Так oднажды говорилa Москвa, но Кремль теперь молчит

Just yesterday late at night, I went across (the) Shaker's post for that day in which he wrote that the junta has achieved none of its objectives and that its strategy is everywhere failing. 

Today, only several hours later, with the fall of Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, and Konstantinovka, the (sic) Shaker fired out that this is a "political disaster for Novorussia and even Russia."

Well, it is not a disaster ... but it could be: 1) if Putin and the Russian government continue what they are doing and saying and not doing and saying what they should be and 2) if major overhaul is not introduced with all the seriousness and urgency which war and a direct threat to the country's security require. 

The class of pathetic measures has meanwhile been further enriched today: the Russian Foreign Ministry reacted with a grammatically correct statement that "it shares the UN concern over the plight of the people in east Ukraine," and Russia announced that, as of today!, they will be no longer sending weapons to the Ukrainian government from Crimea. Sometimes, even ineptitude, whether benign or criminal, is incredibly symbolic.

Now, we can see a version of what happened in Krajina in the summer of 1995 and Moscow and people in the east of Ukraine will try to make a deal with the victorious fascists and emboldened NATO or a more gradual retreat will happen or new factors will change the situation.

Some Syrian patriots criticized Putin and Russia for helping Syria only up to a point at which the war in Syria or, to be more precise, a 4th generation warfare invasion of Syria continues to drag instead of giving them greater military help for a quicker and decisive victory. On this account, I did defend on few forums the indispensable value of Russia's help.  Then I started noticing statements coming from Moscow that indicated a presence of problematic and even haughty attitudes and statements evidently made to say some of the things, which the West wanted to hear. In this respect, I noticed, but passed (till now) in silence one portion of Putin's interview in France on June 5 when he went on record making  a factually and politically very wrong statement that the Syrian government and "the opposition" are "equally guilty of mass atrocities."

Now, when it comes to Ukraine, it is easy, almost all too easy to see US escalation strategy at work: it was moving like a clock through its charts of ever greater force and expanding attacks down to the caliber and the type of weapons that are to be used. This gradual and systematic escalation has already reached a point of daily shelling of Russian border posts and hence Russia’s own territory—and with impunity.

This very careful and well planned escalation by degrees almost seems to be following a protocol and design, which is exactly the case.

This calibrated escalation (also used for Maidan itself) was (mis)matched by attempted demobilizing de-escalation from Putin, most openly presented by him four days ahead of the referenda when he urged their effective cancellations. Putin's own stated goal was to "create favorable conditions" for the elections of Poroshenko as new Ukrainian president.

Thus, soon after the referenda, the rapid mobilization and strategic escalation on the part of the junta was met with appeasement sought by Moscow and haphazard and disorganized mobilization attempts on the side of the antifascist resistance made of poorly prepared by civilians for most part. On the part of antifascist resistance, we do have an improvised, spontaneous revolt against the junta and fascism launched by ordinary people (which was not exactly the case in Crimea). The war in Syria was prepared and organized for several years before it was launched and, similarly, Maidan was a long and carefully planned and organized regime change action. As a result, there is now a significant disparity of forces.

As a result, there is now a significant disparity of forces. Sheer statistics and the power of logistics organized by the state of Ukraine and NATO started to loom above the tactical prowess and heroism of the militia. 

Reaching some kind of agreement with Europeans is as illusory as thinking, as Putin expressed it in his 4 July congratulation and greeting to Obama, that the Empire would ever treat Russia as an "equal partner" (instead of New Rome's New Carthage). And the Europeans are but Empire's willing assistants.

To argue that Europe or the EU should stop "this nightmare" at its borders is pathetic. The EU is in political and military terms but an economic prop to NATO, and this nightmare is at the borders of Russia and aimed on Russia. To appeal to one's own enemies for help and rescue is ludicrous.

Russia should have conducted public (people’s) diplomacy, and Putin should have made a clear agreement with the people in east Ukraine. Instead, Putin preferred an ever increasing ambiguity.

Putin's ability to salvage his face now depends on and is in the hands of Strelkov who is ready to sacrifice himself for it.

Three months ago the Kiev junta had 5000 man in a disorganized and dysfunctional army. Now they have 60 000 combat troops, which does not include a very large logistical base of a 44 million state with the whole Western alliance firmly behind it.

And these 60,000 and growing are no longer disorganized, but combat-trained so that, at this pace, there is a reasonable prospect to see at this pace at least a 100,000 army driven by combat fury, hate for Russia, and fascist nationalism.

Those who helped blocked Russia's effective action with the mirage of World War III when the danger was many times smaller than it is now (neutralizing a 5,000 force), will have a chance to reuse the argument for the chances of a world war and NATO's direct involvement do rise with the stakes and the rapid rise of the power of the Ukrainian army. Risking a world war for several thousands of militants led by the Right Sector on behalf of a coup d’état is one thing. Risking a world war when you have suddenly 40 million people harnessed to a fascist dictatorship with a whole modern army of 100,000-500,000 on the move and Moscow only 400 miles away is a whole new game. Moreover, if this happens against the backdrop of a serious moral and political crisis and disorientation.

Relying on some economic or social self-destruction of the junta is not a strategy, but a wish, which posits a yet not-existent deus ex machina of the future for the actual hard struggle of today. Moreover, unarmed crowds cannot turn against armed fascism. And the junta will sell to the people its difficulties for hate of Russia and Putin. Gazprom might also strike a new deal with the junta.

It is only a matter of time till the Ukrainian government, as Moscow also calls it, will issue its new "ultimatum"--not just to the Donetsk insurgents or "terrorists," as they call them--but to Russia over Crimea. And we already know that, once Kiev does that, it will have the US and whole NATO lined up behind them with "strategic destabilization" in Russia, the Caucuses, and Central Asia in full swing.

Russia's strategy from the late 1980s has been to trade nearly all its allies—for concessions and a promise of partnership. Real power and influence has thus been traded Russia’s own progressive concessions. One major exception to this rule has been China.

The Roman Empire started falling apart when it exhausted its expansion and, with it, new sources to plunder. In this regard, the resources of Russia are enough to give the Empire a new lease on life for hundreds of years.

Back on June 16, Strelkov concluded that, without serious decisions and measures made by Moscow, antifascist resistance in east Ukraine is "strategically losing" and would be defeated. He also indicated that this defeat would also be Russia's own defeat. Then, on July 2, when Putin announced in Moscow that "everything that is going on in Ukraine is the internal business of the Ukrainian government" and while trying to put together yet another fictional ceasefire, Strelkov made his point explicit: "If we lose, this will be a defeat not just of a small band of militiamen, but of the Russian people" ("Если мы проиграем, это будет поражение не кучки ополченцев, а русского народа"). Strelkov issued this warning on June 2, and, at night on June 4 and 5, the Donetsk militia withdrew from Slavyansk and Kramatorsk after two-and-half month-long heroic struggle against the combined and united might of a 40-million fascist state. 

These are strange times. Fascism is back, but its most formidable, most disciplined and adamant opponent in the form of communism is gone. And many in the West who profess their sympathies for the Russians are sure that non-interference with fascism in Ukraine and less assistance to the resistance rather than more is the safest, most responsible, most reliable and best way of how to deal with the beast.

Strelkov knows what he is talking about. He looked the beast into the eye.

Back in World War II, the Moscow radio started its famous reports with the words: "Говорит Москва ..." Moscow is speaking ... Who would have guessed that, when fascism returns, we would have this instead: "A Кремль молчит ..."