as one's guarantee ... or to give it to those whom he
swears, and should he break his oath, his honor is forfeited and ceases to
exist ... Did [Benes] consider it as a simply promise that can be according to
circumstances disavowed, omitted or adjourned? If he did, it marked the coming
and further future of moral and legal norms, times when so much was forgotten
or debased - oath, honor, faithfulness degraded into words of merely
conditioned validity and binding force. A fateful mode of behavior was created.[57]
With regard to this final phase of
the dismantling of the state, it is peculiar to note that the principal
constitutional figures and institutions used unconstitutional methods either as
blackmail in relation to other state institutions or as direct means for
enforcing their program. On September 3, 1992, the liquidation federal executive
ordered that the three-fifth threshold of the votes in each of the three
chambers of the federal legislature required for any constitutional change be
reduced to a simple majority of deputies at the republican level, forcing the
federal legislative body out of decision-making.[58] Klaus
threatened to declare Czech independence "if the Slovaks would drag
on," making it clear that he would not hesitate, in contravention to the
constitutional order, to bypass the Federal Assembly using his command of a
narrow majority in the Czech chamber. He portrayed resisting deputies as
"disloyal" and "obstructionists" and precluded "any
substantive debate on the Czech-Slovak union as an alternative."[59] As
Young stressed, "at this point, it was Klaus who was willing to threaten
[with] a non-constitutional separation."[60] Havel
publicly supported the course of Vaclav Klaus, as well as the idea to ignore
the federal legislature because, as he claimed, "in such a situation a
legal puritanism has no importance."[61] Havel
also attacked the last-minute resistance of federal deputies as "divisive
and disruptive."[62] Again
later, on November 17, 1992, Havel announced that he would run for the Czech
presidency at a moment when no post of this kind yet existed, nor the end of
the federation was yet official, and no constitution of the Czech Republic
existed.[63]
Consequently, the easiness with which Havel terminated his obligations to the
Czechoslovak state corresponded to that he demonstrated by announcing his
candidacy for another post of president. Coincidentally, Havel made this
declaration of his intent one day before a crucial vote in the Czechoslovak
parliament on allowing the breakup, thus, placing the deputies under an
additional pressure not to run against his manifest will.[64] On
November 10, 1992, the Czech republican legislature passed a resolution
assuming "full responsibility" for the Czech Republic, ignoring the
powers of federal authorities and the federal constitution. In addition, the
two political parties ruling in both republics with 30 percent of votes issued
their public threats to dissolve the federation unconstitutionally.[65] On
November 25, 1992, the Federal Assembly passed the dissolution law with a
majority of one and two votes, respectively, beyond the designated thresholds.[66]
Symbolically, Vaclav Klaus attended the parliamentary session hobbling on
crutches. To formally clear this "constitutionally doubtful breakup,"[67] the
deputies were encouraged by a government-made promise that they would be seated
in non-existing republican Senates for the rest of their lives. During the
whole process, the media also played a crucial role in disciplining and even
"brainwashing" the populace and precluding the articulation and
promotion of a pro-Czechoslovak platform.[68]
Subsequent analyses undertaken by
different authors independently came to the conclusion that the breakup of
Czechoslovakia was executed undemocratically, illegitimately and without an
evident mandate.[69] In this regard, the political elites in
both republics were said to carry the responsibility for it.[70] At the moment when most people in both
republics were clearly saddened by the forthcoming breakup, on the eve of the
anniversary of Czechoslovak independence, V. Havel spoke to his co-patriots
about "the necessity to turn the fruit of this harvest into a new
sowing" because "[we] have sown well and have watered well," and
"life is a joyful participation in the miracle of being."[71] On December 10, 1990, when he tried to
use the Czecho-Slovak question to have his presidential powers expanded (a
constant drive of Havel's), Havel spoke a different tune, although apparently
correctly:
if
we made possible that all this [the breakup] happens ... we would enter into
the records of history of our nations as the first generation in their history
which, without being exposed to any inadvertent [public] pressure from outside,
prepared with their own blindness a unbounded and long-term suffering (sic). I
dare to say that the next generations would curse us, and that the world
community would declare us mad.[72]
It is the international aspect and
possible repercussions of this "joyful sowing" that concern our
present analysis. In particular, the relevant statements of Czech leaders are
worth reviewing. There is a consensus on the part of the Czech leadership that
the breakup should be viewed as part of a broader framework. In his speech to
the Polish Parliament in January 1990, Vaclav Havel had expressed his
appreciation of a new Mitteleuropa as
a meaningful filling of "the great political vacuum that appeared in
Central Europe after the break-up of the Hapsburg empire," describing it
as a "political" project that has today a "real historic
chance."[73] Havel
had further indicated that the split of Czechoslovakia would in principle
entail a "breakdown of all guarantees of the inviolability of her
borders."[74]
Clearly, Havel himself had no doubts about the repercussions. Moreover, Havel
also correctly defined the new ensuing danger for the Czech state that was to
be facilitated and "legitimized" by the breakup (in the spirit of
Pithart's thesis - see, below). At a time when he was already contemplating his
resignation,[75] he
stated:
The breakup of the state would
also mean an actual loss of defense ability of both republics (a circumstance
especially serious in the situation of
questioned state borders [by whom?]. From the standpoint of security, it
would be consequently a really hazardous act.[76]
Havel further strengthened this
projection by stressing that "certainly, it would be a very painful step
with long-term tragic consequences for both republics." In this regard, as
Havel put it, the Czechs and Slovaks alike should "get rid of their
illusions."[77] What
does Havel's notion of "illusion" include? It can be presumed that
the answer is to be sought along the demands of Böhmisch nihilism, as stated
above in programs of Uhl, Pithart and Havel himself. When a law on the ways of
terminating the federation was not passed on October 1, 1992, in the federal
parliament that thus hindered the process of breakup, the then federal Primer Minister
J. Strasky declared: "This is an unfavourable signal, especially for the
world and the European Union."[78] After
the breakup, Klaus compared the advent of a separate Czech entity to a state of
"post-operational narcosis" and spoke about it as "a
geopolitical tragedy."[79]
However, in the view of Deputy Foreign Minister Pavel Bratinka, "the
breakup of Czechoslovakia was the only viable way to preserve stability in
Central Europe," whereby the Czech elite allegedly rendered "a great service
to Europe."[80]
In this light, the views and
concepts of Czech leaders concerning the (future) Czech statehood (its value
and nature) are worthy of attention. Adopting the German term Verkleinerung (diminishing, cutting
down, belittling) for denoting the Czechoslovak breakup,[81] Klaus
implied that the new Czech state could be seen as "a somehow compensatory
and temporary arrangement, a state residue."[82] In this
regard, the future of this Czech state may also be "a provisional,
temporary and compensatory solution."[83] Some
time earlier, Havel had also declared that the Czech people "little
appreciated their own republic as a sensible expression of their
existence."[84]
The Czech ex-Prime Minister Pithart
set the tone, arguing in his analysis of the split that the Czech state was
"commonly seen as an unwanted child." Moreover, in Pithart's view, the nation as a concept is the property
of the poor: for one's identification and existence, wealth is sufficient.
Consequently, the nation is (to be)
rejected as an identification (for the Czechs). In Pithart's view, region replaced nation. "Regions" (should) attempt to free themselves
from the state (in Pithart's words: "deetatization of the Czech
Republic") in the process of "their disintegrating by rich
regions," thereby "securing for themselves a special status."[85] As a
result of this political regrouping, the internal setup of the Czech Republic
should be "less advantageous" than connections inside "new
regions." In fact, this had already been achieved to a great extent in the
frontier areas of the Czech Republic from where many thousands of people daily
commuted to labour in Germany, after the local Czech industries declined under
the "laissez-faire" policies of the government. According to Pithart,
moreover, current state frontiers should be reduced to "merely
hypothetical lines." The power of the existent Czech state will weaken in
the same measure. Furthermore, the existing national education should
"virtually melt" in the framework of the new "regional"
setup.
What Pithart calls "Czech
nationalism" has to be radically "cut off from its roots."[86]
Significantly, the former Czech Prime Minister himself associates such a
program with a revision of the Munich deal of 1938 that, allegedly, because of
the split of Czechoslovakia, should now be seen "from a new
perspective." In Pithart's view, Czechoslovakia was an "artificial
state," "unviable creation," "fastidious task" and
"mistake" "fortuitously" born in 1918 out of the will of
the great powers and "hard-to-please imagination of a cosmopolitan"
T.G. Masaryk with a provincial background. The Munich deal of 1938 so
"desatanized" by Pithart is then nothing more than a fault of the
Czechs - "the Germans have always told us that." In Pithart's view,
the breakup of Czechoslovakia confirms de
facto that the Czechoslovak state was an "error," implying that
the "fastidious task" of sustaining a common state had been
sacrificed by the Czechs for the sake of "having more meat than the
Slovaks have and more meat than we had with the Slovaks." He concludes
that the situation of the Slovaks and the treatment of the Sudeten Germans in
the 1930s (and the Munich deal) were results of the same "faulty [Czech]
national policy." The only solution left for the Czechs is seen in a
multiregional Mitteleuropa based
"not only on economics."[87]
Similarly, on the state anniversary
of 28 October in 1990, V. Havel declared that there is "a legitimate
question of whether the decision of our predecessors [to found an independent
Czechoslovakia] was also free and whether it was also right."[88] At the
OSCE summit in Helsinki on 9 July 1992, Havel, still in the capacity of
Czechoslovak President, indicated that Czechoslovakia was "already
overcome by the dynamics of history."[89] Lately,
those ideas have been intensively expanded and elaborated by the media and
other members of the Czech elite.
Jiri Valenta, a Director of the
Czech foreign ministry's Institution of International Relations, also holds in
his analysis of the Czechoslovak breakup that on the part of the Czech
Republic, there is "a less evident taste for statehood," and that
neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia are capable of "reliably defending
themselves."[90] In this
regard, as early as 1 January 1990, Havel declared: "As Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, I want to be a guarantor that the security of our state
will never again be a pretext for anybody to thwart courageous peace
initiatives ..."[91] With
regard to such a "peace drive" sacrificing the state and its
security, Miroslav Vacek, the former Czechoslovak Defence Minister, said that
those who stood in the Czech Republic behind the separation were well aware
that it would undermine the stability of the Czech Republic itself - also by
losing the defence industry of Slovakia.[92] This
conscious weakening of the security of the state was continued after the
breakup as well.[93] It is
noteworthy that, since the breakup unto the time of writing this work, the
Czech government elaborated no defence doctrine of the state. In 1993, Vaclav
Klaus, the prime minister, justifying the lack of security strategy of the
state, claimed in this regard that "the defence doctrine is not a document
that is to be approved by the government."[94] By the
end of April 1996, Klaus still maintained that "we [the government of the
nation?] have not yet misfired in anything," while the current Czech
constitution completely ignores defence and security issues of the state.[95]
In this regard, it is peculiar that,
in negotiating the breakup, it was the Czech side that systematically kept
rejecting (sometimes even as a "joke") all Slovak proposals for any
kind of mutual military and economic union.[96] The
desperate and vain efforts of the Slovak government to preserve as much as
possible from the former joint defense system and strategy indicate that the
Slovak party tried to offset or at least mitigate the geopolitical and security
ramifications of the split, being cognizant of the fact that the split would
place an independent Slovakia relatively further to the East while the Czechs drifted
away from Slovak friendship somewhere else.[97] Klaus
explicitly declared:
the current abandoning of the federation is in the interest of both parties.
Projects of confederation, union or some alliance amount to forcing one part of
the present federation into the political, economic, national and possible
'neighbouring' problems of the other part, and this can be very dangerous.[98]
Sometimes, one has to appreciate the openness
of Czech politicians insomuch as the public does not listen to speeches nor
read articles of their leaders. For example, Pithart admitted once more:
At present, the problem of a
previous lack of legitimacy [of the breakup - that is, post factum] is being resolved. In order to lessen the number of
those who still regret the dissolution of the federation, the relationship
between the two states is often artificially
worsened ... As a result, today, the prospect of some new rapprochement is
clearly an illusion.[99]
All the available evidence seem to
confirm that the breakup of the country 1) was a conscious and long striving of
the Czech political elite and partial fulfilment of the previously declared
programs (Petr Uhl, Petr Pithart) imposed against the will of the Czechs and
even against that of the Slovaks; 2) was not an expression of the
"authentic" will of the elite themselves in a sense of its
subordination to external factors; and 3) was not as such a final destination
in the revamping of the region of Central Europe as being part of broader
strategic visions that are basically in accordance with the dynamics of the
nihilistic making of the Universal and Homogeneous State. In this light, the
breakup was a maturation of a long-term Böhmisch nihilism aimed against the
Czechoslovak statehood and concept of the Czech nation, but not its uppermost
culmination. Apparently, the objects of following attacks are to be the Czech
state itself and finally the nation. The said also points towards a radical
alienation of the Böhmisch elite from the nation and its state. Further, the
analysis also indicates that apparent "failures" of the political
elite bear more of a character of realized pre-conceived plans and designs than
merely their inability to cope with the problems that they have themselves
created. And again, the findings reveal a strong continuous progression and
consistency of the goals and demands whose nature points towards their
determinative nihilistic undercurrent. In this way, Böhmisch nihilism is
pervading different political phenomena whose essence, however, remains not only
hostile to the notion of the state and the nation, but it also brings about the
political mortification of the state and nation.
In this light, it might be seen as
the Hegelian end of history in making, which appears to include conscious
long-term efforts to realize the end of Czech statehood and nation. The formal
flag or cipher-name of that nihilism does not seem to matter so much in this
regard - with one important reservation: such nihilism clearly tends to partake
in two basic modes - in Communism (Marxism) or National Socialism whose
apparently strange intertwined (personal, political, economic) relationship was
present in varying forms in the course of the examined stages of Böhmisch
nihilism. Both forms (Communism and Nazism) also conspicuously converge in what
can be defined by Arendt's term of totalitarianism where crime is the law, and
tyranny of death of man and nation qua political
dignified beings is sought on the way to its global, planetary rule. In this
regard, the post-1989 and post-breakup articulation and evolution of concepts
and politics by the elite with regard to the state and nation provide important
further evidence and insights in the unfolding dynamics of Böhmisch nihilism as
an important part of the overall design and drive.
1 [1]
Cited in a CBC report on the split emitted on the French channel of the CBC at
23.-24.00 on 20.9.1995.
2 [2]
See, the account of the leaders' meeting in Brno on 7 July 1992 in Robert
Young, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia,
Research paper No. 32, (Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's
University: Kingston, 1994), p. 35. Also Rudiger Kipke and Karel Vodicka, eds.,
Rozlouceni s Ceskoslovenskem: priciny a
dusledky cesko-slovenskeho rozchodu, (Praha: Patriae, 1993), p. 110.
5 [5]
Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko
1990 - 1992), (Hodonin: Pedagogicke stredisko, cerven 1995), p. 59.,. Uhde's
attitude may be contrasted with his explanation of how he became a dissident:
"I was suffering from habits of a prominent from the 1960s, and if they
had been treating me only slightly better, they would have won me." [Milan
Uhde, Ceska republiko, dobry den,
(Praha: Atlantis, 1995), p. 8] Notably, Havel is also the author of the concept
of "light violation of parliamentary
customs" [law] and "relative popular consensus" that was applied
during the process of dismantlement of Czechoslovakia from above. [See in Z.
Jicinsky, Cs. parlament v polistopadovem
obdobi, op. cit., pp. 112 ftn. and 111] Needless to say, Milan Uhde himself
as a public and political figure has a history going back to the Communist
regime of the 1950s. Jicinsky's comment in this regard is significant: "In
the creation of the independent Czech republic ... the ruling coalition has put
into the foundation of the new Czech state something very dangerous, that is,
contempt for the will of the citizens." Again, this statement well
summarizes the misery of the continuity of Böhmisch nihilism. [Z. Jicinsky, Cs. parlament v polistopadovem obdobi,
op. cit., p. 34] In this regard, one may also compare this refusal to consult
the voice of the people with Havel's words addressed to the people gathered
in demonstration in Prague on November
25, 1989 where Havel criticized the Communist leaders because "[these]
representatives of the state claim that the problems of this country cannot be
discussed in the street [that is, directly with citizens]." Almost exactly
what Uhde repeated later, although from the point of view of "these
representatives of the state." [M. Otahal and Z. Sladek, Deset prazskych dnu, op. cit., p. 464]
In his New Years's address of 1993, when the breakup of the state had already
taken place, Milan Uhde took the courage to reassert that "a free citizen
is the guarantee of [democratic] conditions." [Lidove noviny, January 4, 1993, p. 3] When the politicians started
openly working on the dismantlement of the state, the Czechoslovak citizens
were demanding not only a referendum (82 per cent in Slovakia and 66 per cent
in the Czech Republic), but also new parliamentary elections (60 percent of the
Czechoslovak citizens); this idea was supported even by 51 per cent of those
who voted for the ruling Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Vaclav Klaus.
[Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15
milionu, (Praha: Prazska imaginace, 1993), pp. 6, 87] In July 1994,one and half a year after the
split, only 35% of the Slovaks supported the preservation of the independent
Slovak state, while more than 50% of them regret the division of the
Czechoslovak state. [Lidove noviny, June 21, 1994, p. 1]
6 [6]
On February 25, 1990, Vaclav Havel declared: "[We] only want that the
people and anybody else have the leading role in reality, not only on
paper." [Vaclav Havel, Projevy
(leden - cerven 1990), op. cit., p. 67]
7 [7]
Dusan Slobodnik, "Hra o
republiku" in Tazky, Mnacko, Kalisky, Vnuk, Comaj, Kalny, Smolec, Simecka,
Veres, Slobodnik, Varos, Hric, Minac, Horuce
temy: Slovensko v ringu,
(Bratislava: Tatrapress, 1991), pp.
99-106. With regard to the official policy of the Czech politicians, which was
detrimental to Slovakia and their backstage manoeuvring, a revealing piece of
evidence was provided by a former economist of the federal government,
Frantisek Dvorak. It also sheds some light on the possible broader strategic
context of the whole operation, especially in relation to large quantities of
armament and aviation transferred to Slovakia before the breakup. Thus, while
the convergence program of military industry enhanced unemployment in Slovakia
and, thus, caused manifest displacements and damage, the amount of money
transfers to Slovakia in 1991-1992 increased in comparison with generous
long-term subsidies for Slovakia under the Communist regime 2-3 times - by
50-70 billion crowns per year. This can be truly appreciated only in the light
of the previous intensive Communist industrialization of Slovakia, that was
largely oriented on the creation of defence industry. [Frantisek Dvorak,
Slavomir Ravik, Jiri Teryngel, Zaloba
aneb Bila kniha k patemu vyroci 17. listopadu 1989, (Praha: Periskop,
1994), p. 128] This information of unusually high amounts of financial
transfers that drastically increased in 1990-1992 was confirmed by a former
Czech minister of education, Petr Vopenka, who claimed that the amount
surpassed in 1992 all the Slovak expenditures on all the forms of education
starting from kinder-gartens to universities. [Lidove noviny, November 20, 1992, p. 8]
8 [8]
In this regard, it is notable that Vaclav Benda, a Czech political leader after
1989, already mentioned above, was heard to declare merely for hours after
swearing his allegiance to the Czechoslovak state that "the mission of the
federal parliament is to liquidate the federation." [Slavomir Ravik, Bylo - nebylo: Tento zpusob leta, (Praha: Periskop, srpen 1995), p. 31]
9 [9]
See, for example, Vaclav Havel, Vazeni
obcane, Projevy cervenec 1990 - cervenec 1992, (Lidove noviny: Praha,
1992),p. 27. In his speech to the Federal Parliament on 17 September 1990,
Havel advocated the need for the Slovaks to "realize their national
sovereignty politically or in any other way and make their existence visible on
the international scene in any possible way." Ibid., p. 193: "I do
not intend to leave my citizens alone ... [but] no state has for me a supreme
value." See also Vaclav Klaus, Rok:
malo ci mnoho v dejinach zeme, (Praha: Repro-media, 1993), p. 66. See also
Dienstbier's similar arguments in Dienstbier, op. cit., p. 25. Havel made his
first announcement on the "non-authenticity" of the state in his
address in Bratislava on 22 November 1989. See Martin Butora and Zora Butorova,
"Neznesitelna lahkost rozchodu," in Kipke, op. cit., p. 137.
Actually, the Manifesto of the Movement for Civic Freedom published on October
15, 1988 prepared by the Charter 77 already advanced the idea of (ir)relevance
of the federation and the idea of
"a true sovereignty" (sic) of the single republics instead
that of the federation as the expression of
the alleged "authentic" aspirations of the Czechs and Slovaks.
This already indicated a translation of Uhl's and Pithart's programs and
Havel's plays into an immediate plan of action. Ironically, the deluding idea
of "authenticity" (in fact amounting to a negation) was presented
under the title "National Sovereignty."[H. Gordon Skilling and Paul
Wilson, eds., Civic Freedom in Central
Europe: Voices from Czechoslovakia,
(London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 142]
10[10]
Vaclav Havel, Letni premitani, op.
cit., p. 28. Consequently, the dissolution of the state first started by
redefining its predicate, using Heideggerian language of authenticity to this
effect, then by depriving it of its traditional name to negate its very being
at the end.
12[12]
Z. Jicinsky, Cs. parlament v
polistopadovem obdobi, op. cit., pp. 106-107, see also ibid., pp. 108-109.
Cf. Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 -
1992), (Hodonin: Pedagogicke stredisko , cerven 1995), p. 5.
13[13]
Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, op.
cit., p. 30. The same idea was also later shared and reinforced by Klaus. See,
Klaus, op. cit., p. 68: Klaus dismissed Czechoslovakia as being an expression
or form of Czech statehood. On the "deformed perception" of the
alleged deformed perception of citizens and the refutation of Havel's
denunciation of the federation as an "administratively complicated way of
totalitarian ruling" see Zdenek Jicinsky, Cs. parlament v polistopadovem obdobi, op. cit., pp. 26-27. Havel
himself was, of course, as federal president the highest representative of that
federation.
14 In the aftermath of Havel's proposals,
Pithart became the Czech Prime Minister and, on February 6, 1990, declared as part of his program that
the Czech government become "a strong counterpart" to the federative
state because the Czech lands had not been allegedly reconciled yet
(accustomed) with the fact that they are an independent republic. Pithart's
government thus was set up to "renew Czech statehood." This was one
rare moments when Pithart expressed a keen interest in 'Czech statehood.' [See
Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko
1990 - 1992), (Pedagogicke stredisko: Hodonin, cerven 1995, pp. 5-6]
16[15]
Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15
milionu aneb jak vyhovet Murphyho zakonum, op. cit., pp. 9, 21. See also
Zdenek Jicinsky, "Ke ztroskotani ceskoslovenskeho federalismu" in
Rudiger Kipke, op. cit, p. 69.
19[18]
Vaclav Havel, Projevy (leden - cerven
1990), op. cit., p. 69. This was immediately followed by Havel's demand to
abolish the death sentence. [Ibid., p. 70]
20[19]
See, for example, Vaclav Havel, Vazeni
obcane, op. cit., p. 30: "Everything
federal is marked by previous sour experience ... the high degree of
nonconfidence of the Slovaks towards the federal institutions, moreover so
geographically distant from them [200-400 kilometres - author's comment], is more than understandable," said the
federal president on 17 September 1990. Ibid., p. 56: Havel, recalling
Masaryk's dictum that "states are sustained only by those ideals out of
which they were born," went to assert that "the situation of our
state ... does not reflect much from those past ideals."
21[20]
From Havel's speech delivered in Prague on February 25, 1990 on the anniversary
of the birth of T.G. Masaryk. [Vaclav Havel, Projevy (leden - cerven 1990), op. cit., p. 65]
23[22]
Ibid., p. 15. Here, in addition to denigrating the federation, Havel also
slandered the Slovaks. This was a common feature of his public speeches from
that time. Or how else can one understand that, after declaring his
"full" or "deep understanding" for the alleged Slovak hatred
and contempt of their "unauthentic" coexistence with the Czechs, he
defines this "fully legitimate will" at the same time as "a
primitive, xenophobic and in its consequences suicidal nationalism" of the
Slovaks? [See ibid., p. 17]
27[26]
Marie L. Neudorfl, "Vaclav Havel and the Ideal of Democracy," a paper
delivered at the Vth Congress for Central and East European Studies, Warsaw,
August 6-11, 1995, p. 15.
28[27]
Theodor Draper, "The End of Czechoslovakia", The New York Review of Books, No. XL, 3/1993: 15. Similarly, as
Draper pointed out, Petr Pithart was promoting an idea of the Czechs as being
"accustomed" to behave as "an arrogant older brother." [Ibid,
p. 15]
29[28]
See Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko
1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, p. 10. On Havel's
attack against the federal parliament, the highest body of the federation, see,
for example, ibid., pp. 48-49.
31[30]
Havel, Vazeni obcane, op. cit., p.
27. The possibility or prospect of a breakup was again announced by Havel in a speech to the Federal Assembly on 10
December 1990. See, Young, op. cit. p. 31.
34[33]
This statement also accusing a popular vote of being demagoguery was made by
Milan Uhde, who entered the circles of the Czechoslovak elite as early as the
1950s to be later demoted. Currently, he is Chairman of the Czech National
Parliament. See Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni
slavnost pro 15 milionu, op. cit., p. 84.
35[34]
The data is based on a poll made by an official Czechoslovak research
institution. Young, op. cit., p. 37. Significantly, one year after the breakup,
which was portrayed by Czech political leaders inside the country, as well as
abroad as the fulfillment of the wishes of the Slovak nation, a pool
established that sixty per cent of the Slovaks would still vote against the
split of Czechoslovakia while only 24 per cent consented with it; in March 1993
(three months after the breakup) only 14 per cent of the Slovaks supported the
move. [Slavomir Ravik, Bylo Nebylo v
listopadu 1993, (Praha: Alernativy, 1993), p. 49] In this light, Ravik
himself tended to consider the separation as a "high treason with all its
consequences." The "low identification of the Slovaks" with
their new state (23 per cent for the separation and 60 per cent against) was
also established by a sociological research conducted by the International
Politological Institute in Brno (Czech Republic) in October 15-25 1993. [Budovani statu: Aktualni problemy Slovenska
po rozpadu CSFR, (Brno: Mezinarodi politologicky ustav Masarykovy
univerzity, 1994), pp. 1-2] Moreover, those Slovaks who were in favour of
democracy overwhelmingly supported the idea of Czechoslovakia. In addition,
according to 58 per cent of the Slovaks, the new Slovak state should not draw
its continuity from the Slovak Independent State from World War II, while 20
per cent were of the opposite opinion. [Ibid., p. 2] With regard to the
warnings against "undemocratic" and "xenophobic" trends in
Slovakia made by the Czech politicians who worked on the breakup, it is also
interesting to note that "the principle of a 'strong hand' has less
supporters in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic" as embodied by Klaus's
government. [Ibid., p. 6]
38[37]
Ibid., p. 22. In this light, the breakup was also a radical revision of the
"ideals" of the Velvet Revolution itself which was a source of legitimacy of the new
political elite. In this connection, Dr.
Josef Sarka, an organizer of the original student demonstration against the
Nazi regime in 1939, who was also participated in the manifestation of November
17, 1989, came to consider the Velvet Revolution as a "betrayed
revolution": "what kind of democracy is it when people could not
speak their mind about the termination of the Czechoslovak state, and the separation
was approved by the deputies who swore their allegiance to the
federation?" [Slavomir Ravik, Bylo
Nebylo v listopadu 1993, (Praha:
Alernativy, 1993), p. 40]
41[40]
On that day, there were actually two meetings organized in Bratislava - one
openly separatist and another supporting the federation. Havel
"coincidentally", as R. Hovorka put it, participated in both of them.
[Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke
stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, p. 32]
44[43]
Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Je to ve
hvezdach, leden 1994, (Alternativy: Praha, 1994), p. 48.
47[46]
Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15
milionu, op. cit., p. 24. M. Macek retreated from his functions after a
revelation of his swindle with a privatized state property. On January 4, 1993,
a few days after the breakup, M. Macek boasted: "I feel well because it is
known about me that I had been pressing for the breakup of
Czechoslovakia." [Ibid., p. 25]
50[49]
Zhuge Liang and Liu Ji, Mastering the Art
of War (commentaries on the classic by Sun Tzu), (Boston & London:
Shambhalla, 1989), p. 124.
53[52]
Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15
milionu, op. cit., p. 14. Young, op. cit., p. 27. As Ravik emphasised,
Havel could stay as President in his office till 5 October 1992 and use all his
presidential powers for mobilizing support for a common state.
54[53]
Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko
1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, p. 55.
56[55]
Quoted in Slavomir Ravik, Bylo - nebylo:
Spolecnost trvale neudrzitelne blbosti, (Praha: Periskop, 1995), pp. 50-51. In 1990, Havel explained
his new candidacy for president by listening to a "voice of higher
responsibility" that "whispered to him that the job has not been
finished yet." In 1992, he abdicated and paved the way for separation.
[Slavomir Ravik, Totalni deziluze, op.
cit., p. 84]
64[63]
Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko
1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, p. 55.
68[67]
Rudiger Kipke, "Nejnovejsi politicky vyvoj v Ceskoslovensku v zrcadle
verejneho mineni" in Rudiger Kipke, op. cit., p. 55.
69[68]
See, for example, Zdenek Jicinsky, "Ke ztroskotani ceskoslovenskeho
federalismu" in Rudiger Kipke, op. cit., p. 71. And Martin Butora and Zora
Butorova, "Neznesitelna lahkost rozchodu," ibid., pp. 135, 139-140.
Actually, before this vote in the federal parliament took place, the employees
of the federal government had been deprived of radios, type-writers and other
logistic support because the material "delimitation" of the
federation had already gone ahead. [Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15 milionu, op. cit., p. 5]
70[69]
See contributions by Rudiger Kipke, Zdenek Jicinsky, Karel Vodicka and Petr
Pithart in Kipke, eds., op. cit., p. 53, 79-81, 98-100, 108-109, 225. Cf. an
analysis of a former Czechoslovak vice-premier, Pavel Rychetsky, in Lidove noviny, September 1, 1992, p. 8.
On October 1, 1992, the federal parliament did not accept a proposal on the
termination of the federation whereby it would de facto, contrary to the constitutional order, delegated the power
to dissolve the Czechoslovak state to national governments or parliaments. It
adopted a proposal of Milos Zeman (social-democrat) on the preparation of the
constitutional law on the transformation of the federation into a Czecho-Slovak
union. The presidium of the federal parliament with no lawmaking powers on its
own simply ignored this legally binding document, so did both republican
governments. However, the proposal itself appeared to essentially a disguised
exercise in misleading the public because "its last article was proposing
to abolish what the first recommended to establish;" in particular, it
read: "The Czecho-Slovak Union ceases to exist in a moment of the entry of
the Czech and Slovak republics into the European Union." [Pavel Tigrid, Jak to bylo, (Praha: Lidove noviny,
1993), p. 30] On November 5, 1992, the federal government submitted to the
federal parliament an addition to its program declaration containing a task to
terminate the federation by December 31, 1992, that was again as such
unconstitutional (de facto an attempt
to dissolve the state by the means of a merely procedural arrangement). This
was rejected. In normal conditions, this would have to entail the resignation
of the government and new elections.
Instead, the Czech government declared its full responsibility for the
state of affairs in the territory belonging to the Czech Republic, and, on
November 20, 1992, the Czech parliament established a Czech ministry of defence
and the office of Czech president while no Czech constitution existed, and matters of defence belonged exclusively
to the federation. At the same, both national governments hastily proceeded in
concluding a series of inter-state agreements that had the nonexistence of the
federation as its basic premise and, thus, stipulated such a situation.
Consequently, these agreements and actions had no legal ground. Their basis was
only the gentlemen's understanding and will of the two republican prime
ministers, Klaus and Meciar. Even, when a tiny majority of the deputies of the
federal parliament sanctioned the separation under pressure and threats of
Klaus, Meciar and Havel, they did so disregarding their own oaths to the
constitutional order of the Czechoslovak state. [See Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 -
1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, pp. 61, 63, 65-66] For
example. J. Kalvoda, the leader of a minor governmental party, the Civic
Democratic Alliance (ODA) representing only some 384,000 voters (around 5 per
cent) was one of the most ardent spokesman for the unconstitutional approach:
"ODA," he declared in a moment of a short-lived resistance of the
highest legislature,, "is not a supporter of such a mode of separation in
which the federal parliament would participate with its decisions,"
"in the process of the separation of the federation, the way by the means
of the federal parliament's decision is not needed ..." [Slavomir Ravik, Totalni deziluze, op. cit., p. 77]
71[70]
See contributions by Fedor Gal and Petr Pithart in Kipke, op. cit., pp 156,
162, 230-1. For Petr Pithart, that acknowledgement is somewhat paradoxical
because it was he who became an ardent partisan of the thesis that
Czechoslovakia had been artificial and a mistake from its very conception, and
as Czech Prime Minister (1990-1992) he prepared much of the ground for the
ensuing breakup.
73[72]
Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, Projevy
cervenec 1990 - cervenec 1992, (Praha: Lidove noviny, 1992), p. 56.
Needless to say, Havel made this statement before he reiteratively praised
himself that everything that he had ever written was right, and his beliefs were consequently thereby even strengthened.
74[73]
Paul G. Lewis, 'History, Europe and the Politics of the East', in Stephen
White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis, Eds., Developments
in East European Politics, (MacMillan: London, 1993), p. 268. On the
continuity of the project Mitteleuropa and its contemporary
context see a more detailed discussion below.
76[75]
See, for example, Vaclav Havel, Letni
premitani, op. cit., pp. 118-119, where he again elevates an allegiance to
"certain values" undefinable in a simple language as the main
criterion for his decision.
77[76]
Ibid., p. 24. Apparently, the elite achieved in this way a really Hegelian
synthesis of identity and non-identity - of the hazardous (detrimental,
self-denying) with the self-conscious.
79[78]
Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni
(Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995,
p. 61.
81[80]
Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Zlaty pist,
kveten 1994, (Alternativy: Praha, 1994), p. 37. As Zdenek Jicinsky stated, P. Bratinka together with D. Kroupa and other
deputies of the Civic Democratic Alliance and the Civic Democratic Party
"belonged to these members of parliament who did not publicly recognize
the federative arrangement of the state ... In one or another way, they
promoted unitarianism [clearly unacceptable as such to the Slovaks], and when
the Slovak side did not want to accept
it [as expected], they for the split." [Ibid., p. 37] Bratinka also called
attention to himself by advocating and arranging - after the split - a return
of property and citizenship to the Sudeten German aristocrats collaborating
with the Nazi regime. P. Bratinka
personally intervened on the side of the Waldsteins, the Bluchers, H. Salm, R.
Czernin, K.M. Arc etc. After they were granted citizenship "due to special
circumstances, all of them asked for return of
milliard-worth estates some of which were confiscated on the basis of collaboration
of their owners with the Fascists." [Slavimir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Zlaty pist, kveten 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994),
p. 24] Bratinka himself commented:
"Yes, some of their relatives [from which they derived their rights
for property in Bohemia] did collaborate with the Fascists. But why should they
suffer because of this?" This was apparently a dangerous attempt on the
part of the Böhmisch elite to break the legal post-war status by setting up
silently individual precedents. [Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo v rijnu 1993,
(Praha: Alternativy, 1993), p. 46] Klaus also supported this unfolding
of the post-breakup sequel in a perfect "dialectic" manner: "It
is not about reparation [or return of property to Sudeten Germans], but about
solving this problem that are two absolutely separate things." [Slavimir
Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Chaos nebo bordel?
unor 1994, (Praha: Alernativy,
1994), p. 61] At the same time, the regime was creating an
administrative obstacle for the naturalization of the Czechs of the Volyn
region from the former USSR. [Ibid., p. 61] Thus, citizenship was restored,
despite the protest of the office of the General Chief of Justice, to Karel Des
Fours Walderode who served in the Wehrmacht,was a member of Henlein's Sudeten German party and the Union
of German Junkers, which assisted in breaking up Czechoslovakia in the 1930s.
The others are successors of Wolf
Auerperg (commander of the Nazi wing), Jan Oldrich Buquoy (died at a Nazi
battle ship Scharnhorst), Karel Evzen Czernin (died during the battle for
France), Alfons Metternich (served the Nazi army) and the Nostics
(collaborating with the Fascist regime). [Ibid., p. 62] Michael Buquoy received
citizenship merely three days after submitting his application on January 26,
1993 - hardly a month after the breakup. Karel Jiri Buquoy was a founding
member of Henlein's party, after the war prosecuted for the crimes against the
state. Again Bratinka commented: "First of all, I refuse to be an officer of the state that evaluates children on
the basis of their parents [who were formally accepted as rendering the legal
ground for return of property and citizenship] ... I refuse to talk about that
[italics added]." [Ibid., p. 62] Significantly, the ministry of interior
absolved inter alia the Sudeten
aristocrats from swearing an oath of
allegiance for gaining their citizenship (Des Fours Walderode, Michael
Buquoy, some from the Waldsteins and Bluchers).
87[86]
Lidove noviny, 6 May 1994, p. 6., For the political aspects of this discussion
and polemic with Pithart, see an article of Vaclav Houzvicka, a sociologist of
the Czech Academy of Science, Lidove noviny, 2 June 1994, p. 8.
88[87]
See Pithart's article "28 October: Munich from a new perspective" was
published in Lidove noviny of 27 October 1994, p. 8. The posited
"artificiality" of Czechoslovakia was a chief slogan in the Nazi
propaganda and also part of the language of the Munich dictate. [See Compton
Mackenzie, Dr Benes, (Toronto: George
G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1946), p. 193]
89[88]
Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, op.
cit., p. 40. Vilem Hejl commented similar views - however, voiced in the
aftermath of the Munich deal of 1938 (and later reproduced by some dissidents
before 1989) in the following way: "From many critiques that appeared
after Munich, we can ignore those which asserted that it had been possible to
prevent Munich beforehand if Czechoslovakia had in time taken care of its
dangerous powerful neighbor. But they do not say anything else than that it
would have been possible to prevent the capitulation by a volunteer and willing
serfdom - such is shortly the essence of the whole philosophy of subsequent
collaborators." [Vilem Hejl, Rozvrat:
Mnichov a nas osud, op. cit., p. 36]
94[93]
This process of weakening the army actually began under the previous Communist
regime. In August 1989 (sic), the then Secretary General of the Communist
party, Milos Jakes, officially announced, without prior consultation with the
army command (!) a reduction of the army service. [Miroslav Vacek, Proc bych mel mlcet, (Praha: NADAS,
1991). p. 48] According to Vacek, Havel as the head of state actively supported
the questioning of the role of the army during political meetings. [Ibid., pp.
27-28] Neither, Havel concealed his intention that the question of the
protection of borders of the state vis-à-vis Germany "should be changed in
the near future." [Ibid., p. 49] In Vacek's view, from the very beginning
[thus, from December 1989], the committee of the Civic Forum for the defense
matters tried vehemently and at any cost to undermine the defence capability of
the army. [Miroslav Vacek, Na rovinu: Bez
studu a prikras, (Praha: Periskop, 1994), p. 179] It is also of symbolic
importance that the post-1989 political elite abolished the Day of the
Czechoslovak Army. [Ibid., p. 210] The essence of the Havel-initiated
"convergence" program was succinctly summarized by Slavimir Ravik:
"In the post-November euphoria, Havel boasted that we would abolish the defense
industry.. In this moment, the foreign military producers cheered up ... Then
Havel explained that he had not meant classic ammunition and hand-guns, but
tanks and all the military hardware. Thereby, he did not cheer up the Slovaks,
who were threatened with an economic collapse which began undermining our
relationship with Slovakia. [Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Prusvih po cesku, cerven 1994, (Praha: Alternativy,
1994), p. 13. On the governmental policy of "quiet demobilization of the
army" after the breakup of Czechoslovakia, which Slavomir Ravik suspects
of being part of "deliberate
designs" and supporting data see, for example, Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Je to ve hvezdach, leden 1994,
(Praha: Alternativy, 1994), p. 43; Slavimir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Chaos nebo bordel? unor 1994, (Praha: Alternativy,
1994), p. 57; Slavomir Ravik, Bylo
nebylo: Uz jsme tady, brezen 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), p. 59;
Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Nevim a
jedu, duben 1994, (Praha: Alernativy, 1994), pp. 32-34; Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Zlaty pist, kveten 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), p. 39; Slavomir
Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Prusvih po cesku,
cerven 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), pp. 51-52; Slavomir Ravik, Bylo - nebylo: Latrina magika v Cechach, na
Morave a ve Slezsku, (Praha:
Periskop, 1995), pp. 98-101; Slavomir Ravik, Bylo - nebylo: latrina Magika v Cechach, na Morave a ve Slezsku,
(Praha: Periskop, 1995), pp. 312-315.
96[95]
Emil Hajek, "Ministerstvo obrany, nebo setrnosti?", Listy, No. 3, 1995: 46. Emil Hajek is a
retired Czech general.
100[99]
Petr Pithart, Czechoslovakia: The Loss of
the Old Partnership, paper delivered at the Conference "Federation or
Confederation: Searching for a New Partnership", Toronto, 22 June 1994, p.
8.
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