The material is presented in the way in which I was able to pen it relying on my self only in the mid 1990s:
Hardly ever has modern history recorded a demise of a state brought about so 'gratis' or with such ease. On the surface, it appeared merely as a result of an irreconcilable personality clash between two stubborn national prime ministers - Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar, to whose political ideologies Czechoslovakia had to be sacrificed. Their collaboration and mutual understanding in dismantling the country was at that time portrayed as a 'natural' outcome of the particular meanness of Meciar complemented by the nonchalant generosity of Klaus. Out of curiosity, one may wish to pose a question of how many minutes or hours it took for a couple of republican leaders to settle the termination of a state. Recently, an advisor to Meciar claimed that it was a matter of merely a several-minute phone call, during which Klaus congratulated Meciar on his election victory. Another version argues that 40 minutes of discussion between Klaus and Meciar was necessary to reach such a conclusion.
Interestingly enough, it was Vaclav Klaus, the Czech Prime Minister, who drew attention to the ostensible connection or continuity of the breakup and previous crucial events in recent Czech history. In rejecting the popular demand for holding a referendum, he compared the breaking up of the state with the years 1918, 1938, 1948, 1968 and 1989, when no referenda had been called either ... Earlier, Havel only admitted the apparent when he stated that "the attempts to divide the state constitute a high-powered play of politicians and do not reflect the interests of ordinary people." This was, however, done deliberately. On September 15, 1992, Milan Uhde, the then president of the Czech parliament and one of key figures in carrying out the split of the country, explained the sidetracking of the federal parliament of Czechoslovakia and rejection of referendum in the following way:
[Referendum] is an obsession with another democracy than with the parliamentary one ... It is an obsession that tries to arouse in people ... an impression that it is the citizen that can consider best all the questions of the state ...
By January 1992, over 2,500,000 citizens' signatures had been collected for a petition calling for a referendum. It was simply ignored by the political elite whose very leaders used this form of appeal during their dissident past (for example, the petition of Charter 77 "Few Sentences" from early 1989 received a wide international attention and was supported by some 30,000 signatures). Dusan Slobodnik, a Slovak political observer and witness of the breakup, argued that the "play" in which the state was at stake had its "scenario" that "can be substantiated factually" as it chronologically unfolded. At the beginning, he said, it was to anger the Czechs and insult the Slovaks, where a key role was played by the media, especially the ex-dissident Lidove noviny and ex-Communist-youth Mlade fronty Dnes, and the leaders of the Civic Forum (J. Ruml, Forejt, Liska, J. Hanak, L. Vaculik). The purpose was to stir or imitate artificially the tension and conflict; a reaction in Slovakia aroused by this manipulation was then presented to the Czechs by the "play directors" an alleged effort of the Slovaks to have a divorce. In this way, the handling of the breakup by the media is once more evidence that the initiative and drive to cut the state apart came from the Czech [or Böhmisch] side. Moreover, this campaign was strangely also supported by the European media who also contributed to the creation of images of the "inevitability of the breakup" that was actually decided by a rather narrow group of politicians. At the same time, the Slovak newspapers and their distribution in the Czech Republic were, according to Slobodnik, deliberately curtailed - only 80 (!) issues of the newspaper Narodna obroda were daily distributed in the Czech Republic. The real position of Slovakia was also played down, distorted or silenced by the federal television network controlled by the people from Charter 77 (Kanturek and others). Despite all this, the vast majority of the Slovaks still kept identifying themselves with the idea of Czechoslovakia, while the group of Czech politicians linked to and supported by Havel adopted arbitrary measures that were damaging Slovak workers (an arbitrary conversion of the military industry in Slovakia, distancing themselves from the problem of a hydro-power station Gabcikovo as allegedly an internal matter between Slovakia and Hungary).
The examination of the process of the breakup seem to confirm a great deal of Slobodnik's conclusions that however lack a notion of the very important foreign context of the "play." Nevertheless, Slobodnik's concept of political technology as theatre (for the stupid Last Men) is noteworthy with regard to the phenomenal part of the breakup, as it was in relation to the Velvet Revolution resembling a kind of revolving theatrical stage (or "refoolation" as suggested above).
The beginning of the whole process of dissolving and "delegitimizing" the common state could be traced to as early as November 1989, when the thesis of the "non-authenticity" of the existing federation had been launched and then intensively promoted - paradoxically, especially by the Czech side (Havel, Pithart, Klaus). Paradoxically, the authorship of unauthenticity of the state was claimed by its "authentic" head, Vaclav Havel. This was certainly an unprecedented phenomenon when such a high official supposed to draw his powers from one political entity asserts that the entity itself which he is to represent is "unauthentic" or "unnatural." Apparently, it is, therefore, to be seen as another evidence of the gravity of the nihilistic sickness.
On 25 January 1990, in the Polish Parliament, Havel reminded the audience that he is an "author of absurd plays with inconspicuously bad ends." On January 23, 1990, Havel "ambushed," as Jicinsky characterized it, the state and the parliament with his unified package of provocative proposals on the change of the state name and symbols. According to Jicinsky, Havel did not reveal his intentions or the content of his proposals to any representative of parliament before his speech. He only insisted that his proposals be immediately accepted. This speech by Havel made the Czecho-Slovak conflict and separation a matter of public politics and initiated the notorious 'hyphenated' war over the new name of the state and state symbols that was, therefore, but an artificial product of politicking presented as a seeming failure or error. To this effect, Havel claimed that "perceiving Czechoslovak statehood and identifying themselves with it" were to be viewed as "a deformed perception." Justifying this initiative, Havel acknowledged that the creation of new state symbols and related quarrels represented a "drastic intervention into the national and state consciousness," that Havel, however, posted as necessary; "because of different reasons," Havel said, "I consider this period to be the beginning of a new historic era that deserves such a radical expression [of new symbols]." Besides dealing with the allegedly "deformed" perception of the people, this battle over 'a hyphen' actually became a beginning of dismantling the state. The prevailing mood among the Czechoslovak populace at the time was a feeling of bewilderment and bafflement over the scolasticism and ostensible lack of reason on the part of the parliament and leadership. Shortly after, in Toronto on February 19, 1990, Havel announced a "very important task to separate the consciousness [of the people] in the Czech lands from the consciousness of Czechoslovak statehood" because, "in the consciousness of the Czechs, Czech statehood had been dangerously integrated with Czechoslovak statehood;" and "it would be wonderful for both nations to have their own national organizations and structures," including "political ones at least." On the same occasion, during a meeting with Czech emigrants, Havel stated as a matter of fact that Slovakia would break away. At that time, perhaps only a very small number of the ordinary citizens would suspect or imagine anything similar to happen in the near time to come. On February 25, 1990, Havel explained the puzzling decision of the elite to have another election again in two years (1992) in the following way: "In two years ... new and more natural territorial breakup of the country will be created ... I, however, recommend that [democracy] be checked up in two years to make it certain."
In addition to heading the drive of the new political elite in claiming the Heideggerian "unauthenticity" of the federation (or what would be its alleged "irrationality" and, thus, "unreality" in a Hegelian sense), Havel basked in a rhetoric that was defaming the nature of the state which he represented. This was quite unusual and unprecedented a political practice when a highest state official openly questions the legitimacy and sensibility of the state. Havel's comments were as much hyperbolically abusive as false:
We behave towards members of other nations or ethnic groups that live with us in way that to do the same with regard a black co-citizen would be inconceivable to any white in New York ... Many Slovaks consider the Czechs as their colonizers, and many Czechs consider the Slovaks as an appendix which complicates their life.
A summary and review of these derogatory statements are presented in Havel's Summer Meditations (1992). Havel renders there his "understanding to the aversion of the Slovaks to be ruled from somewhere outside [Prague]." Havel emphasizes this even further by claiming that in their history the Slovaks "have been always under somebody's else rulership," thus dismissing the Czechoslovak federation and his own presidency as being also shared by the Slovaks. In this regard, Havel, effectively fomenting a Slovak alienation, went to assert that "for many Slovaks it is less important if they are under a good or bad rule, with their participation or without it, with or without a consideration of their interests (sic), than a bare fact that is from somewhere else." In making these inflammatory statements, Havel hid himself behind his references to alleged Slovak opinions or gossips and was putting in the mouth of the Slovaks what he apparently could not promote as his own conviction in a more open and direct way. In addition, these Slovak "views" were usually blown out of proportion, torn away from the historical context or represented as the position of the whole nation while, as in the case of the separatist demands, they were shared only about some fifteen per cent of the Slovaks until the very moment of the split, so that this was creating an impression as if Havel was acting as their unacknowledged spokesperson. So, for example, referring to the Slovaks, Havel spoke about perceiving the federation as a Czech trick and invention (despite all the recent historical data) that intended to restrict Slovak sovereignty. Similarly, the Slovaks were presented by Havel as "always neglected, overlooked" and "condemned to live in the shadow of their bigger and stronger brother." Havel himself explained his depreciating of the common state, asserting that "it is not from the sociological or political point of view important to what extent and when these feelings were correct, but it is important that they simply existed and exist." As M. Neudorfl stated, Havel was thereby "actually encouraging in his speeches the Slovak nationalist sentiment and ignored the positive achievements of the two nations in Czechoslovakia." This attitude-tactics was also observed by Theodor Draper who noted that Havel was positing as a fact his idea that it was a Czech "egoism" and "contempt" that "forced the Slovaks to cease considering Czechoslovakia as their country."
Further, Havel also initiated and legitimized the ignoring of the federal parliament, later a subject of his open attacks, and of the federal constitution in the process of the breakup by summoning both republican governments without the federal one to a "common working session" to his residence in Lany on April 11, 1990. There, it was established that the "primacy, sovereignty and integrity of the national republics" (versus the federation), being de facto an unconstitutional act, be the decisive principle for all the subsequent negotiations. This was justified by claiming that the hitherto state arrangement and, thus, also the valid constitution "did not respect fully" some undefined "authentic principles of the federation." This was later followed by other meetings of the governments, including then the federal executive, organized or sponsored by Havel who thereby "transferred the debate on unconstitutional fora, away from the Federal Assembly." In September 1990, Havel had to admit publicly that the presidentially sponsored negotiations on the division of powers in the federation, held in the summer of 1990, "led to suspicions and sometimes even to doubts about the future of our federal state." By enforcing the issue of the split, the political elite de facto ambushed with this agenda the two nations: only 12 per cent of the Slovaks and 11 per cent of Czechs thought in September 1990 that Slovakia and Bohemia should separate. The rationale of the 'hastily made' decision to hold elections as early as two years after those in 1990 is also pertinent in the light of the subsequent termination of the state. The validity of available indications that the Czech part had been heading for separation as early as 1990, was later also reconfirmed by Meciar. Later, Meciar also announced that, at least since December 1990, the Czech had already a secret timetable for separating the state programmed with a precision even up to concrete days and hours.
The population was unable to understand their own leaders. Two years later, when most citizens demanded a referendum, it was the leaders who could not come to terms with the rationality of such national will. They argued that holding a referendum would be 'too expensive,' 'untimely', 'too complicated' or that "a man from the street cannot decide such an important question," and that it would be impossible to compose the right question and even to rightly decipher the people's [right] answer. When the fate of Czechoslovakia was decided from above, only 16 percent of people in both republics favoured the same. Finally, it was simply proclaimed that a referendum on the future of Czechoslovakia "no longer made any sense" (Havel). Moreover, in foreshadowing his forthcoming resignation, Havel claimed against all the facts to the contrary that he "cannot impose the federation on a nation [the Slovaks] which does not want to live in it," while preventing the same nation from expressing its true position.
Clearly, it was not the nation which did not want the common state, but importantly the political elite. In addition, Havel himself was aware that the breakup ordered from above was not only contrary to the will of both the Czechs and Slovaks but was a negation and denial of the whole previous national being of both nations and their statehood: "The divorce would be a denial of the will of all the previous generations, denial of the common work of our Czech and Slovak predecessors and rejection of the ideals that stood at the foundation of our common state." This slighting of reason by the political representation probably made Dienstbier denote the split as "inevitable irrationality." And curiously, as Young noted, "there seemed to have been little pressure from abroad to settle the issue through a referendum."
A very important impetus for widening and legitimizing the mood for separation was brought about by Havel's 'address to the Slovaks' in Bratislava, the Slovak capital, which was delivered on March 14, 1991, on the anniversary of the 14th of March 1939, when the "Slovak Independent State" was declared under the patronage of Hitler. In a relatively short speech (covering slightly over two pages), Havel stated that the Slovaks had "a unique chance to make freely for the first time in their history their own decision [my italics]" about their own state and national sovereignty; and, according to Havel, such a chance "should not be wasted away":
It is not up to anybody else but only to you, citizens of the Slovak
Republic, how you decide that you fulfill your longing for national
sovereignty ... There is much [evidence] that a majority of the Slovaks wish just such a development - a majority that is perhaps less loud, but is considerate and thinks in a long term perspective.
The whole speech of Havel boiled down to a steady reiteration of this appeal. Havel's urging that the Slovaks "should make such a decision" was stressed fifteen times. The same message was additionally reinforced by another fifteen similarly worded imperatives; at the same time, the word "Czechoslovak" was completely avoided and was not uttered at all. Havel further described the federation as "pseudofederation," "necessary evil," "a brake on the development of its members," "a burden" and "a source of complications." Havel then offered to extend a prior full consent to a Slovak decision to separate from the Czechs. He wound up his speech with a prophetic: "God is watching you, and I hope that we will not ask him to forgive us in years to come."
Interestingly, the then Czech Minister of Finance (then Federal Deputy Finance Minister under Klaus), I. Kocarnik, ordered stamps for the separation of a single Czechoslovak currency as early as 1991. In May 1991, upon its own initiative, the Czech National Council discussed the scenarios for separation. The Slovak part followed suit. By mid-1991 both republican governments had separation plans ready, detailed down to the division of federal assets. In this regard, a Canadian analyst, Robert Young, argued that normally the state authorities "cannot readily acknowledge the possibility of fragmentation before it occurs, even to the point of commissioning reports and contemplating scenarios." On July 17, 1991, M. Macek, the then vice-chairman of the later ruling Civic Democratic Party and Czechoslovak vice-premier, indicated that the ruling Civic Democratic Party identified itself with the separation of the state. On November 17, 1991, Havel launched a direct appeal to the citizens to support his own position against the powers of the parliament and government, tying this together with his apparent concern about the federation. Shortly beforehand, Havel implied that the citizens should be "given an opportunity" to speak their mind at least as far as the broadening of his own powers is concerned. This untimely and isolated action on Havel's part aroused and also effectively pre-emptied people's sincere enthusiasm and involvement. The parliament, government and Havel himself ignored the result of this initiative, as said above, manifested in over 2,500,00 signatures. Understandably, the effect was a dissuasion and discouragement of the misled people. Such a tactic is known from ancient times. As an ancient Chinese strategist stressed:
Bravery in battle is a matter of energy. Once energy is drummed up, a second try makes it wane, and it disappears at the third. They were exhausted while we were full, so we overcame them.
This is also exactly what happened. When people's resistance and energy was needed most - in the summer of 1992 - it was coincidentally a time of vacations, and their previous lesson was a sheer uselessness of their action. Admittedly, at that time, most people shared a high trust in Havel and relied on his guidance. This prevented them from an effective independent resistance (compare the section on war strategy below). Furthermore, on the part of the elite, there was nobody of any serious clout or interest who was in a position to organize and direct people's counter-action.
On May 12, 1992, speaking to Slovak citizens in Bratislava during the fatal election campaign of 1992, Havel again stated that it was better to separate than to indulge in a "never-ending confusion caused by the cowardly inability of politicians to say what they are up to." On June 25, 1992, when the split was already being openly negotiated by Klaus and Meciar, Havel resorted to an unspecified looming threat when, speaking in the Czechoslovak Parliament, he warned against "all forms of resistance" because otherwise:
we will all and everybody have to pay for it very dearly and very soon, when the interest charged will be so high that you will be shocked ... A serious and profound historical process is involved here; it has a thousand aspects that you could understand only after a certain time ... It is about matters that are too serious ...
In the meantime, Havel had to dispense somehow with his oath sworn to the Czechoslovak state. He used the Slovak formal manifestation of sovereignty, adopted on July 17, 1992, as the opportunity to resign prematurely, thus clearing the scene - within an hour after the Slovak Assembly's vote. His resignation, Havel expressly justified by his inability to stand up to his oath to the state and the constitution because it would not be "any longer in accordance with his [private] nature, conviction and conscience." In this way, his responsibility and obligation towards the state was sacrificed relatively easily and somewhat opportunely for the sake of his own private preferences. On this occasion, Havel also lauded his own character: he resigned because "simply, the society has not been able to stand up to [his own] moral mirror." Shortly afterwards, , Havel stated in an interview for Time (August 3, 1992) that "he does not have any emotional bounds towards the Czechoslovak state. As Young stressed, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus "encouraged and welcomed the resignation of Havel as the last prominent Czech leader at the federation level." In this connection, it is worth recalling what Vilem Hejl wrote in 1989 with regard to the disassociation of the head of state, Edvard Benes, during the Munich deal:
What is an oath? ... to give to the God one's soul as one's guarantee ... or to give it to those whom he swears, and should he break his oath, his honor is forfeited and ceases to exist ... Did [Benes] consider it as a simply promise that can be according to circumstances disavowed, omitted or adjourned? If he did, it marked the coming and further future of moral and legal norms, times when so much was forgotten or debased - oath, honor, faithfulness degraded into words of merely conditioned validity and binding force. A fateful mode of behavior was created.
With regard to this final phase of the dismantling of the state, it is peculiar to note that the principal constitutional figures and institutions used unconstitutional methods either as blackmail in relation to other state institutions or as direct means for enforcing their program. On September 3, 1992, the liquidation federal executive ordered that the three-fifth threshold of the votes in each of the three chambers of the federal legislature required for any constitutional change be reduced to a simple majority of deputies at the republican level, forcing the federal legislative body out of decision-making. Klaus threatened to declare Czech independence "if the Slovaks would drag on," making it clear that he would not hesitate, in contravention to the constitutional order, to bypass the Federal Assembly using his command of a narrow majority in the Czech chamber. He portrayed resisting deputies as "disloyal" and "obstructionists" and precluded "any substantive debate on the Czech-Slovak union as an alternative." As Young stressed, "at this point, it was Klaus who was willing to threaten [with] a non-constitutional separation." Havel publicly supported the course of Vaclav Klaus, as well as the idea to ignore the federal legislature because, as he claimed, "in such a situation a legal puritanism has no importance." Havel also attacked the last-minute resistance of federal deputies as "divisive and disruptive." Again later, on November 17, 1992, Havel announced that he would run for the Czech presidency at a moment when no post of this kind yet existed, nor the end of the federation was yet official, and no constitution of the Czech Republic existed. Consequently, the easiness with which Havel terminated his obligations to the Czechoslovak state corresponded to that he demonstrated by announcing his candidacy for another post of president. Coincidentally, Havel made this declaration of his intent one day before a crucial vote in the Czechoslovak parliament on allowing the breakup, thus, placing the deputies under an additional pressure not to run against his manifest will. On November 10, 1992, the Czech republican legislature passed a resolution assuming "full responsibility" for the Czech Republic, ignoring the powers of federal authorities and the federal constitution. In addition, the two political parties ruling in both republics with 30 percent of votes issued their public threats to dissolve the federation unconstitutionally. On November 25, 1992, the Federal Assembly passed the dissolution law with a majority of one and two votes, respectively, beyond the designated thresholds. Symbolically, Vaclav Klaus attended the parliamentary session hobbling on crutches. To formally clear this "constitutionally doubtful breakup," the deputies were encouraged by a government-made promise that they would be seated in non-existing republican Senates for the rest of their lives. During the whole process, the media also played a crucial role in disciplining and even "brainwashing" the populace and precluding the articulation and promotion of a pro-Czechoslovak platform.
Subsequent analyses undertaken by different authors independently came to the conclusion that the breakup of Czechoslovakia was executed undemocratically, illegitimately and without an evident mandate. In this regard, the political elites in both republics were said to carry the responsibility for it. At the moment when most people in both republics were clearly saddened by the forthcoming breakup, on the eve of the anniversary of Czechoslovak independence, V. Havel spoke to his co-patriots about "the necessity to turn the fruit of this harvest into a new sowing" because "[we] have sown well and have watered well," and "life is a joyful participation in the miracle of being." On December 10, 1990, when he tried to use the Czecho-Slovak question to have his presidential powers expanded (a constant drive of Havel's), Havel spoke a different tune, although apparently correctly:
if we made possible that all this [the breakup] happens ... we would enter into the records of history of our nations as the first generation in their history which, without being exposed to any inadvertent [public] pressure from outside, prepared with their own blindness a unbounded and long-term suffering (sic). I dare to say that the next generations would curse us, and that the world community would declare us mad.
It is the international aspect and possible repercussions of this "joyful sowing" that concern our present analysis. In particular, the relevant statements of Czech leaders are worth reviewing. There is a consensus on the part of the Czech leadership that the breakup should be viewed as part of a broader framework. In his speech to the Polish Parliament in January 1990, Vaclav Havel had expressed his appreciation of a new Mitteleuropa as a meaningful filling of "the great political vacuum that appeared in Central Europe after the break-up of the Hapsburg empire," describing it as a "political" project that has today a "real historic chance." Havel had further indicated that the split of Czechoslovakia would in principle entail a "breakdown of all guarantees of the inviolability of her borders." Clearly, Havel himself had no doubts about the repercussions. Moreover, Havel also correctly defined the new ensuing danger for the Czech state that was to be facilitated and "legitimized" by the breakup (in the spirit of Pithart's thesis - see, below). At a time when he was already contemplating his resignation, he stated:
The breakup of the state would also mean an actual loss of defense ability of both republics (a circumstance especially serious in the situation of questioned state borders [by whom?]. From the standpoint of security, it would be consequently a really hazardous act.
Havel further strengthened this projection by stressing that "certainly, it would be a very painful step with long-term tragic consequences for both republics." In this regard, as Havel put it, the Czechs and Slovaks alike should "get rid of their illusions." What does Havel's notion of "illusion" include? It can be presumed that the answer is to be sought along the demands of Böhmisch nihilism, as stated above in programs of Uhl, Pithart and Havel himself. When a law on the ways of terminating the federation was not passed on October 1, 1992, in the federal parliament that thus hindered the process of breakup, the then federal Primer Minister J. Strasky declared: "This is an unfavourable signal, especially for the world and the European Union." After the breakup, Klaus compared the advent of a separate Czech entity to a state of "post-operational narcosis" and spoke about it as "a geopolitical tragedy." However, in the view of Deputy Foreign Minister Pavel Bratinka, "the breakup of Czechoslovakia was the only viable way to preserve stability in Central Europe," whereby the Czech elite allegedly rendered "a great service to Europe."
In this light, the views and concepts of Czech leaders concerning the (future) Czech statehood (its value and nature) are worthy of attention. Adopting the German term Verkleinerung (diminishing, cutting down, belittling) for denoting the Czechoslovak breakup, Klaus implied that the new Czech state could be seen as "a somehow compensatory and temporary arrangement, a state residue." In this regard, the future of this Czech state may also be "a provisional, temporary and compensatory solution." Some time earlier, Havel had also declared that the Czech people "little appreciated their own republic as a sensible expression of their existence."
The Czech ex-Prime Minister Pithart set the tone, arguing in his analysis of the split that the Czech state was "commonly seen as an unwanted child." Moreover, in Pithart's view, the nation as a concept is the property of the poor: for one's identification and existence, wealth is sufficient. Consequently, the nation is (to be) rejected as an identification (for the Czechs). In Pithart's view, region replaced nation. "Regions" (should) attempt to free themselves from the state (in Pithart's words: "deetatization of the Czech Republic") in the process of "their disintegrating by rich regions," thereby "securing for themselves a special status." As a result of this political regrouping, the internal setup of the Czech Republic should be "less advantageous" than connections inside "new regions." In fact, this had already been achieved to a great extent in the frontier areas of the Czech Republic from where many thousands of people daily commuted to labour in Germany, after the local Czech industries declined under the "laissez-faire" policies of the government. According to Pithart, moreover, current state frontiers should be reduced to "merely hypothetical lines." The power of the existent Czech state will weaken in the same measure. Furthermore, the existing national education should "virtually melt" in the framework of the new "regional" setup.
What Pithart calls "Czech nationalism" has to be radically "cut off from its roots." Significantly, the former Czech Prime Minister himself associates such a program with a revision of the Munich deal of 1938 that, allegedly, because of the split of Czechoslovakia, should now be seen "from a new perspective." In Pithart's view, Czechoslovakia was an "artificial state," "unviable creation," "fastidious task" and "mistake" "fortuitously" born in 1918 out of the will of the great powers and "hard-to-please imagination of a cosmopolitan" T.G. Masaryk with a provincial background. The Munich deal of 1938 so "desatanized" by Pithart is then nothing more than a fault of the Czechs - "the Germans have always told us that." In Pithart's view, the breakup of Czechoslovakia confirms de facto that the Czechoslovak state was an "error," implying that the "fastidious task" of sustaining a common state had been sacrificed by the Czechs for the sake of "having more meat than the Slovaks have and more meat than we had with the Slovaks." He concludes that the situation of the Slovaks and the treatment of the Sudeten Germans in the 1930s (and the Munich deal) were results of the same "faulty [Czech] national policy." The only solution left for the Czechs is seen in a multiregional Mitteleuropa based "not only on economics."
Similarly, on the state anniversary of 28 October in 1990, V. Havel declared that there is "a legitimate question of whether the decision of our predecessors [to found an independent Czechoslovakia] was also free and whether it was also right." At the OSCE summit in Helsinki on 9 July 1992, Havel, still in the capacity of Czechoslovak President, indicated that Czechoslovakia was "already overcome by the dynamics of history." Lately, those ideas have been intensively expanded and elaborated by the media and other members of the Czech elite.
Jiri Valenta, a Director of the Czech foreign ministry's Institution of International Relations, also holds in his analysis of the Czechoslovak breakup that on the part of the Czech Republic, there is "a less evident taste for statehood," and that neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia are capable of "reliably defending themselves." In this regard, as early as 1 January 1990, Havel declared: "As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, I want to be a guarantor that the security of our state will never again be a pretext for anybody to thwart courageous peace initiatives ..." With regard to such a "peace drive" sacrificing the state and its security, Miroslav Vacek, the former Czechoslovak Defence Minister, said that those who stood in the Czech Republic behind the separation were well aware that it would undermine the stability of the Czech Republic itself - also by losing the defence industry of Slovakia. This conscious weakening of the security of the state was continued after the breakup as well. It is noteworthy that, since the breakup unto the time of writing this work, the Czech government elaborated no defence doctrine of the state. In 1993, Vaclav Klaus, the prime minister, justifying the lack of security strategy of the state, claimed in this regard that "the defence doctrine is not a document that is to be approved by the government." By the end of April 1996, Klaus still maintained that "we [the government of the nation?] have not yet misfired in anything," while the current Czech constitution completely ignores defence and security issues of the state.
In this regard, it is peculiar that, in negotiating the breakup, it was the Czech side that systematically kept rejecting (sometimes even as a "joke") all Slovak proposals for any kind of mutual military and economic union. The desperate and vain efforts of the Slovak government to preserve as much as possible from the former joint defense system and strategy indicate that the Slovak party tried to offset or at least mitigate the geopolitical and security ramifications of the split, being cognizant of the fact that the split would place an independent Slovakia relatively further to the East while the Czechs drifted away from Slovak friendship somewhere else. Klaus explicitly declared:
the current abandoning of the federation is in the interest of both parties. Projects of confederation, union or some alliance amount to forcing one part of the present federation into the political, economic, national and possible 'neighbouring' problems of the other part, and this can be very dangerous.
Sometimes, one has to appreciate the openness of Czech politicians insomuch as the public does not listen to speeches nor read articles of their leaders. For example, Pithart admitted once more:
At present, the problem of a previous lack of legitimacy [of the breakup - that is, post factum] is being resolved. In order to lessen the number of those who still regret the dissolution of the federation, the relationship between the two states is often artificially worsened ... As a result, today, the prospect of some new rapprochement is clearly an illusion.
All the available evidence seem to confirm that the breakup of the country 1) was a conscious and long striving of the Czech political elite and partial fulfilment of the previously declared programs (Petr Uhl, Petr Pithart) imposed against the will of the Czechs and even against that of the Slovaks; 2) was not an expression of the "authentic" will of the elite themselves in a sense of its subordination to external factors; and 3) was not as such a final destination in the revamping of the region of Central Europe as being part of broader strategic visions that are basically in accordance with the dynamics of the nihilistic making of the Universal and Homogeneous State. In this light, the breakup was a maturation of a long-term Böhmisch nihilism aimed against the Czechoslovak statehood and concept of the Czech nation, but not its uppermost culmination. Apparently, the objects of following attacks are to be the Czech state itself and finally the nation. The said also points towards a radical alienation of the Böhmisch elite from the nation and its state. Further, the analysis also indicates that apparent "failures" of the political elite bear more of a character of realized pre-conceived plans and designs than merely their inability to cope with the problems that they have themselves created. And again, the findings reveal a strong continuous progression and consistency of the goals and demands whose nature points towards their determinative nihilistic undercurrent. In this way, Böhmisch nihilism is pervading different political phenomena whose essence, however, remains not only hostile to the notion of the state and the nation, but it also brings about the political mortification of the state and nation.
In this light, it might be seen as the Hegelian end of history in making, which appears to include conscious long-term efforts to realize the end of Czech statehood and nation. The formal flag or cipher-name of that nihilism does not seem to matter so much in this regard - with one important reservation: such nihilism clearly tends to partake in two basic modes - in Communism (Marxism) or National Socialism whose apparently strange intertwined (personal, political, economic) relationship was present in varying forms in the course of the examined stages of Böhmisch nihilism. Both forms (Communism and Nazism) also conspicuously converge in what can be defined by Arendt's term of totalitarianism where crime is the law, and tyranny of death of man and nation qua political dignified beings is sought on the way to its global, planetary rule. In this regard, the post-1989 and post-breakup articulation and evolution of concepts and politics by the elite with regard to the state and nation provide important further evidence and insights in the unfolding dynamics of Böhmisch nihilism as an important part of the overall design and drive.
1  Cited in a CBC report on the split emitted on the French channel of the CBC at 23.-24.00 on 20.9.1995.
2  See, the account of the leaders' meeting in Brno on 7 July 1992 in Robert Young, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia, Research paper No. 32, (Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University: Kingston, 1994), p. 35. Also Rudiger Kipke and Karel Vodicka, eds., Rozlouceni s Ceskoslovenskem: priciny a dusledky cesko-slovenskeho rozchodu, (Praha: Patriae, 1993), p. 110.
3  Slavomir Ravik, Totalni deziluze, (Prazska imaginace: Praha, 1992), p. 83.
4  Young, op. cit., p. 70.
5  Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), (Hodonin: Pedagogicke stredisko, cerven 1995), p. 59.,. Uhde's attitude may be contrasted with his explanation of how he became a dissident: "I was suffering from habits of a prominent from the 1960s, and if they had been treating me only slightly better, they would have won me." [Milan Uhde, Ceska republiko, dobry den, (Praha: Atlantis, 1995), p. 8] Notably, Havel is also the author of the concept of "light violation of parliamentary customs" [law] and "relative popular consensus" that was applied during the process of dismantlement of Czechoslovakia from above. [See in Z. Jicinsky, Cs. parlament v polistopadovem obdobi, op. cit., pp. 112 ftn. and 111] Needless to say, Milan Uhde himself as a public and political figure has a history going back to the Communist regime of the 1950s. Jicinsky's comment in this regard is significant: "In the creation of the independent Czech republic ... the ruling coalition has put into the foundation of the new Czech state something very dangerous, that is, contempt for the will of the citizens." Again, this statement well summarizes the misery of the continuity of Böhmisch nihilism. [Z. Jicinsky, Cs. parlament v polistopadovem obdobi, op. cit., p. 34] In this regard, one may also compare this refusal to consult the voice of the people with Havel's words addressed to the people gathered in demonstration in Prague on November 25, 1989 where Havel criticized the Communist leaders because "[these] representatives of the state claim that the problems of this country cannot be discussed in the street [that is, directly with citizens]." Almost exactly what Uhde repeated later, although from the point of view of "these representatives of the state." [M. Otahal and Z. Sladek, Deset prazskych dnu, op. cit., p. 464] In his New Years's address of 1993, when the breakup of the state had already taken place, Milan Uhde took the courage to reassert that "a free citizen is the guarantee of [democratic] conditions." [Lidove noviny, January 4, 1993, p. 3] When the politicians started openly working on the dismantlement of the state, the Czechoslovak citizens were demanding not only a referendum (82 per cent in Slovakia and 66 per cent in the Czech Republic), but also new parliamentary elections (60 percent of the Czechoslovak citizens); this idea was supported even by 51 per cent of those who voted for the ruling Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Vaclav Klaus. [Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15 milionu, (Praha: Prazska imaginace, 1993), pp. 6, 87] In July 1994,one and half a year after the split, only 35% of the Slovaks supported the preservation of the independent Slovak state, while more than 50% of them regret the division of the Czechoslovak state. [Lidove noviny, June 21, 1994, p. 1]
6  On February 25, 1990, Vaclav Havel declared: "[We] only want that the people and anybody else have the leading role in reality, not only on paper." [Vaclav Havel, Projevy (leden - cerven 1990), op. cit., p. 67]
7  Dusan Slobodnik, "Hra o republiku" in Tazky, Mnacko, Kalisky, Vnuk, Comaj, Kalny, Smolec, Simecka, Veres, Slobodnik, Varos, Hric, Minac, Horuce temy: Slovensko v ringu, (Bratislava: Tatrapress, 1991), pp. 99-106. With regard to the official policy of the Czech politicians, which was detrimental to Slovakia and their backstage manoeuvring, a revealing piece of evidence was provided by a former economist of the federal government, Frantisek Dvorak. It also sheds some light on the possible broader strategic context of the whole operation, especially in relation to large quantities of armament and aviation transferred to Slovakia before the breakup. Thus, while the convergence program of military industry enhanced unemployment in Slovakia and, thus, caused manifest displacements and damage, the amount of money transfers to Slovakia in 1991-1992 increased in comparison with generous long-term subsidies for Slovakia under the Communist regime 2-3 times - by 50-70 billion crowns per year. This can be truly appreciated only in the light of the previous intensive Communist industrialization of Slovakia, that was largely oriented on the creation of defence industry. [Frantisek Dvorak, Slavomir Ravik, Jiri Teryngel, Zaloba aneb Bila kniha k patemu vyroci 17. listopadu 1989, (Praha: Periskop, 1994), p. 128] This information of unusually high amounts of financial transfers that drastically increased in 1990-1992 was confirmed by a former Czech minister of education, Petr Vopenka, who claimed that the amount surpassed in 1992 all the Slovak expenditures on all the forms of education starting from kinder-gartens to universities. [Lidove noviny, November 20, 1992, p. 8]
8  In this regard, it is notable that Vaclav Benda, a Czech political leader after 1989, already mentioned above, was heard to declare merely for hours after swearing his allegiance to the Czechoslovak state that "the mission of the federal parliament is to liquidate the federation." [Slavomir Ravik, Bylo - nebylo: Tento zpusob leta, (Praha: Periskop, srpen 1995), p. 31]
9  See, for example, Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, Projevy cervenec 1990 - cervenec 1992, (Lidove noviny: Praha, 1992),p. 27. In his speech to the Federal Parliament on 17 September 1990, Havel advocated the need for the Slovaks to "realize their national sovereignty politically or in any other way and make their existence visible on the international scene in any possible way." Ibid., p. 193: "I do not intend to leave my citizens alone ... [but] no state has for me a supreme value." See also Vaclav Klaus, Rok: malo ci mnoho v dejinach zeme, (Praha: Repro-media, 1993), p. 66. See also Dienstbier's similar arguments in Dienstbier, op. cit., p. 25. Havel made his first announcement on the "non-authenticity" of the state in his address in Bratislava on 22 November 1989. See Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "Neznesitelna lahkost rozchodu," in Kipke, op. cit., p. 137. Actually, the Manifesto of the Movement for Civic Freedom published on October 15, 1988 prepared by the Charter 77 already advanced the idea of (ir)relevance of the federation and the idea of "a true sovereignty" (sic) of the single republics instead that of the federation as the expression of the alleged "authentic" aspirations of the Czechs and Slovaks. This already indicated a translation of Uhl's and Pithart's programs and Havel's plays into an immediate plan of action. Ironically, the deluding idea of "authenticity" (in fact amounting to a negation) was presented under the title "National Sovereignty."[H. Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson, eds., Civic Freedom in Central Europe: Voices from Czechoslovakia, (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 142]
10 Vaclav Havel, Letni premitani, op. cit., p. 28. Consequently, the dissolution of the state first started by redefining its predicate, using Heideggerian language of authenticity to this effect, then by depriving it of its traditional name to negate its very being at the end.
11 Vaclav Havel, Projevy, leden-cerven 1990, (Praha: Vysehrad, 1990), p. 39.
12 Z. Jicinsky, Cs. parlament v polistopadovem obdobi, op. cit., pp. 106-107, see also ibid., pp. 108-109. Cf. Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), (Hodonin: Pedagogicke stredisko , cerven 1995), p. 5.
13 Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, op. cit., p. 30. The same idea was also later shared and reinforced by Klaus. See, Klaus, op. cit., p. 68: Klaus dismissed Czechoslovakia as being an expression or form of Czech statehood. On the "deformed perception" of the alleged deformed perception of citizens and the refutation of Havel's denunciation of the federation as an "administratively complicated way of totalitarian ruling" see Zdenek Jicinsky, Cs. parlament v polistopadovem obdobi, op. cit., pp. 26-27. Havel himself was, of course, as federal president the highest representative of that federation.
14 In the aftermath of Havel's proposals, Pithart became the Czech Prime Minister and, on February 6, 1990, declared as part of his program that the Czech government become "a strong counterpart" to the federative state because the Czech lands had not been allegedly reconciled yet (accustomed) with the fact that they are an independent republic. Pithart's government thus was set up to "renew Czech statehood." This was one rare moments when Pithart expressed a keen interest in 'Czech statehood.' [See Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), (Pedagogicke stredisko: Hodonin, cerven 1995, pp. 5-6]
15 Vaclav Havel, Projevy, leden-cerven 1990, (Vysehrad: Praha, 1990), pp. 34-35.
16 Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15 milionu aneb jak vyhovet Murphyho zakonum, op. cit., pp. 9, 21. See also Zdenek Jicinsky, "Ke ztroskotani ceskoslovenskeho federalismu" in Rudiger Kipke, op. cit, p. 69.
17 Vaclav Havel, Projevy, leden-cerven 1990, (Vysehrad: Praha, 1990), p. 49.
18 Polygon, No. 3-4/1994, June 20, 1994: 33.
19 Vaclav Havel, Projevy (leden - cerven 1990), op. cit., p. 69. This was immediately followed by Havel's demand to abolish the death sentence. [Ibid., p. 70]
20 See, for example, Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, op. cit., p. 30: "Everything federal is marked by previous sour experience ... the high degree of nonconfidence of the Slovaks towards the federal institutions, moreover so geographically distant from them [200-400 kilometres - author's comment], is more than understandable," said the federal president on 17 September 1990. Ibid., p. 56: Havel, recalling Masaryk's dictum that "states are sustained only by those ideals out of which they were born," went to assert that "the situation of our state ... does not reflect much from those past ideals."
21 From Havel's speech delivered in Prague on February 25, 1990 on the anniversary of the birth of T.G. Masaryk. [Vaclav Havel, Projevy (leden - cerven 1990), op. cit., p. 65]
22 Vaclav Havel, Letni premitani, (Praha: Odeon, 1992), p. 15.
23 Ibid., p. 15. Here, in addition to denigrating the federation, Havel also slandered the Slovaks. This was a common feature of his public speeches from that time. Or how else can one understand that, after declaring his "full" or "deep understanding" for the alleged Slovak hatred and contempt of their "unauthentic" coexistence with the Czechs, he defines this "fully legitimate will" at the same time as "a primitive, xenophobic and in its consequences suicidal nationalism" of the Slovaks? [See ibid., p. 17]
24 Cf., for example, Oskar Krejci, Jak to prasklo, (Praha: Trio, 1991), pp. 124-125.
25 Ibid., p. 16.
26 Ibid., p. 16.
27 Marie L. Neudorfl, "Vaclav Havel and the Ideal of Democracy," a paper delivered at the Vth Congress for Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, August 6-11, 1995, p. 15.
28 Theodor Draper, "The End of Czechoslovakia", The New York Review of Books, No. XL, 3/1993: 15. Similarly, as Draper pointed out, Petr Pithart was promoting an idea of the Czechs as being "accustomed" to behave as "an arrogant older brother." [Ibid, p. 15]
29 See Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, p. 10. On Havel's attack against the federal parliament, the highest body of the federation, see, for example, ibid., pp. 48-49.
30 Ibid., p. 37.
31 Havel, Vazeni obcane, op. cit., p. 27. The possibility or prospect of a breakup was again announced by Havel in a speech to the Federal Assembly on 10 December 1990. See, Young, op. cit. p. 31.
32 Oskar Krejci, Jak to prasklo, (Praha: Trio, 1991), pp. 124-125.
33 See in Dienstbier, op. cit., p. 26.
34 This statement also accusing a popular vote of being demagoguery was made by Milan Uhde, who entered the circles of the Czechoslovak elite as early as the 1950s to be later demoted. Currently, he is Chairman of the Czech National Parliament. See Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15 milionu, op. cit., p. 84.
35 The data is based on a poll made by an official Czechoslovak research institution. Young, op. cit., p. 37. Significantly, one year after the breakup, which was portrayed by Czech political leaders inside the country, as well as abroad as the fulfillment of the wishes of the Slovak nation, a pool established that sixty per cent of the Slovaks would still vote against the split of Czechoslovakia while only 24 per cent consented with it; in March 1993 (three months after the breakup) only 14 per cent of the Slovaks supported the move. [Slavomir Ravik, Bylo Nebylo v listopadu 1993, (Praha: Alernativy, 1993), p. 49] In this light, Ravik himself tended to consider the separation as a "high treason with all its consequences." The "low identification of the Slovaks" with their new state (23 per cent for the separation and 60 per cent against) was also established by a sociological research conducted by the International Politological Institute in Brno (Czech Republic) in October 15-25 1993. [Budovani statu: Aktualni problemy Slovenska po rozpadu CSFR, (Brno: Mezinarodi politologicky ustav Masarykovy univerzity, 1994), pp. 1-2] Moreover, those Slovaks who were in favour of democracy overwhelmingly supported the idea of Czechoslovakia. In addition, according to 58 per cent of the Slovaks, the new Slovak state should not draw its continuity from the Slovak Independent State from World War II, while 20 per cent were of the opposite opinion. [Ibid., p. 2] With regard to the warnings against "undemocratic" and "xenophobic" trends in Slovakia made by the Czech politicians who worked on the breakup, it is also interesting to note that "the principle of a 'strong hand' has less supporters in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic" as embodied by Klaus's government. [Ibid., p. 6]
36 See Young, op. cit., p. 37.
37 Vaclav Havel, Letni premitani, op. cit., p. 22.
38 Ibid., p. 22. In this light, the breakup was also a radical revision of the "ideals" of the Velvet Revolution itself which was a source of legitimacy of the new political elite. In this connection, Dr. Josef Sarka, an organizer of the original student demonstration against the Nazi regime in 1939, who was also participated in the manifestation of November 17, 1989, came to consider the Velvet Revolution as a "betrayed revolution": "what kind of democracy is it when people could not speak their mind about the termination of the Czechoslovak state, and the separation was approved by the deputies who swore their allegiance to the federation?" [Slavomir Ravik, Bylo Nebylo v listopadu 1993, (Praha: Alernativy, 1993), p. 40]
39 Dienstbier, op. cit., p. 28.
40 Young, op. cit., p. 51.
41 On that day, there were actually two meetings organized in Bratislava - one openly separatist and another supporting the federation. Havel "coincidentally", as R. Hovorka put it, participated in both of them. [Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, p. 32]
42 Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, op. cit., p. 65.
43 Ibid., pp. 65-67.
44 Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Je to ve hvezdach, leden 1994, (Alternativy: Praha, 1994), p. 48.
45 Young, op. cit., pp. 31, 33.
46 Ibid., p. 33.
47 Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15 milionu, op. cit., p. 24. M. Macek retreated from his functions after a revelation of his swindle with a privatized state property. On January 4, 1993, a few days after the breakup, M. Macek boasted: "I feel well because it is known about me that I had been pressing for the breakup of Czechoslovakia." [Ibid., p. 25]
48 See Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, op. cit., pp. 118-119.
49 Quoted in Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15 milionu, op. cit., p. 17.
50 Zhuge Liang and Liu Ji, Mastering the Art of War (commentaries on the classic by Sun Tzu), (Boston & London: Shambhalla, 1989), p. 124.
51 Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, op. cit., p. 181.
52 Ibid., p. 192.
53 Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15 milionu, op. cit., p. 14. Young, op. cit., p. 27. As Ravik emphasised, Havel could stay as President in his office till 5 October 1992 and use all his presidential powers for mobilizing support for a common state.
54 Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, p. 55.
55 Slavomir Ravik, Totalni deziluze, (Praha: Prazska imaginace, 1992), p. 85.
56 Quoted in Slavomir Ravik, Bylo - nebylo: Spolecnost trvale neudrzitelne blbosti, (Praha: Periskop, 1995), pp. 50-51. In 1990, Havel explained his new candidacy for president by listening to a "voice of higher responsibility" that "whispered to him that the job has not been finished yet." In 1992, he abdicated and paved the way for separation. [Slavomir Ravik, Totalni deziluze, op. cit., p. 84]
57 Young, op. cit., p. 35.
58 Vilem Hejl , Rozvrat: Mnichov a nas osud, (Toronto: Sixty-Eight Publishers, 1989), p. 44.
59 Ibid., p. 54.
60 Ibid., p. 42.
61 Ibid., p. 54.
62 Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15 milionu, op. cit., pp. 83, 22.
63 Ibid., p. 54.
64 Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, p. 55.
65 Ibid., p. 39.
66 Ibid., p. 55.
67 Ibid. cit., p. 56. Rudiger Kipke, op. cit., p. 155.
68 Rudiger Kipke, "Nejnovejsi politicky vyvoj v Ceskoslovensku v zrcadle verejneho mineni" in Rudiger Kipke, op. cit., p. 55.
69 See, for example, Zdenek Jicinsky, "Ke ztroskotani ceskoslovenskeho federalismu" in Rudiger Kipke, op. cit., p. 71. And Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "Neznesitelna lahkost rozchodu," ibid., pp. 135, 139-140. Actually, before this vote in the federal parliament took place, the employees of the federal government had been deprived of radios, type-writers and other logistic support because the material "delimitation" of the federation had already gone ahead. [Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15 milionu, op. cit., p. 5]
70 See contributions by Rudiger Kipke, Zdenek Jicinsky, Karel Vodicka and Petr Pithart in Kipke, eds., op. cit., p. 53, 79-81, 98-100, 108-109, 225. Cf. an analysis of a former Czechoslovak vice-premier, Pavel Rychetsky, in Lidove noviny, September 1, 1992, p. 8. On October 1, 1992, the federal parliament did not accept a proposal on the termination of the federation whereby it would de facto, contrary to the constitutional order, delegated the power to dissolve the Czechoslovak state to national governments or parliaments. It adopted a proposal of Milos Zeman (social-democrat) on the preparation of the constitutional law on the transformation of the federation into a Czecho-Slovak union. The presidium of the federal parliament with no lawmaking powers on its own simply ignored this legally binding document, so did both republican governments. However, the proposal itself appeared to essentially a disguised exercise in misleading the public because "its last article was proposing to abolish what the first recommended to establish;" in particular, it read: "The Czecho-Slovak Union ceases to exist in a moment of the entry of the Czech and Slovak republics into the European Union." [Pavel Tigrid, Jak to bylo, (Praha: Lidove noviny, 1993), p. 30] On November 5, 1992, the federal government submitted to the federal parliament an addition to its program declaration containing a task to terminate the federation by December 31, 1992, that was again as such unconstitutional (de facto an attempt to dissolve the state by the means of a merely procedural arrangement). This was rejected. In normal conditions, this would have to entail the resignation of the government and new elections. Instead, the Czech government declared its full responsibility for the state of affairs in the territory belonging to the Czech Republic, and, on November 20, 1992, the Czech parliament established a Czech ministry of defence and the office of Czech president while no Czech constitution existed, and matters of defence belonged exclusively to the federation. At the same, both national governments hastily proceeded in concluding a series of inter-state agreements that had the nonexistence of the federation as its basic premise and, thus, stipulated such a situation. Consequently, these agreements and actions had no legal ground. Their basis was only the gentlemen's understanding and will of the two republican prime ministers, Klaus and Meciar. Even, when a tiny majority of the deputies of the federal parliament sanctioned the separation under pressure and threats of Klaus, Meciar and Havel, they did so disregarding their own oaths to the constitutional order of the Czechoslovak state. [See Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, pp. 61, 63, 65-66] For example. J. Kalvoda, the leader of a minor governmental party, the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) representing only some 384,000 voters (around 5 per cent) was one of the most ardent spokesman for the unconstitutional approach: "ODA," he declared in a moment of a short-lived resistance of the highest legislature,, "is not a supporter of such a mode of separation in which the federal parliament would participate with its decisions," "in the process of the separation of the federation, the way by the means of the federal parliament's decision is not needed ..." [Slavomir Ravik, Totalni deziluze, op. cit., p. 77]
71 See contributions by Fedor Gal and Petr Pithart in Kipke, op. cit., pp 156, 162, 230-1. For Petr Pithart, that acknowledgement is somewhat paradoxical because it was he who became an ardent partisan of the thesis that Czechoslovakia had been artificial and a mistake from its very conception, and as Czech Prime Minister (1990-1992) he prepared much of the ground for the ensuing breakup.
72 Vaclav Havel, 1992 & 1993 (projevy), op. cit., p. 21.
73 Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, Projevy cervenec 1990 - cervenec 1992, (Praha: Lidove noviny, 1992), p. 56. Needless to say, Havel made this statement before he reiteratively praised himself that everything that he had ever written was right, and his beliefs were consequently thereby even strengthened.
74 Paul G. Lewis, 'History, Europe and the Politics of the East', in Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis, Eds., Developments in East European Politics, (MacMillan: London, 1993), p. 268. On the continuity of the project Mitteleuropa and its contemporary context see a more detailed discussion below.
75 Slavomir Ravik, Zahradni slavnost pro 15 milionu, op. cit., p. 22.
76 See, for example, Vaclav Havel, Letni premitani, op. cit., pp. 118-119, where he again elevates an allegiance to "certain values" undefinable in a simple language as the main criterion for his decision.
77 Ibid., p. 24. Apparently, the elite achieved in this way a really Hegelian synthesis of identity and non-identity - of the hazardous (detrimental, self-denying) with the self-conscious.
78 Ibid., p. 25.
79 Rostislav Hovorka, Kronika deleni (Ceskoslovensko 1990 - 1992), Pedagogicke stredisko, Hodonin, cerven 1995, p. 61.
80 Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Zlaty pist, kveten 1994, (Alternativy: Praha, 1994), p. 20.
81 Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Zlaty pist, kveten 1994, (Alternativy: Praha, 1994), p. 37. As Zdenek Jicinsky stated, P. Bratinka together with D. Kroupa and other deputies of the Civic Democratic Alliance and the Civic Democratic Party "belonged to these members of parliament who did not publicly recognize the federative arrangement of the state ... In one or another way, they promoted unitarianism [clearly unacceptable as such to the Slovaks], and when the Slovak side did not want to accept it [as expected], they for the split." [Ibid., p. 37] Bratinka also called attention to himself by advocating and arranging - after the split - a return of property and citizenship to the Sudeten German aristocrats collaborating with the Nazi regime. P. Bratinka personally intervened on the side of the Waldsteins, the Bluchers, H. Salm, R. Czernin, K.M. Arc etc. After they were granted citizenship "due to special circumstances, all of them asked for return of milliard-worth estates some of which were confiscated on the basis of collaboration of their owners with the Fascists." [Slavimir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Zlaty pist, kveten 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), p. 24] Bratinka himself commented: "Yes, some of their relatives [from which they derived their rights for property in Bohemia] did collaborate with the Fascists. But why should they suffer because of this?" This was apparently a dangerous attempt on the part of the Böhmisch elite to break the legal post-war status by setting up silently individual precedents. [Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo v rijnu 1993, (Praha: Alternativy, 1993), p. 46] Klaus also supported this unfolding of the post-breakup sequel in a perfect "dialectic" manner: "It is not about reparation [or return of property to Sudeten Germans], but about solving this problem that are two absolutely separate things." [Slavimir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Chaos nebo bordel? unor 1994, (Praha: Alernativy, 1994), p. 61] At the same time, the regime was creating an administrative obstacle for the naturalization of the Czechs of the Volyn region from the former USSR. [Ibid., p. 61] Thus, citizenship was restored, despite the protest of the office of the General Chief of Justice, to Karel Des Fours Walderode who served in the Wehrmacht,was a member of Henlein's Sudeten German party and the Union of German Junkers, which assisted in breaking up Czechoslovakia in the 1930s. The others are successors of Wolf Auerperg (commander of the Nazi wing), Jan Oldrich Buquoy (died at a Nazi battle ship Scharnhorst), Karel Evzen Czernin (died during the battle for France), Alfons Metternich (served the Nazi army) and the Nostics (collaborating with the Fascist regime). [Ibid., p. 62] Michael Buquoy received citizenship merely three days after submitting his application on January 26, 1993 - hardly a month after the breakup. Karel Jiri Buquoy was a founding member of Henlein's party, after the war prosecuted for the crimes against the state. Again Bratinka commented: "First of all, I refuse to be an officer of the state that evaluates children on the basis of their parents [who were formally accepted as rendering the legal ground for return of property and citizenship] ... I refuse to talk about that [italics added]." [Ibid., p. 62] Significantly, the ministry of interior absolved inter alia the Sudeten aristocrats from swearing an oath of allegiance for gaining their citizenship (Des Fours Walderode, Michael Buquoy, some from the Waldsteins and Bluchers).
82 Klaus, op. cit., p. 57.
83 Ibid., p. 68.
84 Ibid., p. 71.
85 Vaclav Havel, Projevy, leden-cerven 1990, op. cit., p. 35.
86 In Kipke, op. cit., pp. 221, 223, 225.
87 Lidove noviny, 6 May 1994, p. 6., For the political aspects of this discussion and polemic with Pithart, see an article of Vaclav Houzvicka, a sociologist of the Czech Academy of Science, Lidove noviny, 2 June 1994, p. 8.
88 See Pithart's article "28 October: Munich from a new perspective" was published in Lidove noviny of 27 October 1994, p. 8. The posited "artificiality" of Czechoslovakia was a chief slogan in the Nazi propaganda and also part of the language of the Munich dictate. [See Compton Mackenzie, Dr Benes, (Toronto: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1946), p. 193]
89 Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, op. cit., p. 40. Vilem Hejl commented similar views - however, voiced in the aftermath of the Munich deal of 1938 (and later reproduced by some dissidents before 1989) in the following way: "From many critiques that appeared after Munich, we can ignore those which asserted that it had been possible to prevent Munich beforehand if Czechoslovakia had in time taken care of its dangerous powerful neighbor. But they do not say anything else than that it would have been possible to prevent the capitulation by a volunteer and willing serfdom - such is shortly the essence of the whole philosophy of subsequent collaborators." [Vilem Hejl, Rozvrat: Mnichov a nas osud, op. cit., p. 36]
90 Vaclav Havel, Vazeni obcane, op. cit., p. 195.
91 In Kipke, op. cit., pp. 201, 203.
92 Vaclav Havel, Projevy, leden-cerven 1990, op. cit., p. 17.
93 Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Zlaty pist, kveten 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), p. 37.
94 This process of weakening the army actually began under the previous Communist regime. In August 1989 (sic), the then Secretary General of the Communist party, Milos Jakes, officially announced, without prior consultation with the army command (!) a reduction of the army service. [Miroslav Vacek, Proc bych mel mlcet, (Praha: NADAS, 1991). p. 48] According to Vacek, Havel as the head of state actively supported the questioning of the role of the army during political meetings. [Ibid., pp. 27-28] Neither, Havel concealed his intention that the question of the protection of borders of the state vis-à-vis Germany "should be changed in the near future." [Ibid., p. 49] In Vacek's view, from the very beginning [thus, from December 1989], the committee of the Civic Forum for the defense matters tried vehemently and at any cost to undermine the defence capability of the army. [Miroslav Vacek, Na rovinu: Bez studu a prikras, (Praha: Periskop, 1994), p. 179] It is also of symbolic importance that the post-1989 political elite abolished the Day of the Czechoslovak Army. [Ibid., p. 210] The essence of the Havel-initiated "convergence" program was succinctly summarized by Slavimir Ravik: "In the post-November euphoria, Havel boasted that we would abolish the defense industry.. In this moment, the foreign military producers cheered up ... Then Havel explained that he had not meant classic ammunition and hand-guns, but tanks and all the military hardware. Thereby, he did not cheer up the Slovaks, who were threatened with an economic collapse which began undermining our relationship with Slovakia. [Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Prusvih po cesku, cerven 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), p. 13. On the governmental policy of "quiet demobilization of the army" after the breakup of Czechoslovakia, which Slavomir Ravik suspects of being part of "deliberate designs" and supporting data see, for example, Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Je to ve hvezdach, leden 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), p. 43; Slavimir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Chaos nebo bordel? unor 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), p. 57; Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Uz jsme tady, brezen 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), p. 59; Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Nevim a jedu, duben 1994, (Praha: Alernativy, 1994), pp. 32-34; Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Zlaty pist, kveten 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), p. 39; Slavomir Ravik, Bylo nebylo: Prusvih po cesku, cerven 1994, (Praha: Alternativy, 1994), pp. 51-52; Slavomir Ravik, Bylo - nebylo: Latrina magika v Cechach, na Morave a ve Slezsku, (Praha: Periskop, 1995), pp. 98-101; Slavomir Ravik, Bylo - nebylo: latrina Magika v Cechach, na Morave a ve Slezsku, (Praha: Periskop, 1995), pp. 312-315.
95 Miroslav Vacek, Na rovinu: Bez studu a prikras, op. cit., p. 153.
96 Emil Hajek, "Ministerstvo obrany, nebo setrnosti?", Listy, No. 3, 1995: 46. Emil Hajek is a retired Czech general.
97 Young, op. cit., pp. 25, 28, 48. Kipke, op. cit., p. 93.
98 Kipke, op. cit., p. 143.
99 Klaus, op. cit., p. 42.
100 Petr Pithart, Czechoslovakia: The Loss of the Old Partnership, paper delivered at the Conference "Federation or Confederation: Searching for a New Partnership", Toronto, 22 June 1994, p. 8.