Russia's Duma mulls a bill that would let Russia stop paying debts to the aggressors and the states who introduced economic and financial sanctions against Russia

Russia's Duma mulls a bill that would let Russia stop paying debts to the aggressors and the states who introduced economic and financial sanctions against Russia.

Indeed, why should Russia continue to pretend that it is "business as usual," when the West tries to depose the Russian government and is making normal relations impossible? Why should Russia's obligations be kept as usual, when the West is making it clear that it is free to discard any rules and any of its own obligations?

Indeed, why should Russia pay debts which the West makes under sanctions much harder to pay back, in addition to freezing (and seizing) selected Russian assets? But with the one exception of agricultural products, Moscow tried to make virtue out of weakness (or incompetence? or impotence?) by "not responding," that is, by boasting of not taking any systemic defensive and much needed counter-measures, thus letting the West to play the game of progressive intimidation in which the West was promising possible future softening of actions that hurt Russia in exchange for real, major present concessions on the ground (principle already tried with Milosevic and Yanukovich: you retreat or disarm now and we will think about our reciprocity once the situation on the ground has radically changed as a result of you making the first step or "you shoot yourself first and we will then think whether we should do something similar as we make you believe that we have promised").

In war (and this is war), besides weapons and resources, one also needs a good mind and balls. Without balls, the mind is impotent, and without the mind, balls are just sacks.

Jon Hellevig: "If this goes forward then hell is loose. Law initiative aims at terminating of payments of Russian debt to foreign countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia. This would be done by amending the civil law provision of force majeure by adding sanctions among such conditions. - The law initiative stems from a known radical lawmaker, so we cannot know if it will fly. But the respected paper Izvestia already wrote about it. Maybe testing the reactions?"

For many, to love Russia is not to ask any difficult questions, but that's exactly what many in Novorossiya now feel compelled to do

A pro-Novorossiya  site standing on Strelkov's positions (without being Strelkov's side) published a set of hard-hitting questions, which created a huge polemic and debate. The questions (both in original Russian and in English are below).

The response or attempted refutation and dismissal of these questions by the so-called Putinists (thus without really answering any of these questions) is rather very simple and consists of two now staple reactions: 1) Putin is a genius whose far-seeing mastermind cannot be comprehended, appreciated or judged by most of the small and limited mortal minds (unless the small mortal mind happily happens to be an unconditional fan)--this makes Putin almost a god, and, if not a god, then at least a demigod; 2) the people of Donbass did not deserve anything better; if there is some fault, it is not a fault of Moscow, but a fault of the people themselves; they did  not fight enough and don't deserve anything better. In my view, both these would-be arguments are really just ad hominem arguments.

In my own view, the contradictory nature of Moscow's policy is captured and reflected most glaringly in the last five questions:

9. Why Putin called for peace in the DPR and LPR when their combined army had already begun to storm the then unfortified city of Mariupol, and not when the Ukrainian soldiers were ruthlessly erasing, shelling and destroying Donetsk, Lugansk and Slavyansk?

10. Why Putin allowed Ukraine to steal Russian gas to the tune of 5 billion dollars, thus delaying the energy and economic crises in Ukraine and lending Ukraine the means to upgrade and purchase new equipment for the war against Donbass?

11. Why Putin returned to Ukraine weapons and equipment from the Crimea, which was then the most armed region of Ukraine when he could not have been unaware that these weapons would be used for re-arming the Ukrainian troops in the war against Donbass and against the peaceful population of South-East?

12. Why Putin made in his speeches so many promises about "Russian world" (Russian Mir), about "we don't leave ours behind", "let them just try [and they will get from us a clear and immediate response]," but in the end he allowed to make Kiev to turn the pro-Russian region of Donbass into "Russian Somalia"?

If I were myself at an exam, how I would respond to these difficult questions? For Questions 1-8, I would say that the answer boils down to how the current governments and powers that be, view and treat the people or the nation. And I am not quite convinced that either the later-day's Soviet governments or the Russian governments of the last 23 years did much better in this respect, which is that the government tends to see and treat the people politically and situationally--not as the true source of power and its own agent, but as a reference point and justification of their own policies and decisions when it appears convenient. In this regard, I remember well the words of German Gref, a key Russian oligarch, the head of the largest Russian private bank, Sberbank, and patron of the current Putin's appointee as the head of the Russian Central Bank: "The people are wild and unenlightened and to give them power is the most terrible mistake one can make."

Now, how I would respond to the other questions at my own exam?

9. Why Putin called for peace in the DPR and LPR when their combined army had already begun to storm the then unfortified city of Mariupol, and not when the Ukrainian soldiers were ruthlessly erasing, shelling and destroying Donetsk, Lugansk and Slavyansk?

The difference between Mariupol, on the one hand, and Slavyansk, Donetsk, and Lugansk, on the other hand, is most simply explainable by the difference these places had for the US and hence by the different pressure and demands exerted by the US (and NATO) on Moscow. I would bet that when it came to the danger of Mariupol being liberated from the junta that the US was sending very strong messages and threats to Moscow with a promise to work out some reasonable solution or "compromise" (the Minsk deal).


10. Why Putin allowed Ukraine to steal Russian gas to the tune of 5 billion dollars, thus delaying the energy and economic crises in Ukraine and lending Ukraine the means to upgrade and purchase new equipment for the war against Donbass?

For a good part of this crisis, Moscow made it very clear that gas and gas business with Europe was its key priority.

11. Why Putin returned to Ukraine weapons and equipment from the Crimea, which was then the most armed region of Ukraine when he could not have been unaware that these weapons would be used for re-arming the Ukrainian troops in the war against Donbass and against the peaceful population of South-East?

Apologists say that most of the weapons returned were junk. I would think that, politically and strategically, this was simply Moscow's blunder based on a political misjudgment (with some possibility that those who supplied this political misjudgment to the leadership knew what they were doing) or that this return of weapons, which would be then used against Donbass and potentially against Crimea itself) was part of some broader deal and bargain pursued by Moscow.

12. Why Putin made in his speeches so many promises about "Russian world" (Russian Mir), about "we don't leave ours behind", "let them just try [and they will get from us a clear and immediate response]," but in the end he allowed to make Kiev to turn the pro-Russian region of Donbass into "Russian Somalia"?

Most of these promises were made only initially, till about the middle of March, and, for the Kremlin, they were meant for Crimea, not for Donbass, which, in my view, is no excuse really. Part of "Putin's cunning plan" was, under the pressure of the West, to assure Ukraine and the West (definitely by April 24) that Russia would not be using deterrence or openly "interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine," while the West only continued with its deterrence against Russia and her more effective countermeasures.

ПОЧЕМУ?!
1. Почему Путин проигнорировал обращение Съезда народных депутатов Юго-Востока, который еще 23 февраля попросил Россию ввести войска для прекращения насилия на Украине, а также для запуска бескровного цивилизованного «развода» по примеру Чехословакии?
2. Почему Путин проигнорировал обращение легитимного президента Украины Виктора Януковича, который тоже обратился с просьбой о вводе войск на Украину, ибо понимал, что уже к лету начнется кровавая гражданская война?
3. Почему Путин проигнорировал обращения лидеров молодых народных республик Юго-Востока Украины, которые на протяжении всего марта-мая обращались к России с просьбой о признании их, а также с надеждой на запуск процесса воссоединения земель?
4. Почему Путин проигнорировал результаты референдумов в ДНР и ЛНР, тем самым оставил эти республики без должного юридического статуса и допуска на трибуны ООН?
5. Почему Путин проигнорировал если не миллионы, то сотни тысяч русского и русскоязычного населения Юго-Востока, которое почти всю весну провело на улицах своих городов, пгт и сел, скандируя «Путин!», «Россия!»?
6. Почему Путин так и не ввел ни бесполетную зону, ни миротворческий контингент, хотя прекрасно знал, что никакой ядерной войны не начнется из-за нищей Украины?
7. Почему Путин, имея в своем подчинении одну из самых сильных в мире армий, так и не решился на защиту русского и русскоязычного населения, а ограничился лишь сгущенкой, военторгом и поминальными свечами?
8. Почему Путин заступился за наших православных братьев осетинов, но не заступился за русских дончан?
9. Почему Путин призвал к миру в ДНР и ЛНР именно тогда, когда их объединенная армия уже приступила к штурму тогда еще неукрепленного Мариуполя, а не тогда, когда украинские каратели безжалостно обстреливали и бомбили Донецк, Луганск и Славянск?
10. Почему Путин позволил Украине украсть российского газа на 5 миллиардов долларов, что позволило отсрочить энергетический и экономический кризисы на Украине, а также найти средства на перевооружение и закупку новой техники для ВСУ?
11. Почему Путин вернул Украине оружие и технику из Крыма - в прошлом самого вооруженного региона Украины - ведь он не мог не знать, что они будут использованы для перевооружения ВСУ, а значит против мирного населения Юго-Востока?
12. Почему Путин озвучил так много речей и обещаний – «Русский мир», «своих не бросаем», «пусть только попробуют», – а в итоге позволил сделать из самого пророссийского региона «Русское Сомали»?
WHY?!

1. Why Putin ignores the address of the Congress of people's deputies of the South-East, which asked Russia already on 23 February to send troops to stop the violence in Ukraine and to assist in launching bloodless "civilized divorce" following the example of Czechoslovakia?

2. Why Putin ignores the address of the legitimate President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich, who also asked for sending troops to Ukraine, for he understood that by the summer there will be a bloody civil war?

3. Why Putin ignored the new leaders of the republics of the South-East of Ukraine who, throughout March and April, were asking Russia for recognition and with the hope to see the beginning of the process of reunification?

4. Why Putin ignored the results of referendums in the DPR and LPR and thus left the Republics without proper legal status and admission (or a opportunity to appeal) to the UN bodies?

5. Why Putin ignored, if not millions, then the hundreds of thousands of the Russian and Russian-speaking people in the South-East, who, almost during the whole spring, were demonstrating in the streets of their cities, town and villages, chanting "Putin!" and "Russia!"?

[My note: IN FACT, NONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EVER EVEN TRIED TO ADDRESS THE PEOPLE OF DONBASS AND TO TELL THEM SOMETHING OR ANYTHING]

6. Why did not Putin introduce a no-fly zone nor a peacekeeping contingent, though, he knew very well that no nuclear war would start because of poor Ukraine?

7. Why did not Putin, commanding one of the strongest armies in the world, dare to protect the Russian and Russian-speaking people, and why did he limit himself to helping only with condensed milk, voentorg and candles lit in the church?

8. Why did Putin stand for our Orthodox brothers, the Ossetians, but not for the [millions] of the Russians in Donbass?

9. Why Putin called for peace in the DPR and LPR when their combined army had already begun to storm the then unfortified city of Mariupol, and not when the Ukrainian soldiers were ruthlessly erasing, shelling and destroying Donetsk, Lugansk and Slavyansk?

10. Why Putin allowed Ukraine to steal Russian gas to the tune of 5 billion dollars, thus delaying the energy and economic crises in Ukraine and lending Ukraine the means to upgrade and purchase new equipment for the war against Donbass?

11. Why Putin returned to Ukraine weapons and equipment from the Crimea, which was then the most armed region of Ukraine when he could not have been unaware that these weapons would be used for re-arming the Ukrainian troops in the war against Donbass and against the peaceful population of South-East?

12. Why Putin made in his speeches so many promises about "Russian world" (Russian Mir), about "we don't leave ours behind", "let them just try [and they will get from us a clear and immediate response]," but in the end he allowed to make Kiev to turn the pro-Russian region of Donbass into "Russian Somalia"?

Novorossiya, "a false start" in Putin's clever plan or the only road to victory?

Boris Rozhin wrote an extensive response to Alexander Boroday, a Moscow's "political crisis manager," who, in a recent TV interview, called Novorossiya " false start" and "a dream which has not materialized in life." Boroday's statement comes here at 29:30  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o50pCIy9iAE

In his response, Rozhin traces the evolution of Moscow's strategy and goals and their gradual downsizing from "Great Novorossiya" to "Small Novorossiya" down to "another Transdnietsria" and from there to "Donbass is Ukraine." As Rozhin correctly says it was the idea of Novorossiya for which the people have been fighting and dying, and it is also the Novorossiya program which alone is a viable strategy: "The idea of Novorossiya is what gives life and strength to Russian politics in Ukraine and, without this idea, to talk about  any influence on Ukrainian processes in the current conditions is pointless."

"Идея Новороссии, это то, что придавало динамики и силы российской политике на Украины и без этой идеи говорить о каком-либо влиянии на украинские процессы в нынешнем раскладе не приходится. Поэтому если не брать в расчет варианты полной капитуляции Кремля, то идея Новороссии будет неизбежно востребована в ходе продолжающейся холодной войны с США за Украину."

http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1978205.html#cutid

For the West, it is simple: all they want and need is to seal off the Russians from the Russians

When it comes  to Ukraine, the West tries to seal off and isolate there any anti-fascist and anti-NATO resistance by trying to seal Ukraine, and especially Donbass, off from Russia, thus sealing off Russia herself--from herself. This is the further stage of containment after, (slowly) starting in the 1950s, the Soviet elite started to seal themselves and the country off from social justice.

As reported on today's meeting between Merkel, the de facto most powerful politician in the EU and Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the "cleanse-the-subhumans" CEO of the Kiev junta who has also just vowed in Germany not to allow Russia to do what Russia did in 1945: "Merkel made clear that the entire Minsk agreement needs to be fulfilled before European Union sanctions against Russia can be lifted. Yatsenyuk said the Minsk deal is still viable and the most urgent priority is to seal the Russia-Ukraine border. " http://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-pm-seeks-western-unity-pushing-russia-peace-111844680.html

Arseniy Yatsenyuk vows to stop Russia better than Hitler did

During a recent interview on a German television, Yatsenyuk said that he will not let "Russia walk over Germany, as it was during the Second World War."

The Ukrainian Prime President trained for his role by US RAND also added: "We are all very well remember the Soviet invasion [a German translation reportedly turned it into 'an advance'] of the Ukraine and Germany, and it should be avoided."

Yatsenyuk thus called the liberation of Europe from Nazism "Russian aggression" which, in his view, Russia displayed toward Nazi Germany and Ukraine.

Aрсений Яценюк во время интервью на одном из немецких телеканалов заявил, что «не даст России пройти по Германии, как это было во времена второй мировой войны».

«Мы все очень хорошо помним советское вторжение на Украину и в Германию, это надо избежать», - также подчеркнул премьер-министр Украины.

Слова Яценюка неоднозначно оценили на Западе и в России. Его речь заставила многих задуматься, чем занимался премьер-министр на уроках истории.

Арсений Яценюк назвал освобождение Европы от нацизма «русской агрессией», которую Россия проявляла и к фашистской Германии, и к Украине.

Также во время своей встречи с Ангелой Меркель, Арсений Яценюк заявил, что недавние хакерские атаки на бундестаг - дело рук российских спецслужб.

На сайты Меркель и правительства ФРГ были совершены перед приездом Яценюка в Берлин. Украинская группировка «КиберБеркут» взяла на себя ответственность в совершении хакерских атак.

Does salvation of Russia (and the world) require suspension of critical reason and thought?

The political and ideological situation (crisis?) on the part of the Russian political and ideological elites (as distinguished from the live and heated debates by the people) in the face of the unfolding Drang nach Osten by the Empire has advanced to a peculiar, paradoxical point at which all the major players and forces categorically demand and insist on suspension of "criticism" directed towards themselves exclusively only (not as a whole, but solely in particular). Criticism of oneself (in whatever form or content) is defined as assistance to the enemy--whether conscious or unconscious.

Opening a question whether such a categorical demand is rational or irrational would also seem to fall under the absolute prohibition. The prohibition amounts to a demand that thought be suspended ... under the conditions of continued deliberate ambiguity, vagueness and evasions.

Under the optics of objective diagnosis, such demands could be seen either as one of the symptoms of ideological, political or even strategic weakness or as a part of a project of "voluntary dictatorship."

A wholesale, absolute ban of criticism would mean a ban on thinking. Any good thinking discriminates and is willing to think not only about a priori assumptions, but also about "taboos." To assume that critique as such is one's enemy regardless of what the critique actually says, regardless of its character and direction, is to replace reason with faith.

In this regard, the basic poles in this debate, boils down to these both exclusive and interrelated positions:

1. Russia is Putin. Putin knows best and always knows best.
2. Russia is (and ought to be) the Fourth (previously Third) Wave (Dugin). Dugin knows best. Or Heidegger. Or Carl Schmitt.
3. Russia is Novorossiya, and Novorossiya is Russia. People devoted an idea and with conscience know best ("ideynye lyudi").
4. Russia is (and ought to be) a Czarist Empire again. Patriotic authorities with a noble character know best.
5. Russia ought to be a USSR 2.0. Only social justice and equality can save the country.
6. Russia ought to be finally and irreversibly Westernized. The West knows best and always knows best.

***

"Any criticism [against us] needs to be stopped immediately," Dugin demands. Any criticism of the "clever plans" needs to be stopped immediately, for the government knows best, is, however, also the demand of those whom Dugin calls supporters of Russian Caesarism and whom he criticizes as not adequate in the current situation.

A.G. Dugin: "Geopolitics is the only method of truth. Whoever is doubting the absolute meaning of geopolitics is either an unconscious or conscious enemy." Dugin expects a color revolution in Russia in the next six months. But he also thinks that the Russian government does not understand the terrible threat of the West's attack and is trying to treat the situation with technical measures in a conservative way in order to delay the finale. According to Dugin, this approach ("Caesarism"), which wavers between liberalism and patriotism (or playing one against the other),  does not work and cannot work. If this approach is to continue, "we will kill ourselves." The main agent of the color revolution in Russia will be liberals who will use (ultra)nationalists for their own/US goals. The situation in Russia is analogous to what happened to Milosevic, but also to the rose revolution in Georgia and the Maidan in Kiev. Russian Caesarism (Putin's system) and Eurasianism are not the same. Certain criticism of Russian/Putin's Caesarism by the patriots is justified. This Caesarism is inherently inconsistent and self-contradictory. Who is against Eurasianism is the enemy of Russia. Eurasianism is the only way for preserving Russia. The color revolution in Russia in inevitable, but its success or failure is not. According to Dugin, any critique of Eurasianism (i.e. Dugin), therefore, needs to be stopped immediately for such criticism is assisting only the enemy.

Dugin also says that he lost his position at the Moscow State University because of his support for Novorossiya. At this round table, Dugin speaks in Russian and, at the same time, he also translates himself into English.

According to Evgeny Fedorov, what can save Russia in this existential confrontation can only be giving to Putin extraordinary powers. Putin and Fedorov are only waiting for the people to clear their brains and grant the former these needed powers. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zJj4rkOV6qI&index=7&list=UUZnUvWIiTV-KRM_zZyUmqow

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-jKDOwwDZ8&index=1&list=UUZnUvWIiTV-KRM_zZyUmqow

Is Donbass Ukraine and Is It a "Deal"? Or No Deal? (Washington Feeds the Press with Leaks from the Inside)

Mark Galeotti published an article in Business Insider that casts some light on the behind-the-scenes diplomacy and the current status of talks over Ukraine by the US and Russia. The habitual impulse of the Putinists is to quickly dismiss such information without further looking into it. A better advised and more prudent course of action is to look more closely into what Galeotti has to say first and then to make a judgment--instead of having a judgement no matter what the case is. So let's proceed.

1. First, Galeotti's sources and credibility. Right at the start, he says: "Efforts to secure some kind of peace deal between Moscow and Kiev —and not just a temporary ceasefire that preserves a frozen conflict —continue. The latest suggestions are that Washington is coming up with peace proposals, as explored in this story from Bloomberg by Josh Rogin. While not officially confirmed, its details chime with what I have been hearing from people in and close to policy circles."

2. Second, Galeotti reports that some deal that was in the works for months might be becoming a done deal AND what this deal could be (on this see further below)--has been claimed and supported by other reports and semi-official leaks. The US and Kiev position has never been much in doubt and it has been repeatedly and quite clearly stated. Russia's position changed notably soon after Putin's March 4 interview and the reunification with Crimea in mid March.

Since then, however, Russia's official position has actually been quite steady, as Lavrov himself recently asserted. But after the months of evasive ambiguities, since August, Putin, Lavrov, and Medvedev started making it clear that Russia's policy is "Crimea is ours, and Donbass is Ukraine."  On the face of this, it is thus possible to say that what Galeotti says (i.e. about the deal) does accord with the words and statements made by the Kremlin. The one thing that does not accord with this and which can still make all the difference (if the Kremlin does not reconsider its rhetoric) are Russia's deeds on the ground, which have not only contradicted Moscow's statements, but they themselves have also been contradictory and in no way well coordinated or one-linear.

3. Nevertheless, based on his inside sources in Washington, Galeotti believes that a deal is at last very close, that the deal is Russia's defeat and that, since the US can achieve as much, the deal might be still too "dangerously" light and too little a defeat of Russia. Galeotti, in fact, also calls the deal "immoral" and "muddle-headed" (written on top of it in bold characters).

Galeotti and apparently also others in the administration) believe that, once the deal is all but done, the US can and should press for more ... with one important caveat--of not making it too much humiliating for Putin, that is, with some "face-saving" device, which, according to Galeotti, should largely depend on the "Moscow-controlled" media anyway and on a very thin definition of "humiliation" and "saving [someone else'] face" on the part of Washington, who does not really care much about Putin, in the first place: "This [deal] represents a defeat [for Putin], but for practical reasons it would be essential that the West and Kiev alike not crow over that. Putin needs some face-saving assistance if any deal is to be palatable ... this would give Putin the opportunity to claim 'mission accomplished' to his domestic audience, and the pliant Russian broadcast media would duly follow this line. Of course, this would be a thin fiction, and in the eyes of the world, Moscow would have been forced to retreat and to pay a price for its seizure of Crimea."

That is to say, Washington would have a hard time to pretend to care about saving Putin's or Moscow's face, if the opposite were not the truth, in fact.

And, like some other reporters with an inside track before him, Galeotti also thinks that Russia also ought to pay "reparations" to Kiev, however, thinly disguised these are to be. He does use the word "reparations" explicitly: "So the answer may be that instead of expecting a Kremlin already dealing with an economic crisis to hand over any cash, that suitable reparations be offset against Ukraine’s future energy bills, allowing Kiev to focus its efforts on reconstruction."

4. So what is the supposed deal? Galeotti explains the deal as follows: "The essence is that in return 'for a partial release of some of the most onerous economic sanctions' Russia would have to adhere to September’s Minsk agreement and cease direct military support for the rebels, while the “issue of Crimea would be set aside for the time being, and some of the initial sanctions that were put in place after Crimea’s annexation would be kept in place.”

Russia’s seizure of Crimea would be considered a done deal and taken out of the equation in return for only minor and personal (ie, not systemic) sanctions — while Russia and Ukraine would in effect be considered to have positions of equal moral weight in the negotiations over eastern Ukraine. ... [But the deal on] Crimea [is only] de facto status [and only for the moment], and this is important, never de jure ..."

5. In the light of this, let's neither try to accept all what Galeotti says on its face value, but let's rather instead suggest certain possibilities:

i. negotiations on some deal have certainly been taking place
ii. some of the key elements--Crimea on one side and the rest on the other side--look realistic and very likely.
iii. the deal is either about to be finalized or has been finalized; the main agreement could have, in fact, preceded the first Minsk Agreements together with some arrangements, concessions, and adjustments for "face-saving" clauses and measures.
iv. the deal was within a reach (or so it seemed), but it fell apart and, by making all this information public, the US might be trying to get at least a partial victory by presenting Russia as turning its back on the Russians in Donbass and Ukraine and being willing to push them back into the anti-Russian Nazi state.
v. or the deal was never a realistic option, but the US is good at presenting Russia's conciliatory moves, appeasement, and concessions as bad as possible for Russia with a view of preparing the best possible conditions for a Russian Maidan and regime change in Moscow.
vi. or much of this or some of this, at least, is true, but Moscow has either decided to change its course or is just about to do it.
vii. if Galeotti's information is, in its core, correct, then it also means that, for the US, the only "deal" possible with Russia is Russia's defeat and that this is for the US non-negotiable. What might be negotiable--though only for the appearances' sake--is the limited and contingent scope of "let's not making it that humiliating"--for what the US does desire is victory and humiliation, which would double (at least) the victory as well. Galeotti tries to suggest that if humiliation cannot be had (right away), then victory pragmatically ought to suffice. But he does with this line a very poor job. Not only he barely tries to make it convincing, his whole article is trying to debase and humiliate--either with or without a deal.
viii. or if the deal was or is about to be signed, Washington tries to derail it with reports like this at the very last moment.
ix. by signing the Minsk Deal, Moscow did sign away its strategic initiative for now--together with the offensive and initiative so hard won by Novorossiya.

PS: I do hope that the removal of Strelkov and the murder of Alexander Bednov and his comrades were not some of the down-payments on the deal.

http://www.businessinsider.com/mark-galeotti-crimea-pivotal-in-ukraine-russia-peace-deal-2015-1

Thesis: Every culture, every system is based on a certain "economy" based on production, exchange, and consumption of Eros or Desire

Wayland Young: "The great merit of the old socialist's achievement is its complete absence of comment [though this was also a symptom of the absence of self-reflection]. It is natural joy in natural beauty naturally shared with the beholder. It would be absurd to comment further on that which is beautiful." Eros Denied

In this, "natural joy in natural beauty" was very much in the spirit of the Renaissance and much against the spirit of Protestantism and even Christianity. In this, there was thus something archaic and even pagan in this "old socialist art" and its "achievement."

The West discovered "natural joy in natural beauty" largely through Freud and through advertising, largely based off Freud, which therefore is neither really about "natural joy in natural beauty" nor for the sake of "natural joy in natural beauty" but for the sake of selling something that is in fact fake and artificial--made up.

Having said, I also readily agree that what Khruschev or Brezhnev and their bureaucracies personified was almost a perfection of the un or ant-erotic life. Life unsexed of life. And 1989 showed that an (internally) dead system cannot live in this age that long.

Life runs on desire.