Heidegger,Dugin and Impious Euthypro from Ohio

Dugin is ripping Heidegger, who was for Leo Strauss the deepest Nazi "philosopher," and is trying to stick it to the cause of antifascist resistance in Donbass. Dugin in his own words: "Narod does not exist for all these ideologies ... But it does exist—it is the only thing that truly exists. Heidegger used to say, 'Dasein exists through a People' (Das Dasein existiert völkisch). .... Only when faced with death does it become clear what it means to be Russian. People go to Novorossia, to Donetsk and Lugansk, obeying the Will of Russian History, drawn in by the Russian Death. It is this Red Death that makes Russians what they are. Death in the world. In the name of Narod. Death for Narod is life. Thus, people go to Novorossia to live in the Russian way."

The cruel irony is that the leaders of the Right Sector do have a less mystical, but more precise understanding of Heidegger. With this sort of philosophizing, one introduces a set of views against which the people have risen in Donbass in a merely repackaged form.

Dugin's often penetrating political analysis is thus crafted on thinking, which heralded the "death of man" and "death of philosophy" as a march into "clearing" and Heidegger's (Nazi) politics and "poetics" of death. Dugin's anti-communism and hatred of liberalism is making him a Russian Heidegger. Yet, in this way, paradoxically, if not tragically, Dugin is doing something very similar to the Russian liberals. While Russian liberal Westernizers commonly import their own believes from the West, without blinking, Dugin decided to import Heidegger and construct his "Russian nationalism" out of it, thus trying to merge two very different things--one is death to another.

Thus Dugin came to believe that, if he is to mean something as a philosopher, he needs to speak Heidegger's language and so he does. His terminology is borrowed from Heidegger. Yet, in fact, this means that he thus stops talking like a Russian and takes on a persona of Russian Heidegger. But when one looks more carefully at his analysis where he is at his best, he does not need Heidegger's heavy-handed terminology. Heidegger's "cowardly" mysticism (to use Leo Strauss' own private appraisal of Heidegger) at best obscures Dugin's political analysis. At worst, it assimilates it with Nazi thinking.

God, please save us from ourselves for we don't know what we are doing! If Heidegger in his old age said that "only God can save us" (a new Nietzschean god), perhaps we can rejoinder by saying that, if we get really lost, then perhaps only God can save us from ourselves where (especially in relation to our atheistic comrades), I would only add that God can be here that part in us which (always) beats our own intelligence or prejudice, whichever happens to get into the way of the Good.

But since high caliber thinkers are the most incorrigible people in the world, and so it is usually too late to save them (from themselves), a prudent course of action would be to try to save people from them. And to keep Russian Heideggers further away from the walls of the Kremlin.

Here is, however, another production by Alexander Dugin also from today, which shows that when Dugin forgets to talk and think like Heidegger, he becomes his own man and becomes one of the strongest Russian political analysts (google translated, though):

"Enough help: save, save, STEPPING situation on Novorossia little clearer. Troops did not enter. Bad, but what can you do. But it seems everyone has realized that giving Novorossia equivalent accelerated junta attack on Crimea, which means exactly the war that so tried to avoid all delays with quality support DNR and LC. Now the picture is clear. Being reorganized defense, military and political centralization of control under the auspices of small arms and the official authorities of New Russia, and in the near future, I think we go on the offensive. Main cohesion and determination. Novorossia reunification with Russia postponed indefinitely (Transnistria scenario), but if we will defend the new state, the legal side of this question a hundred times will be revised. in Russia from May to July were two parallel universes: patriotic and information , continues the line of Russian Spring and active party plum, in the face of the sixth column, which not only screamed "not to send troops," "not to draw Russia into war" (for some reason, completely forgetting about the Crimea and and that the junta in any moment can draw Russia into the war worth it just to attack the Crimea), but generally opened a case to ensure that the right to bring Novorossia (requirement I. Jurgens Putin - "revoke Rifle and Beard", confirmed in kinked-schizoid konspiratsionistskoy manner provocateur Kurginyanom). The Kremlin took his time, balancing between these lines without throwing Novorossia completely, but not providing enough support to effectively protect people from genocide. Attention to the word "reasonable." If support would be "sufficient", many would not be a horror. So, it was not sufficient. And it is a fact. One explanation of this duality - Moscow game on the contradictions between the EU and the USA. I dealt with this topic for many years and is committed responsibly argue that for a complete split between Brussels and Washington until the conditions are ripe. And especially in the Ukrainian situation. Contradiction there, but still ahead, and it will have to work very seriously. As elsewhere, the personal actions of Putin's effectiveness and efficiency. But as elsewhere, his reforms have almost no institutionalization, everything rests on manual control, and should he turn away, all at once falls from his hands. NATO will not break up now, it will break later. And count on the fact that suspending aid Novorossia we convince Europe and this will push her ​​to take a specific position is simply naive. Theoretically correct (from a geopolitical point of view), but does not consider the timing of processes. It's on the next turn. All Ukrainian epic Moscow will have to go with support for themselves and partners multipolar club (also not yet ready to fully support and coordinated strategy). Lack of institutionalization perfectly reasonable endeavors to Europe Putin makes logical chain - "betray Novorossia Europe will support the thesis of" our Crimea "and" stop the war "- into something naive, ridiculous, and to give the sixth column. Not support (yet). We may have to go whole range of tests to return to the Russian Mir all 20 million of its citizens who are under the authority of the neo-Nazi junta and only then deal with Europe. Next. Sixth column mortally frightened Russian people with a gun, fighting not to order, and by his heart. Her deadly frightened patriotism and steep true folk reform leadership Novorossia. mortally frightened Her symbolic image of a small arm. mortally frightened Her rousing Russian people. So she climbed out of the skin, these two unbearable months to torpedo any means Russian Spring. tried to strike the final blow Kurguinjan, lashing out at Strelkova in the most critical moment when a feather on one of the cups weights predetermined decision on the adequacy of assistance this time. It's all understandable and certainly not over yet. Novorossia once whacks, threatens to turn into another state with Russian avant-garde folk and patriotic conservative agenda. And here Greater Russia faces a choice: to say to the New Russia "yes" to rely on the Russian Awakening, because this patriotic upsurge began precisely with the sharp and was taken up by "Hurrah!" Crimean people demarche Putin, or merge it to demonize its leaders and heroes, disown militias and new Russian Epic, emerging before our eyes. But it is fraught review support Russian masses in Russia itself. Putin is poised to lead the Russian Spring, but taking in this matter towards the sixth column, the contrary, he hit himself. In all senses - both morally and historically, and even technologically. A sixth column just waiting in secret. Once (God forbid) Putin will weaken support for the Patriots lost, the sixth column connects to the fifth and to take advantage of their insidious plans also by patriots (in the spirit of network warfare, where all the tools are suitable - for Evromaydane this technology connection between the liberals and nationalists, and even Neo-Nazis again tested). Sufficient help Novorossia - Patriots victory and Putin. And all in vain efforts to oppose him Strelkova. Shooters embodies the people, but the people, devoted to his State performing their duty. And if the state takes people and expresses its aspirations, the people of this State is faithfully. Therefore, the formula for winning the battle Novorossia Putin + arrows. Then all the risks transferred and assigned to the outside network Atlanticist agents of influence, that is, traitors. It will be difficult? Yes. But I do not agree with the hypothesis of our friend and patriot Yevgeny Fyodorov about "Putin's weakness," his hands and feet bound sixth and fifth column, as well as direct representatives of the World Government. I think Putin is completely sovereign ruler. And it will be quite a sovereign, if finally will support the Patriots. People he feels he understands Russian, it himself in the end, it is Russian and quite popular. That's what "our man in the Kremlin." But the fact that so many years he is operative game, what to do - the former does not happen. Draining Novorossia under any pretext (the argument can be any "avoid war", "an internal affair of the neo-Nazi State", "bad militias", "little children and women's bodies, "etc.) - both war (Crimea), and betrayal, and empty efforts to" separation of Europe "(early, not ripe), and loss of time and territory. And most importantly: the peoples of this opposition, namely the people - the basis of support for Putin. Therefore plums Novorossia - end Russia. The sixth column, together with the fifth and cheated and betrayed patriots, including returning from Novorossia fighters and refugees, plans to overthrow Putin. It is the American plan, including the repetition of the Maidan in Moscow. Here everything is transparent, and Putin is not blind not to see this perspective, and not suicidal, to seeing her continue in this spirit. I am today in the following. Party plum and its strategy will be gradually phased out. Novorossia will receive sufficient support to remain, protect and go to the counter-offensive. And we will move to where should. two-month delay ends. Putin + Shooters. From defense to offense. Last: It is important not to forget about the Crimea. How cheerfully he began as a folk patriotic impulse was shot down later. Revolution can not be transformed into everyday life, immersed in a lot of Russian Spring technological details. Crimea should not be just the same as Russia, it is not enough. It should be somewhat better - even in the idea, in theory, on the horizon - the present-day Russia, it should be at least one step closer to the New Russia to New Russia. After Aksenov Chaly - Russian folk heroes. Not just business executives. Stage movement in Russian future must be such Russian Crimea, New Russia. To Novorossia. Towards a New Russia. Therefore Crimea need another chord popular revolution, another revolution purification and takeoff."

"Technically (in)correct propaganda" versus telling the truth to power and even to oneself

Joaquin Flores presented a manual for "technically correct propaganda" the "good example" of which includes an important and actually truthful piece by Dugin, which is actually one of several other studies that have already "outed" so to speak the role of Khodakovsky, the Vostok battalion commander, responsible for the decimation of his battalion at the Donbass airport and then leading his men to a prepared ambush on the border. Khodakovsky himself is clearly part of multiple games played in the background. Dugin's piece is thus a very strange exemplification of what Flowers otherwise seems to advocate. The "exemplary" piece by Dugin meets no explicit talking points or demands made by Flores on behalf of "technically correct propaganda." In fact, in its essence, it directly contradicts them.

Flowers' stated concerns are laudable, and the call for taking or stealing the liberals' monopoly on "human rights" is one of the battles that needs to be won. 

There are, however, some serious issues with Flowers' directives. In my view, the most critical are the following:

1. "The concept of the ‘just war’ still prevails today, and despite the loss of property and regrettable destruction of lives and the increasing casualties, the cementing in the European (and internally, Russian) discourse that the Russians are the victims is more valuable in the near term and long term, and ultimately will save more lives than would be otherwise."

The notion that having made or allowed one's enemy to produce more corpses and suffering on one's side to buy with it more sympathy in the West or some "value" with one's own people is a way of saving lives has no factual or even logical support. Just war theory emphasizes mainly the importance of the cause, and people sympathize with various sides based on their interests and the cause. Both recent and not recent wars produced many dead people and suffering, and people showed an amazing ability and willingness to ignore or even cheer suffering and death of the side, which they don't like or don't care about. 

But to induce the enemy to "increase one's own casualties" and call it a strategy is like a devil's advice. In fact, this is what some of Western propaganda started imputing to Putin in order to present him as a leader who does not care for the people and uses them merely as an instrument of cold-blooded realpolitik. Reapolitik works as a snake charm for students of politics, but one cannot lead and inspire a nation with it.

To say that, basically the Russian government needs to buy Western opinion with Russian blood and present this is a pro-Russian position is as good as asking a person to shoot his own arm off so that he can be then helped with someone else's arm.

I am not sure when knowingly letting one's people die (without any other reason except for having them die) on a massive scale has ever gained oneself a sympathy from others ... unless, as in cases like in 9/11, the "letting" is kept secret for a sufficient length of time, which is possible only under a near total control or domination of the media and info space. But then one would be merely trying to plagiarize the Empire's cookbook.

In a word, to let fascists kill or even overrun one's own in order to impress emotionally the liberals is quite something in itself. Especially, if these liberals are actually allies and cheerleaders with the same fascists.

To present this as a serious strategy with a serious face is a very bold sale pitch, to say the least.

Yet knowing what things are sold and bought, one can never underestimate either a man's folly or the cunning of the salesman. 

2. "Putin must finally act when he is pushed from below and from  the sides by all; rather, by all who are outraged and upset by the crimes committed by the KJ campaign.  To act before this, conversely, is to draw the ire both in Europe and in Russia of the liberals.  Of course their ire will be there at any rate, but the critical question is the language of the liberals."

To base one's decisions of war and peace on the pressure of excited emotions (pressure from all sides) and, above all, from the liberals, is the stupidest thing I've heard in a long time. Especially if to make decisions only then and only under such conditions is get the get the liberal's ire anyway--because "of course their ire will be there at any rate." So no matter what ones does, one will still upset and outrage the liberals, the enemies, but one must "act finally only" when the liberals are "at any rate" upset ... For "the language of the liberals is the critical question." To make one's salvation, strategy or victory depend on whether the liberals are going to be pleased or slightly less upset is tantamount to basing one's actions and decisions on the emotions and pleasures of the liberals. The West would love that and so would the liberals. But, of course, seeing what is happening, one can never discount either one's amoral short-sightedness (I took out a more mundane term) or such friendly advice.

3. "It is important to maintain the pervasive belief at the targeted audience that Russia is not involved while not attacking Putin or the Russian effort."

According to Flowers, "technically correct propaganda" in Ukraine in the interest of Moscow would be then pervasively claiming, lying, believing or establishing that  Russia is not involved. But, at the same time, Russia's established or claimed non-involvement must no be presented as a criticism, issue, or problem. Something like: "Let us pretend that A) we are doing what we are not doing and that we are not doing what we are doing so that we can do the opposite of what we are (not) doing ... when we sell and exchange our victimhood and blood for the language of the liberals and emotional ire."

Flowers does not seem to believe that truthfulness about principles and fundamental issues might be the best and most needed strategy. To mobilize people by preaching non-involvement is like trying to breathe by closing one's mouth and nose. Moreover, if one has to mobilize and sway people based on pretense and lies, one might have a still bigger problem somewhere.

One central problem in this is the lack positive evidence that the Russian government does want Novorossyia to succeed. Putin went on record saying that he wanted the junta's presidential elections to succeed. Putin also went on record against holding the referenda in the people's republics.

Moreover, at this point, we still have not even the slightest sign of any publicly expressed moral support for the people's republics by the Russian government.

Kiev started increasing its military buildup around Crimea, concentrating a portion of its heavy weapons there. Kiev's strategy is a strategy and it is a plan, and it is methodical as was its siege of Slavyansk, which forced people's self-defense to retreat from five larger cities with a combined population of over 500,000 people. The Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republic now control just about 20% of these regions' territory.

Some people think that one of the key purposes of analysis is to keep reassuring oneself of the feeble-mindedness of one's opponent, whether this feeble-mindedness is real or assumed, and congratulate oneself on one's assured victory every such an opportunity of the opponent's assumed or real feeble-mindedness presents oneself. Truth to be hold, this is putting Sun Tzu not only on his head, but turning the art of war into a battle of the most placating fairy tales and does more harm to oneself. Underestimating the enemy is a kinderstube mistake.

Strelkov asked: Why did Russia rush to rescue several thousand South Ossetians and not millions of Russians? One of the most obvious reasons seems to be that the Western pressure against Russia helping in Ukraine is many times stronger than in Iraq. Helping in Ukraine is the least and most undesirable thing which the West wants to see Russia to do. Hence the greatest pressure and threats ... The other reason is, and I think now very obvious that Russia did not expect that there would be a people's pro-Russian revolt in eastern Ukraine. And so they did not plan for it, and since they did not plan for it (unlike for securing the bases in Crimea), they, indeed, did not have plans, policies, and strategies in place. Governments are people too, and, in most cases, they work more slowly than people do. In history, it happened few times that revolutions happened that took even revolutionaries who were trying to prepare for them and make them by surprise and unprepared. And the more if this happens to a state and bureaucracy under oligarchy where nothing happens before someone produces many pages and then submits them to a whole hierarchy of approvals and permissions.

So these are strange times, indeed. In 1939-1941, Stalin was afraid to mobilize or build better defenses in the west in fear that Nazi Germany would consider it aggressive. 

In 2014, when the Banderites came to power in Kiev, we are assuring each other that greater and more effective help to the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics would be bad, dangerous and stupid because fascists in Kiev and their allies would call it an aggression. 

We or so many of us, and apparently also many Russians, are afraid of what the fascists would say of them or us ... if we don't do what they want us to do.

In 1999, NATO called even Yugoslavia's self-defense an act of aggression. 

And today Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy is also called an act of aggression.

In 2001, the non-existent connection between Iraq and 9/11 was called an act of aggression. In 2001, the non-existent weapons of mass destruction, previously destroyed by the UN, were also called aggression. 

Thus, the Empire's lies were called aggression on the part of someone else.

How does one please fascists without becoming one of them or one of the victims of their aggression? 

By the way, the West has already called Crimea's return to Russia aggression. The West also called Russia's response to Georgia's attack in 2008 a Russian war of aggression as well. 

In the eye of principled fascism, one's existence is enough to be declared aggression. The old Hobbesian principle behind the modern corporate state whose "natural state" is war against all else.

Strange things are, however, often a result of our misinformation, false beliefs, ignorance, or the lack of knowledge and understanding; perhaps a combination of states of denial and being misled. 

So some "strange" things to consider:

1. In 1988 and perhaps even in early 1989, who would have thought that communists in the former East would not only agree to the fall of communism, but would also engineer it or actively help it to happen?
2. A NATO officer: We foresaw the breakup of Yugoslavia at least as early as 1983.
3. Banderites waging war, killing civilians and marauding in eastern Ukraine 400 miles east of Moscow with NATO full support? How many would have thought this absolutely crazy just several months ago?
4. Would many people have thought that that the US and NATO would want to bomb Syria in order to help al Qaeda armies?
5. How many would have thought that Russia would give Ukraine (a fascist junta) some $5 billion in free gas?
6. Do many people know that the Hague Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia keeps behind bars Vojislav Seselj for more than eleven and half years for his speeches and political activity and without conviction? 
7. Do you know that when the US invaded Afghanistan with 140,000 troops (more or less) to fight al Qaeda 50-200 men strong--according to the Pentagon's own public statements?
8. How many fascists in Ukraine does it take to command a nation of 44 million whose every fifth member was killed by the Nazis in World War II?

And this is just a quick short list.

Yanukovich is in the Kremlin, and Putin is gone

Ukraine today is in the midst of killing Russians, pro-Russians, and anyone suspected of supporting them, thus trying to restore Ukraine's "rightful" and "traditional" place in the bosom of its European "Fatherland," which traditionally loved Ukraine that much:

Ukraine under the junta is marching back to Europe, which means that it is marching with fascist columns on the east, and Europe is marching forward to, trying to put some democratic makeup on the faces of the fascist shock troopers, while the Russian government is trying to utter the best passable compliments to its Ukrainian and Western "partners" with gentle reminders of their joint responsibilities. At the same time, the Kremlin and Putin's fans are now turning what have been mere hints into ever louder rebukes to the antifascist resistance in east Ukraine to the effect that they are at best misguided fools.

Borys Filatov, a right-hand of Kolomeysky, explains the "miracle" of fascist peace in Dnienpropetrovsk. The method is the one, for which Yanukovich would have been hanged in the Hague. Maidan occupied and seized government property and buildings, shot the police and set them on fire. Then the US praised them for their "incredible non-violence." Now, Filatov explains what the new Maidan authorities do once in power:

Dnipropetrovsk is a firewall of pro-government sentiment in a restive region ...“I called them in and told them there is a red line,” said Borys Filatov, the deputy governor who made a fortune as a corporate lawyer. “I said, you can wave your flags and shout anything you want. But if you try to take over the building, there won’t be any of this ‘Please leave,’ like in Donetsk. We will shoot without warning. We will kill you.” He paused and seemed to ponder how his take-no-prisoners message sounds to an outsider. “I am sorry if I sound brutal,” he said." The West and its journalists were deeply in awe.

The plan for nazification of east Ukraine is euphemistically dubbed brutal "neutralization." Otherwise, to use the plan's own other expression (p. 2), it could also be called "Fascism's new phase: back to normal" by means of massive state terror, which includes:

1.      crackdown to be undertaken "irrespective of public opinion"

2.      "gain" to be obtained: "decimation of activists and pro-Russian voters"

3.      "gain" to be obtained: wholesale destruction and shutdown of the economy of Donbas, thus "relieving" the fascist regime of too many antifascist people

4.      destruction of Donbass (genocide) will help save Kiev money by reducing gas 

5.      consumption and imports

6.      use of "non-conventional weapons" (read: prohibited by Geneva Conventions and chemical weapons, etc.) is recommended

7.      adults ought to be "relocated to [concentration] camps"

8.      executions of people on the spot is recommended whether armed or not and irrespective of status, age, or gender

9.      even children under 13 are to be moved away to concentration "facilities"

10.  all wounded survivors should be persecuted for terrorism

11.  large scale expropriations of private properties envisaged

12.  areas of such state terror and massive deliberate repression shall be off the limits to any outside media

13.  massive and systematic disregard of Geneva Conventions and laws of war

14.  Everything on the ground and the whole course of the junta's so-called ATO or "anti-terrorist operation" conforms to this plan and fits it to a t.

This plan makes both the junta and RAND criminal organizations and war criminals.

  

In its execution, the plan looks like this (the list is by no means complete):

   

Since the armed coup in December we have seen Dimitry Yarosh, the leader of the Right Sector, seizing Russian assets and properties in Ukraine, killing and kidnapping Russian journalists and citizens, hundreds of verbal attacks by "officials" on Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and top Russian leaders, death threats against officials of all levels, sanctions applied against Russian officials and even journalists by the Kiev, ethnic Russians killed and bombed on a daily basis, attacks on an embassy with the participation of the foreign minister, military incursions into Russian territory, the bombing of Russian border checkpoints, the stealing of Russian resources including 4.5 billion dollars in gas, false flag operations staged to blame Russia, continuous wild claims against Russia by top officials and the list goes on.

This was supposed to be originally a picture showing the humanitarian side of the fascist junta from Slavyansk after the retreat of Strelkov's militia. It did not take long for people to see and notice things even in the junta's own disinfo production: 

As Strelkov and others also noted, when the junta begins its assault, it systematically targets first civilian infrastructure, water supplies, energy plants, electricity and gas networks, and factories. After factories, the junta's heavy artillery proceeds with destruction of hospitals and schools and then bombs apartment buildings and whole streets. The shelling includes white phosphorous, chemical weapons, cluster bombs, and large caliber missiles. Fascism even in Ukraine works still according to a plan. The militiamen are often targeted only after these priorities are addressed. 

Under the conditions of outside appeasement, fascism has overcome a serious psychological barrier--the fear and resistance to kill "not simply living people, but their own people, i.e. civilians and Russians. The Ukrainian Army has no longer this problem. 

The New York Times helps us understand what, besides Moscow's inaction, started making difference in Ukraine. Fascism and shock troopers learned how to shoot into their own people: 

Mykola Sungurovskyi, the director of military programs at the Razumkov Center, a policy research organization here in the capital of Ukraine, [explained that] ... there has also been aid from abroad ... but even more important ... was a crucial psychological shift: Soldiers surmounted a reluctance to open fire on their own countrymen ... 'They have overcome that psychological barrier in which the military were afraid to shoot living people,' Mr. Sungurovskyi said. “They had this barrier after Maidan, after the death of that hundred — not simply to shoot living people, but their own people.

 Andriy Parubiy, the leader of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, chimed in:

  

We, of course, studied the experience of both Croatia and Israel ... [but if] this experience is successful, this experience can very easily be used ... even in Belarus and Kazakhstan. If we do not stop Putin here, nobody knows where his Girkins will appear next.

   

From Slavyansk, meanwhile, like from Kransnyi Liman or Schastie, stories are coming out about executions of males of the military age and even mothers of militiamen. In accordance with the dirty war or rather fascist war plan prepared for the junta by U.S. strategic and military think tank RAND.

While this is happening, let's bring back what Putin said on March 2, which, for the Russians and millions of people in the world, was a loud and clear message:

   

In case if the violence in Ukraine and Crimea spreads, the Russian Federation reserves the right to protect its interests and the interests of the Russian-speaking citizens. ... Moscow reserves the right to protect its interests and those of Russian speakers in Ukraine, the Kremlin said. Putin also drew attention to the provocative, criminal actions by ultra-nationalists, in essence encouraged by the current authorities in Kiev. The Russian President underlined that there are real threats to the life and health of Russian citizens and compatriots on Ukrainian territory.

On July 7, Sergey Lavrov defined Russia's position, which has become clear--though very opposite to Putin's Marc 2 position, as follows in an interview with Bulgaria's Focus News Agency: “The principles of a state's sovereignty and the non-interference into internal affairs [in Ukraine] have priority significance." 

In other words the borders of Ukraine is more important than any humanitarian issue which might occur. This is a license to kill for the Ukrainian government. A blank check for the junta and NATO to implement the RAND nazification plan to the fullest. And, much less than chess by Putin, what we have now looks more like a dance between death, fascism, various oligarchs and Moscow. 

And so, as many antifascist militiamen and their supporters see it, Putin broke his word as and obligation. As, one can see in this interview with an antifascist militiamen from Lugansk. An Anna-News reporter is asking him what happened today. The man briefly answers, but then he says that he needs to talk rather about something else. He "wants to say a word to the leadership of Russia. I am Russian living in Ukraine. And when Crimea was joining Russia, we were all full of joy, and then, at the massive manifestations, they were saying that 'Russians do not abandon their own." And we believe it ... but when the say that Russians do not abandon their own, we no longer believe it. ... We cannot fight with a Kalashnikov against tanks and artillery pounding us from 15 km away. ... If you say that Russians don't abandon their own, you must prove it. ... We deeply bow to all the volunteers from Russia. And when it comes to Putin and to the leadership of Russia, we no longer believe them. You were saying that you are not abandoning Russians. But that's exactly what you have done." 

Another antifascist militiaman in Lugansk reveals that he is from Turkmenistan. He says that he went to Lugansk to fight for the underling: "It is always necessary to defend the weak. If people are coming here to help Russians even from a country like mine, from Turkmenistan, why cannot then much stronger Russia come with help?"

Meanwhile, the junta and its shock troops are fully enjoying their blank check issued by the US, the EU and NATO and certified by Moscow. Understandably, this has mightily raised their spirit, morale, and enthusiasm to shoot objecting soldiers, civilians, POWs, wounded, or anyone else on their way. The junta's troops are thus also attracting all the sadistic psychopaths and cold blooded looters. A sense of impunity has become the new opiate that unifies not only the oligarchs with the fascists, but both of them with sociopaths from the rest of society as well. 

One of the key questions of the events brutally unfolding in Ukraine that needs to be seriously asked and explored is this: What are the likely consequences of fascism (in the form of resurgent Banderism) and the cardinal fact that this aggressive and anti-Russian fascism has captured and seized the state machines and its tools of war and violence in a 44-million nation? 

Of course, it would have been nicer and easier if political evil did not exist and the world was a benign place in which courage would not be needed or where such political evil would go away or collapse on its own, by itself without anyone having to speak up against it or trying to do something about it ... for, strangely enough, this new falsely "post-historical" world also happens to a world where a new sort of "anti-fascism" has emerged--one that argues that the wisest and most moderate anti-fascism is one which resists new fascism little or as least as possible. 

If fascism is not resisted, will it go away--almost as quickly and easily as our will and courage to fight it? 

Boris Kagarlitsky sees the situation differently though:

Moscow has never wanted to conquer Ukraine or dismember it. This is not because the Kremlin has been loyal to the interests of a neighboring state, but simply because the Russian leadership has lacked any strategic plan whatever. Today’s Russian elites are fundamentally incapable of thinking strategically. ... The annexation of Crimea to Russia was unquestionably an improvisation, and not so much on the part of Moscow as on that of the Crimean elites, who reacted to a changed situation and exploited it to serve their interests. But once Crimea had been annexed, the main task facing Russian diplomacy was to defend the acquisition. Part of this involved sacrificing the interests of the Ukrainian south-east.

For some, 1) Putin does have a secret, long-term strategic plan, which is remarkably working despite anything that we see on the ground or around; we just need to wait and see and watch. Yet, according to way too many people, the secret plan is not that secret--it is simply and ingeniously waiting for the winter. According to the other position presented by Kagarlitsky above, 2) there is no strategic plan. Then, it would, of course, convenient for the rest of us to either put a blind faith into 1) or to say that we occupy one of the many positions in the moderate middle, which is safe, reasonable, does not distinguish itself and does not stick its head out. 

My sense is that Putin himself would like the public to assume 1) and not 2). That's also why, last Tuesday, he said that "all our prognoses [in Ukraine] have unfortunately been fulfilled." Though, yes, there is this adverb in the middle ... if one's prognoses and,implicitly, strategy are being realized, then the word "unfortunately" could be applied only to the tragedy, the rising costs, and heightened threats and risks. 

While it is hard to be blind to the obvious cases of scrambling and improvisations, it is also hard to assume that hundreds or thousands of people who are actually paid to come up with plans would have really empty drawers, binders and safes. 

In order to cut the chase and get down to one essential question of our moment, Kagarlitsky's last sentence from above is a critical point: "Part of this [securing and defending the acquisition of Crimea] involved sacrificing the interests of the Ukrainian south-east."

Kagarlitsky assumes that this strategic decision has already been made, and there is much available that would support this claim. What questions this are less actions or statements of Moscow than the determined resistance of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics. They refuse to agree.

The critical point ought to be turned into a critical question (if it is still possible and even necessary to ask it): "Is defending the acquisition of Crimea secured by sacrificing the interests of the Ukrainian south-east?" 

And the question's inevitable follow-up:

"Does sacrificing the interests of the Ukrainian south-east secure Russia's own broader interests, its stability, status, prestige and does it advance and secure struggle against fascism in Ukraine and anti-imperialist struggles elsewhere?" 

Paul Craig Roberts on his part argues for decisive action:  

Putin’s alternative is to come to the defense of the Ukrainians who are being attacked. Putin could accept the requests of the rebellious provinces to rejoin Russia as he did with Crimea, declare Washington’s stooge, Petro Poroshenko, to be a war criminal and issue a warrant for his arrest, and send in the Russian military to face down the forces sent by Kiev. Outside the West, this would establish Putin as a defender of human rights. Inside the West it would make it completely clear to Washington’s European vassals that the consequence of their alignment with Washington is that they will be drawn into war with Russia and, likely, also with China. Europeans have nothing to gain from these wars. ... Putin has done what he can to avoid conflict. Now he needs to do the right thing, as he did in Georgia and Crimea.

Several things can be said about Paul Craig Robert's sober and realistic evaluation. Among these, the one that strikes me is this: "Putin’s alternative is to come to the defense of the Ukrainians who are being attacked ... this would establish Putin as a defender of human rights."

It is evident that Putin is neither any liberal in the US-British sense of the word nor a neo-liberal. In the former case, this means that he does not treat human rights as effectively, strategically, and cynically as Machiavelli or Hobbes and their pupils do. In the latter case, In the former case, this means that he does not treat human rights as effectively, strategically, and cynically as today's Democrats or Republicans in the US do. At the same time, he is in many ways a Russian realist, which means that while he is not approaching human rights cynically, he does not treat them strategically or as a great concern either. 

In practice and in what he or Lavrov are saying, this then means that the notion of fascism as a radical rejection and massive violation of human rights does not even seem to have come up in their minds. 
Furthermore, this also means that, either out of ideological and political preference or by default, the Kremlin is staying away from the human rights language and thus reduces its own position vis-a-vis Ukraine and potential greater involvement to weak, general and ineffective appeals. Whether this inability to present a stronger case for helping the people's republics is by default--due to the Russian government's character and idiosyncrasies, which does not allow Putin and his government to talk more convincingly of human rights and their violations in Ukraine and even of fascism there--or whether it is by a deliberate choice not to have a strong case and position for greater involvement, i.e., intervention, is a question the answer to which is most likely multi-factorial and has shares in both. For no one can think that far outside of one's character, and thinking and judgment is a key part of character itself. Our choices are bound up with who we are.

So here is just a rough sketch of my thoughts an article from the Sovetskaya Rossiya which is an example of the above said new phenomenon. I am familiar with the use of the term Bonapartism and I do think that it does not describe Russia's current system. What is interesting though is that some sort of Bonapartism was alleged to have been entertained for an envisaged disintegration of Russia toward the 1990s. Otherwise, much of it goes in the article from point 4 down has for me a weight and looks like sober and serious warnings. 

Strelkov's first observation supported by some other serious commentators when he arrived in Donetsk emphasized the unpreparedness of Donetsk for the war and the strikingly notable underestimation of what serious defense requires. If this situation exists in Donetsk, then one might perhaps also find some excuse or rather measure for a similar attitude, and most likely even stronger, on the part of Moscow. 

The world, Russia, and anyone concerned about the rising reaction is now staring into the face of an arisen beast of fascism, which is already well networked and interconnected and in the midst of its mobilization. 

Today, I posted two relatively simple questions in two different posts about the situation and its dilemma. The interesting sociological result was that no one actually dared or bothered to give a response to those questions, which the above article is in fact also trying to address. 

This suggests at least two things: 1) accepted memes and received notions are blocking further though t process and other thoughts and 2) many people prefer at this moment a state of denial. As a minimum, what I think can be said is that Putin was always comfortable to lead and rule as if from behind, this he balanced from time to time with his several hours long interviews. This style now, however, starts looking as the lack or retreat of leadership. There is also a good deal of evidence that Moscow has been relying on and trusting in some possibility of a compromise or deal, using connections among various oligarchs. Perhaps similar to that kind of understanding Putin struck with most of the Russian oligarchs in Russia. 

Instead of seeing this (pacification through mutual oligarchic rapprochement) as a workable solution, I see rather as a problem and hole in the fortress of Russia. Russia is a would-be Prometheus bound by the chains of oligarchy, and oligarchy has no desire to fight fascism in Ukraine. The situation is also severely compounded by hopelessly entangled old ideological lines and narratives. Ukrainian communists are part of the junta's "representative" system, supporting the legitimacy of the regime. That's why Ukrainian communists have been similar in their function to the discredited Party of Regions. Russian communists have become split into various sections, and Zyuganov's communists are for most part a mix of perestroika communists and late Soviet communists. Some serious ideological or theoretical work needed to be done, but I don't think, it was, and I am much skeptical that it can done in the middle of a war. 

The best might be to learn from the Syrian example where a new national unity is emerging from the left to the right. The trouble with the Russians is that they love to write a lot without really listening to each other, and the trouble with others is that we are usually stuck with what we happened to come to believe. Thus new thinking and new synthesis seem to be out of reach. Institutionalized beliefs are also often dead beliefs, and those outside of established institutions are just that--outside.

At the same time, people in Donbas spontaneously supported antifascist and anti-oligarchic slogans almost as much some sort of new or renewed people's power (hence people's republics). Leadership of the antifascist struggle thus went to (right-wing, right-center) nationalists and military officers even though their ideological platforms are entangled and problematic as much of those on the left or anywhere else. Going back to the tasks of the moment: Russia could have pre-empted the war in Donbass, as she did in Crimea, had she acted boldly and decisively. That window of opportunity closed a week after the referenda. If Russia fails to take further effective deterrent and pre-emptive actions, then the Empire will turn on massive-scale technologies of destabilization, chaos, and violence--from Ukraine, Central Asia (Uzbekistan is already almost on the verge of its own convulsion), and from within. Much of the organization, networks, people, tools, know-how is in an advanced state of preparation. The writing is on the wall.

Syria, where numerous techniques of managed chaos were tested and applied, also offers numerous dearly paid lessons. One of which was this observation of a Syrian high ranking officer: "When the troubles began, we though that it would be a version of the Muslim Brotherhood uprising from 1982. In this regard, we totally underestimated and misjudged what has been prepared for us."

Currently, some 40 million Ukrainians are being added to a balance sheet against Russia thanks to the massive propaganda campaign against Russia, Russians, and their very right to defend themselves. Banderism is on a mission, and it is well supported, organized, armed, and advised. Moreover, these 40 million Ukrainians are not just a hypothetical weight as in the case of most of these Westerners. But the Ukrainian regime already sees itself as being at war with Russia. And it is now just mobilizing and gathering power. 

While the people's republics appear to be basically on their own, Putin himself is now facing very sharp attacks from within. It is greatly the fault of the critics themselves, one might say. A good deal of responsibility for it, however, also goes to the adopted policies toward Ukraine and the people's republics unrecognized by Moscow itself. While the liberal fifth column mentored by the West has been Putin's fierce opponent of Putin as a matter of principle and tends to see in the Kiev junta its close, if not closest ally right next to the US and NATO, these new critics are among Russian patriots themselves. 

  

Ukraine and even more so eastern Ukraine is not an Afghanistan. It is a part of Russia taken from Russia by the communists. Not helping eastern Ukraine, Russia is acquiescing in aggression against herself. The essential question to be asked is what happens once the fascist junta defeats the people's republics and declares its victory and, justifiably so, a as a victory over Russia and as Russia's defeat? And does anyone believe that the fully mobilized and combat ready Ukrainian army, by that time, certainly larger than 100-150,000 and with full and unreserved NATO support, will just go back to its barracks, disarm, and demobilize? Moreover, instead of the "Russian Spring" we might be getting Russian paralysis--both of the government and the people. There is no paralysis on the part of Kiev.

Currently, some 40 million Ukrainians are being added to a balance sheet against Russia thanks to the massive propaganda campaign against Russia, Russians, and their very right to defend themselves. Banderism is on a mission, and it is well supported, organized, armed, and advised. Moreover, these 40 million Ukrainians are not just a hypothetical weight as in the case of most of these Westerners. But the Ukrainian regime already sees itself as being at war with Russia. And it is now just mobilizing and gathering power. 

So, seeing all this, one has an impression that, soon after Crimea returned to Russia, something happened, and Putin has become his own version of the composite animal from Book X of Plato's Republic. This time comprising not just himself, but also his predecessors, Yeltsin and Gorbachev, and even Yanukovich. Unless Yanukovich himself did not flee to Russia for safety only, but to morphed into Putin himself.

There is other nagging hypothesis is that, at some point in March or April, Moscow and Washington struck a secret deal. And the rest is just smoggy fog, posturing, PR, and much suffering. In the light of what Moscow has been stating and doing since that time, the burden of disproving this ought to be on the fans of VVP.

In this situation, the only way for the people's republics to survive is to become what they purport to be--true people's republics. There is no other road left.

The Kiev junta feels lucky now: its troopers are already able to shoot their own people without remorse

In Ukraine, under the conditions of outside appeasement, fascism has overcome a serious psychological barrier--the fear and resistance to kill "not simply living people, but their own people, i.e. civilians and Russians. The Ukrainian Army has no longer this problem.

The New York Times helps us understand what, besides Moscow's inaction, started making difference in Ukraine. Fascism and shock troopers learned how to shoot into their own people: "Mykola Sungurovskyi, the director of military programs at the Razumkov Center, a policy research organization here in the capital of Ukraine, [explained that] ... there has also been aid from abroad ... but even more important ... was a crucial psychological shift: Soldiers surmounted a reluctance to open fire on their own countrymen ... 'They have overcome that psychological barrier in which the military were afraid to shoot living people,' Mr. Sungurovskyi said. “They had this barrier after Maidan, after the death of that hundred — not simply to shoot living people, but their own people.'"

Andriy Parubiy, the leader of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council:
"We, of course, studied the experience of both Croatia and Israel ... [but if] this experience is successful, this experience can very easily be used ... even in Belarus and Kazakhstan. If we do not stop Putin here, nobody knows where his Girkins will appear next.”

Evidently, after Donbass, the fascists are already looking ahead to Belarus and Kazakhstan. In addition to Crimea somewhere close by.

From Putin's experienced fans in the West: Resisting fascism too much is irresponsible and bad for peace

It is almost an honor to have been promoted first by Joaquin Flores from "even friends" to the 6th column and a Cointelpro agent and from there and the 6th column (one would need to be employed in the Russian government structures for that though) to the 5th column (the traitorous pro-Western liberals) and then from there to romantic lovers of Che Guevara who fight (or speak up) "without consultation with anyone" and are not lined up at Putin's own "choosing."

Since Che Guevara has nothing to do with either the 6th column or the 5th column, then this earned appreciation, however, confused, is probably yet another promotion to a column No. 4 or 3 I would suppose. However, there is some clarity in this public denunciation, for, if Val and Daniel (two personal critics of mine, and Daniel here is NOT Dan Welsch) are correct, then, indeed, Putin's position and his strategy is that "when the day is done, reaction and Nazis have been brought to East Ukraine," but to support the creation of the people's republics, the Novorossyia idea, people's referendums and that also means armed resistance and self-defense is wrong, arrogant, and not in accordance with Putin's wish or decision.

In Val's immortally memorable words: "Putin told the people in Eastern Ukraine not to have a referendum. He didn't tell any one to go wage a guerrilla war. The people who chose this path chose it on their own hoof without consultation with anyone. They thought they could drag Putin into a war of their own choosing, not Russia's nor the president's choosing. Manipulation doesn't work. When the day is done, reaction and Nazis have been brought to East Ukraine." Translation: you cannot rise up against fascism until you have for it 1) Putin's permission and 2) Val's support.

Ironically, we might agree that, overall, this is how Putin's position, indeed, looks to be.

Where we disagree and part our ways is what we think of fascism and the reasonableness, morality and wisdom of the position, which, to use Putin's words, is "meant to create favorable conditions" for restoration of the Kiev junta's legitimacy and its sovereignty. In other words, while Val and I might agree as to the fascist or Nazi nature of the Kiev regime, it is not actually that clear that this view is also Putin's view  for the farthest he ever went in this respect was that the "Ukrainian government" could be or become really a junta if things like the Odessa massacre can happen. He strictly stood several miles away from any suggestion about the Nazi character of the regime in Kiev.

Nevertheless, it seems that, while for Putin, the chief form of resistance so far appeared  to be the unsuccessful effort to make the junta pay at least another slice of their debt for gas and trying to get oligarch Medvedchuk with Kolomoysky's support take over the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics as the junta's appointed governor, Val's preferred form of resistance appears to be one of pleading with the Nazis, their troops, and their Western supporters in a way which would somehow make of us as if their conscientious mothers and girlfriends of these Nazi soldiers who don't want their men enlisted by fascism to go into battle without more secure body armor.

Trying to do more is, according to Val, criminal manipulation. When the cloud of this kind of rhetoric is settled, Val's and Putin's (?) position amounts to: "Protest against fascism, but don't resist because any serious resistance to fascism is 1) not in accordance with Putin's decree and 2) is against world peace." The return of fascism to Ukraine and Europe, like Brzezinski's Grand Chessboard strategy, which basically demands the former, is a road to Hell. And, yes, many columns are heading there. Hard to keep the count. But if someone has trouble counting and discerning, it happens to be the left, namely, whatever is left of the left in the first world, the imperial core, and then in its semi-colonial periphery of the former (communist) East.

As Socrates said the other day: "I went down to Piraeus together with Glaucon to pay my respect to the goddess and to see her festival ... and what a sight it was!" As for myself I am merely one guy and voice on the bank of an Ohio river, which happened to spontaneously burst into flames twice in the past, as, we are told, any good river in Hades likes to do. And the only thing I am doing is merely saying: "Look! And don't just look here, but also look ahead!"

Так oднажды говорилa Москвa, но Кремль теперь молчит

Just yesterday late at night, I went across (the) Shaker's post for that day in which he wrote that the junta has achieved none of its objectives and that its strategy is everywhere failing. 

Today, only several hours later, with the fall of Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, and Konstantinovka, the (sic) Shaker fired out that this is a "political disaster for Novorussia and even Russia."

Well, it is not a disaster ... but it could be: 1) if Putin and the Russian government continue what they are doing and saying and not doing and saying what they should be and 2) if major overhaul is not introduced with all the seriousness and urgency which war and a direct threat to the country's security require. 

The class of pathetic measures has meanwhile been further enriched today: the Russian Foreign Ministry reacted with a grammatically correct statement that "it shares the UN concern over the plight of the people in east Ukraine," and Russia announced that, as of today!, they will be no longer sending weapons to the Ukrainian government from Crimea. Sometimes, even ineptitude, whether benign or criminal, is incredibly symbolic.

Now, we can see a version of what happened in Krajina in the summer of 1995 and Moscow and people in the east of Ukraine will try to make a deal with the victorious fascists and emboldened NATO or a more gradual retreat will happen or new factors will change the situation.

Some Syrian patriots criticized Putin and Russia for helping Syria only up to a point at which the war in Syria or, to be more precise, a 4th generation warfare invasion of Syria continues to drag instead of giving them greater military help for a quicker and decisive victory. On this account, I did defend on few forums the indispensable value of Russia's help.  Then I started noticing statements coming from Moscow that indicated a presence of problematic and even haughty attitudes and statements evidently made to say some of the things, which the West wanted to hear. In this respect, I noticed, but passed (till now) in silence one portion of Putin's interview in France on June 5 when he went on record making  a factually and politically very wrong statement that the Syrian government and "the opposition" are "equally guilty of mass atrocities."

Now, when it comes to Ukraine, it is easy, almost all too easy to see US escalation strategy at work: it was moving like a clock through its charts of ever greater force and expanding attacks down to the caliber and the type of weapons that are to be used. This gradual and systematic escalation has already reached a point of daily shelling of Russian border posts and hence Russia’s own territory—and with impunity.

This very careful and well planned escalation by degrees almost seems to be following a protocol and design, which is exactly the case.

This calibrated escalation (also used for Maidan itself) was (mis)matched by attempted demobilizing de-escalation from Putin, most openly presented by him four days ahead of the referenda when he urged their effective cancellations. Putin's own stated goal was to "create favorable conditions" for the elections of Poroshenko as new Ukrainian president.

Thus, soon after the referenda, the rapid mobilization and strategic escalation on the part of the junta was met with appeasement sought by Moscow and haphazard and disorganized mobilization attempts on the side of the antifascist resistance made of poorly prepared by civilians for most part. On the part of antifascist resistance, we do have an improvised, spontaneous revolt against the junta and fascism launched by ordinary people (which was not exactly the case in Crimea). The war in Syria was prepared and organized for several years before it was launched and, similarly, Maidan was a long and carefully planned and organized regime change action. As a result, there is now a significant disparity of forces.

As a result, there is now a significant disparity of forces. Sheer statistics and the power of logistics organized by the state of Ukraine and NATO started to loom above the tactical prowess and heroism of the militia. 

Reaching some kind of agreement with Europeans is as illusory as thinking, as Putin expressed it in his 4 July congratulation and greeting to Obama, that the Empire would ever treat Russia as an "equal partner" (instead of New Rome's New Carthage). And the Europeans are but Empire's willing assistants.

To argue that Europe or the EU should stop "this nightmare" at its borders is pathetic. The EU is in political and military terms but an economic prop to NATO, and this nightmare is at the borders of Russia and aimed on Russia. To appeal to one's own enemies for help and rescue is ludicrous.

Russia should have conducted public (people’s) diplomacy, and Putin should have made a clear agreement with the people in east Ukraine. Instead, Putin preferred an ever increasing ambiguity.

Putin's ability to salvage his face now depends on and is in the hands of Strelkov who is ready to sacrifice himself for it.

Three months ago the Kiev junta had 5000 man in a disorganized and dysfunctional army. Now they have 60 000 combat troops, which does not include a very large logistical base of a 44 million state with the whole Western alliance firmly behind it.

And these 60,000 and growing are no longer disorganized, but combat-trained so that, at this pace, there is a reasonable prospect to see at this pace at least a 100,000 army driven by combat fury, hate for Russia, and fascist nationalism.

Those who helped blocked Russia's effective action with the mirage of World War III when the danger was many times smaller than it is now (neutralizing a 5,000 force), will have a chance to reuse the argument for the chances of a world war and NATO's direct involvement do rise with the stakes and the rapid rise of the power of the Ukrainian army. Risking a world war for several thousands of militants led by the Right Sector on behalf of a coup d’état is one thing. Risking a world war when you have suddenly 40 million people harnessed to a fascist dictatorship with a whole modern army of 100,000-500,000 on the move and Moscow only 400 miles away is a whole new game. Moreover, if this happens against the backdrop of a serious moral and political crisis and disorientation.

Relying on some economic or social self-destruction of the junta is not a strategy, but a wish, which posits a yet not-existent deus ex machina of the future for the actual hard struggle of today. Moreover, unarmed crowds cannot turn against armed fascism. And the junta will sell to the people its difficulties for hate of Russia and Putin. Gazprom might also strike a new deal with the junta.

It is only a matter of time till the Ukrainian government, as Moscow also calls it, will issue its new "ultimatum"--not just to the Donetsk insurgents or "terrorists," as they call them--but to Russia over Crimea. And we already know that, once Kiev does that, it will have the US and whole NATO lined up behind them with "strategic destabilization" in Russia, the Caucuses, and Central Asia in full swing.

Russia's strategy from the late 1980s has been to trade nearly all its allies—for concessions and a promise of partnership. Real power and influence has thus been traded Russia’s own progressive concessions. One major exception to this rule has been China.

The Roman Empire started falling apart when it exhausted its expansion and, with it, new sources to plunder. In this regard, the resources of Russia are enough to give the Empire a new lease on life for hundreds of years.

Back on June 16, Strelkov concluded that, without serious decisions and measures made by Moscow, antifascist resistance in east Ukraine is "strategically losing" and would be defeated. He also indicated that this defeat would also be Russia's own defeat. Then, on July 2, when Putin announced in Moscow that "everything that is going on in Ukraine is the internal business of the Ukrainian government" and while trying to put together yet another fictional ceasefire, Strelkov made his point explicit: "If we lose, this will be a defeat not just of a small band of militiamen, but of the Russian people" ("Если мы проиграем, это будет поражение не кучки ополченцев, а русского народа"). Strelkov issued this warning on June 2, and, at night on June 4 and 5, the Donetsk militia withdrew from Slavyansk and Kramatorsk after two-and-half month-long heroic struggle against the combined and united might of a 40-million fascist state. 

These are strange times. Fascism is back, but its most formidable, most disciplined and adamant opponent in the form of communism is gone. And many in the West who profess their sympathies for the Russians are sure that non-interference with fascism in Ukraine and less assistance to the resistance rather than more is the safest, most responsible, most reliable and best way of how to deal with the beast.

Strelkov knows what he is talking about. He looked the beast into the eye.

Back in World War II, the Moscow radio started its famous reports with the words: "Говорит Москва ..." Moscow is speaking ... Who would have guessed that, when fascism returns, we would have this instead: "A Кремль молчит ..."