On Putin's "difficulties which we we are creating for ourselves" (was this with a reference to the mythical "clever plan"?)

In his March 18, 2015 speech commemorating the reunion of Crimea with Russia, Vladimir Putin made a serious of interesting, if not baffling statements (see my tweets). One of these statements was his declaration that "we've come to understand that Crimea was not only a matter of strategic importance [military strategic importance?], but also a matter of [caring for] millions of Russians." Another such statement, which I would like to delve on a bit more here, was Putin's stated confidence that "we will overcome the difficulties which we have been creating for ourselves." This statement immediately triggered a mass of questions and inquiries to which Dmitry Peskov, Putin's spokesman, was compelled to react. Peskov dealt with the issue, however, only very briefly, but he mentioned especially the plague of "bureaucratism."

In my view, the question of "difficulties" created by Russia, and by Moscow, in particular, as opposed to those created for Russia by her enemies is a question on which depends not only the further existence of Novorossiya, but also Russia's own salvation and thus also destinies of other peoples in Europe and elsewhere. It is, therefore, a question of utmost importance, which should not be shelved or closed before it is properly and adequately addressed.

The irony and paradox of these difficulties is that many of them could be easily attributed to the so-called clever plans or rather clever plans (for they were constantly shifting and changing as the previous ones failed to live up to their promises, assurances, platitudes and predictions).

If one wants to be both sincere and serious about these obvious difficulties, which are neither abstract nor benign, one may want to start with listing some of the most pressing ones. For they threaten to unravel exactly what, in the same speech, Putin said that the collective pronoun is now learning to respect and honor--the struggles and achievements of the previous generations and their heroes. 

So let's down to this urgent task and let's look into at least some of these "difficulties." I will list here at least six critical difficulties, which are becoming evermore obvious just to anyone who pays attention.

1) The one glaring "difficulty," which is actually a policy decision adopted on the very top, is that Moscow curators of Novorossiya (as they are sometimes called) have also been stalling and blocking real state/nation building of Novorossiya and its war mobilization. 

2) However, Moscow also took no detectable necessary state building efforts in the face of the Western sanctions, the war in Donbass, which the junta always saw as part of the war with Russia, and NATO systematic mobilization against Russia in Europe. Military exercises are not enough. 

3) Also, as I said earlier, the number of former Russian government high ranking officials (Nemtsov was just one of them) who are now openly anti-Russian is staggering. Some of them were part of Putin's and Medvedev's government only recently. It's almost like a circus. 

4) Worrisome reports start coming (one of the latest of this kind can be found here), that, apparently trying to conform to yet another Minsk deal and giving powers to the Ministry for Emergency Situations, Moscow began severely curtailing flow of goods, medications, supplies, and even assistance to the people's republics of Novorossiya. The republics are forced to import commercial goods from Ukraine or via Ukraine, and humanitarian assistance is being limited to the official one and to the officially endorsed providers. These measures are thus effectively and directly aiding to the blockade of the people's republics, which the Kiev Banderite regime has already imposed on its part. The reports are coming from the people on the ground, from activists and also members of the opolchenie. While such measures fit what the West and the junta want to see and what they have demanded all along, their adoption would as criminal as disgraceful and can be justified or excused on no solid grounds, however "clever" they might appear in the minds of the people behind them.

5) The other thing, which Putin's speech celebrating the reunion with Crimea only slightly touched, is the fact that the Minsk agreements in their design and essence hauntingly, imperially, and self-defeatingly (for the Kremlin) dismissed, ignored and belittled the will of the people of Donbass and the millions of the Russians there.

6) Another quintessential question, which needs to be raised, is this one: if Russia still continues to be mired in post-Soviet oligarchy, as it is arguably the case, what political ideology is to be expected to correspond best to this class character of the regime? One can find it in Surkov, one can also find the answer in the common sense. First, oligarchy's political ideology would be or is principally antithetical to any people's power which most people in Novorossiya want and demand. Second, it would very likely not be that far from the reactionary musings of someone like Ivan Ilyin, the one thinker who has the honor of being most cited by President. Third, oligarchy's political ideology could be very likely described as some form or version of right-wing nihilism (with strong elements and currents in the direction of equally nihilistic hedonism, protestations toward so-called or would-be conservatism notwithstanding. Fourth, oligarchy's political ideology as such might also hold some explanatory power towards grasping some of the perverse temptation to call the junta in Kiev and its Banderite fascist leaders as "trusted partners" or even as the "party of peace."

Having creating these "difficulties" for ourselves and by ourselves is deplorable. But whether the Russian leadership and its strategists will also able to rectify and overcome them will also serve as an objective measure and test of true statesmanship and leadership.