Wednesday, July 30, 2014

Update on MH17: Running a circle around the false flag (Or in sync with Petri Krohn's and Max van der Werff's findings)

Since virtually all signs are pointing to the MH17 tragedy as a deliberate false flag  attack with only side standing to benefit from it, if it became successful, it is both possible and necessary to sketch the likely game and to put in sync with Petri Krohn's and Max van der Werff's latest analyses:

1. To pin the blame on the Novorossiya army required establishing a possible connection to a plausible weapon, that is, a Buk missile battery since NAF has no air force.

2. This means that it was needed to use a Buk missile to take down the plane.

3. However, to do that also required that the Buk missile be fired as close to the rebels-held territory as necessary since it would have been impossible to sneak a battery and a radar unto the rebels-held territory itself.

4. This was achieved by positioning a Ukrainian Buk missile battery in Zaroschenskoye, where the Ukrainian Army parked it just and only for that day, July 17, when the Malaysian airliner was shot down presumably by such a Buk missile.

5. The positioning of the Ukrainian Buk missile battery, documented by satellite images of the Russian Armed Forces and disclosed in Moscow on July 21, was made a mere 8 km south of rebels-held Shaktyorsk, which the junta tried to occupy on July 26-29.

6. In doing so, the US government and Western media used a deliberately very imprecise map issued by "the  Ukrainian Council of National Security and Defense:"

The map is especially greatly imprecise in the south-west part of the war zone, where it gives to the rebels significantly more territory than what they held there, as can be easily checked against any other maps and accounts. However, it is futile to expect the corporate media or Western talking heads, i.e. Kerry or Psaki, to have any desire to be precise on this account.

7. A better map showing the situation around July 17 is this one, even though this one too is not sufficiently detailed and thus does not show the Zaroschenskoye pocket. Map of July 17; but it allows a good comparison with the US/Ukrainian map and it shows well the bluntly striking attempt to add to the rebels a huge chunk of the territory in the south-west, which was and is in the hands of the Kiev regime and where its Buk missile battery was deployed just for July 17:

8. A more detailed map (as this one) shows not only where the Ukrainian battery in Zaroschenkoyoe was placed, but it also shows that the position was within a thin wedge conveniently, if not precariously wedged in-between rebel’s-held positions at that time—between Pokrovka and Blagodatnoye.

9. Only on July 23-24, the Ukrainian Army was able toenter the village of Blagodatnoye, while it attempted to storm Pokrovka on July 30. („И 23 июля завязали бои за исходные районы этого наступления – Дебальцево и Благодатное. 24 июля им удалось окончательно закрепить за собой Благодатное …”

10. Having positioned the Buk missile battery there, it is also very likely that, if the Ukrainian Army fired a Buk missile, it would have come from there. This would also be consistent with the fact that the US refuses to publish its own satellite photos of what it claimed is its intelligence or established fact that a Buk missile was fired, while, then on the briefing for US media by “US intelligence officers” on July 22 in the aftermath of the briefing by the Russian military offices the day before, a new version of the event was that people in Ukrainian uniforms or “a Ukrainian defector” or “Ukrainian drunken soldiers” might have fired the missile “by mistake.”

11. From the available information and the ongoing discussions, it does seem that the Malaysian Boeing was hit while passing Snezhnoe or, at least, that an attempt to down the plane was made when the plane was over Snezhnoe.
12. In order to create the necessary footprint and the false flag narrative, we can assume, and it is consistent with the information that is available, that the Ukrainian Buk missile was fired against the Malaysian airliner.
13. According to the Russian Defense Ministry’s briefing, when the plane was struck, it was at a point of trying to return to its flight path after suddenly veering 14 km off its path to the north-east. The plane would be thus coming from north-east rather than from north-west.
14. According to Aleksandr Zhilin’s analysis (to which I referred earlier), the plane was proceeding straight and, when hit (by a jet fighter) made a U-turn to the left over Grabovo.
15. According to Petri Krohn though, the plane made not only a U-turn, but almost a circle and crashed when flying from the west and not from the south-east. According to this version, the cockpit, which fell in Rozsypne several kilometers from west off Grabovo, was lost first  and then the main body of the plane with the wings and the engines felled in Grabovo.

16. To adjudicate between Krohn’s and Zhilin’s version should not be the difficult. First, it does make sense, if the cockpit or front of the plane was hit, for this part to fall first, since the inertia would carry the rest of the plane further (the reverse does not appear to be likely). Second, the direction of the wings and the engines should also indicate from which direction the plane was crashing. From available photos from Grabovo, it appears that the plane was, indeed, coming from the west. And thus it seems that Zhilin was mistaken with respect to the direction of the U-turn and that Krohn is right. Zhilin’s version does account for the semi-circle made by the plane to the east and back, as outlined in the Russian Defense briefing.

17. The crash site is otherwise not only some 20 km past or back from Snezhnoe, the furthest (southern) known point reached by the MH17 plane, but the direction of the crash site (west-east) is also at odds with the assumed north-west to east-south flight route of the Malaysian Boeing. These facts almost completely exclude the US official version of the story, in which the plane was hit by the rebels with a Buk fired from Snezhnoe and then fell (sideways) almost 25 km in Grabovo/Rozsypne in front of Snezhnoe.

18. The sharp deviation of the plane to the east and back is, indeed, very strange and otherwise inexplicable. It appears that, for a while, the plane lost its navigation, coordinates, and GPS and did so right in the middle of the war zone. It is thus very hard to assume that the plane would be directed to make this “mistake” by Ukrainian air controllers or by the pilots themselves. If this was, as it appears to be a false flag operation from the very beginning, then it would be also possible to assume that this sudden deviation from the course was not a mistake, but that it might have been somehow a part of the plan. By making this deviation over the war zone, it appears that the plane was saying or, better said, even baiting: “I am a strange plane: Would any civilian plane do this? Please shoot me!”

19. By making the deviation, which was then putting the plane more straight or head-on with respect to the Ukrainian battery in Zaroschenkoye than sideways (or at an almost right angle: Zaroschenkoye versus the original flight path from the north-west), it might have been possible to “fake” the direction and trajectory from which the missile was fired—aligning the new flight path with Zaroschenkoye instead of Snezhnoe in order to present the latter for the former.

20. The deviation of the plane 14 km off and (almost) back before being hit would almost indicate that, when the deviation started, the pilots were either no longer alive or that the plane was either flying at remote control or on re/pre-programmed auto-pilot, whereby the deviation was executed.

21. After this hit or attempt, the plane apparently traveled another 50-70 km (making the loop), which would take some 4-5 minutes with its travel speed of 900km/h. But since the plane's speed falling to 200km/h, the time would take few additional minutes.

22. The available information, especially Krohn’s investigation and analysis, thus seems to be indicating that, if a Ukrainian Buk missile was fired, it did not fatally destroy the plane. The plane started losing quickly speed and altitude, but was still capable of staying in the air and continuing on its new circular route/deviation.

23. At this moment, as the Russian Ministry informed, from the left of the plane, a Ukrainian military fighter appeared, climbing above 5000m towards the plane and then staying in the vicinity of the Malaysian airliner for at least another 4 minutes.

24. The damage to the cockpit and the wings does seem to indicate that the coup de grace delivered to the Boeing was then executed with either a fighter’s cannon (Krohn's preference) or with a Ukrainian jet fighter's air-to-air missile(s), which then caused the front part to sever and fall in Rozsypne before the rest of the plane crashed in Grabovo. Since the distance between the cockpit and the rest is about 2-3 km, one can also assume that the plane was gunned down not that far from these two places. 

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