What does the Protocol (Etiquette and Formalities) of Minsk 2.0 tell us about the nature of the Minsk Deal itself?

While Minsk 2.0 was negotiated by Merkel, Putin, and Hollande, the document was signed, as with Minsk 1.0, on behalf of the "three-party contact group" by an OSCE envoy, Russia's Ambassador to Ukraine, and Kuchma as "the Second President of Ukraine." All these three have titles to their names (see the link). Below them, as in the case of Minsk 1.0, Zakharchenko and Plotnisky, the heads of the DPR and LPR, signed too, but without their official titles. The two-tier way of negotiating and signing spells and shows it clearly that, while Zakharchenko and Plotnisky are treated as an appendix to the process, Russia acts as part of the three-party "contact group" which is handing the demands and conditions agreed without the DPR and LPR participation in the negotiations to the latter for implementation--yet without the slightest recognition of the entities they represent. For, like Minsk 1.0, Minsk 2.0 is in its essence an act which stipulates dissolution and death of the DPR and the LPR.

This patently humiliating and low treatment of the representatives of the people's republics is a far cry from the way in which, for example, the Geneva talks and the Moscow talks were conducted between the Syrian government and the West-created opposition, which revolves around al Qaeda-organized armies.

PS: the claim that Zakharchenko and Plotnisky did not sign was lame disinformation, happily circulated by the usual disinformation channels.

https://vk.com/strelkov_info?w=wall-57424472_46375

Minsk 2.0 as a lesson in (Nazi) state and nation building

Some of the crystal ball readings of Minsk 2.0 assume without some good reasons for it that Minsk 2.0 was something, which Putin either initiated or demanded. I am aware of nothing notable which would support this idea. The parsimonious (simple) explanation is that Minsk 2.0 was initiated and imposed by the West 1) in response to the coming-to-be catastrophe for the junta troops in Debaltzevo, 2) the perceived need to bring to an end the "sabotage" of Minsk 1.0 on the part of Russia, and the DPR and LPR. The series of meetings between Poroshenko and the Western leaders were well sequeled and coordinated so were the sudden ultimatums and the renewed anti-Russian rhetoric. After all, Minsk 1.0 was an agreement on "certain principles" (however unprincipled I would see them), and the rest is tightening of the screws and presenting Minsk 1.0/2.0 etc. as the "only rational and viable option" left (I am citing by memory from Brzezinski's blueprint where this very strategy/tactic is emphasized). If in Spring, as some Russian commentators noted (was it El Murid?), Russia had a number of possible options and possible moves in front of herself, then the list or options left has since then been reduced significantly, while the uprising and resistance to the junta, which, last Spring, was rising from Odessa to Kharkov, has been effectively contained and cornered in a smaller portion of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. The Nazi junta now has a firm grip on and control of the whole state apparatus mightily assisted by a new phenomenon of armed, trained, and very motivated Nazi paramilitaries, organizations, and their activists. Their professionalism has also dramatically increased and expanded. The insufficiently appreciated fact is that the Kiev regime with the help of all kinds of experts, helpers, and minders has been intensively working on a new "nation-building" and Nazi state-building, however perverse and criminal this process is. At the same time, nation- and state-building in the DPR and LPR has been often torpedoed or put on brakes. As a result, despite great odds, while the militia is being at last transformed into something that begins to resemble an army (which ought to be undone under Minsk), the building of institutions and the state is very behind. Should these partial and inadequate attempts be further aborted or exchanged for changing the would-be republics into regions, which the original junta's law on their special status was actually turning into zones under ATO military command, then anti-fascist resistance and opposition would be simply reduced to a state of organizational impotence, chaos and disorder.

A seemingly realistic, but politically dishonest and intellectually lazy response to the question about Minsk 2.0 and the apparent lack of other possibilities and good options would be to say that there are no good options left, that all are bad and that the one we are left with is the least bad under the given conditions. One can explore and find several objections to this. One from the more obvious and readily available is that this least bad option, though seemingly a clever one, is a result of the diplomatic and political initiative and offensive undertaken by the Empire. And while the flare of the visible diplomatic activity that led to Minsk 2.0 started seemingly only some two weeks ago, the present move has been in the works for months since last Spring.

When was the last time a Polish politician felt comfortable to threaten the Russians?

The ink on Minsk 2.0 which those who did not negotiate it were forced to sign has not dried yet and emboldened Tusk is already busy issuing threats to Moscow: Watch out, if you breach what you agreed to in Minsk! More punitive measures are in store for you!

When was the last time a Polish politician felt comfortable to threaten the Russians?

What happened in Minsk and what the EU thinks of what happened there is coming out rather very fast and without much ado, and it also shows what happened to the much hitherto cherished "partnership" and how Russia is treated by the leading capitalist elites. Poland's Donald Tusk as Chief of the European Council (EU President) has just issued an open threat to Russia: "The EU is ready to take further measures in addition to the sanctions it has already imposed if a new Ukraine peace pact is breached."

Despite what the Minsk apologists also claimed, Tusk also repeated the charge of "Russian aggression" against Ukraine.

What will Russia do if Kiev breaches the Minsk agreements and it Kiev continues Nazification of Ukraine, mobilization for war against Russia, and its terror against opposition?

Previously I said that the DPR and LPR representatives were held in a different room apart from Putin, Merkel, Hollande, and Poroshenko. More precisely, not just in another room, but also in another building.

http://news.yahoo.com/eu-necessary-steps-ukraine-pact-breached-tusk-215605078.html

Minsk 2.0: Post Scriptum

1. So far the fighting in the Debaltzevo cauldron continues unabated. The Ukrainian troops are encircled there despite Poroshenko's denials, but Kiev is trying to break the encirclement.
2. The Empire and the Kiev regime are putting much of hope into imposing on the breakaway republics "new local elections" which would change the republics' leadership and replace it with the junta's stooges or effective quislings.
3. For it is apparently under the new local "leadership" that the stipulated demilitarization and disarmament of the republics is to be carried out (Point 10: "Withdrawal of all foreign armed units, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under the supervision of the OSCE. The disarmament of all illegal groups.") The date of these new elections--for Kiev does not recognize the current republics or their leadership as legitimate--is, however, not defined except that all the required changes are to be achieved before the end of 2015.
4. Will the junta be willing to stop shelling Donetsk, Gorlovka and other cities, as implied under the stipulated withdrawal of heavy weapons by March 1?

The disbanding and disarming of the NAF, effectively described by Minsk 2.0 as "an illegal group" (for, according to Minsk 2.0, even the republics have no legal or political standing or status) can be hypothetically achieved in these ways:
1. voluntary self-disarming and dissolution under the current leadership and command
2. disarming and demilitarization after the "new local elections" (option evidently favored by Kiev and the West)
3. enforced and carried out by Russia
4. or by the Kiev regime or/and Kiev's allied enforcer (i.e., foreign de facto invasion)

Minsk 2.0 basically requires from Kiev only to behave nicely at least initially and to refrain from military actions, that is, to cease their pursuit at least temporarily.

Minsk 2.0: Putin Fulfilled His Purpose

Minsk 2.0 (just like Minsk 1.0) de iure (as opposed to de facto for now) buried the existence not only of Novorossiya, but also of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and effectively makes their referendums nil and void.

It re-establishes Kiev's sovereignty and stipulates that Kiev ought to re-establish full control over all the borders with Russia by the end of 2015. According to Poroshenko, no federalization or autonomy is part of Minsk 2.0. Some sort of "special status" can mean many things, that is to say, very little, if anything. The status of these regions is to be prescribed by a law made by Kiev, merely with some possible coordination or input from the regions. Nothing more.

The crux of the dictate in the form of the agreement is point 10 of the "Set of Measures for the Implementation [of Minsk 1.0]": "Withdrawal of all foreign armed units, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under the supervision of the OSCE. The disarmament of all illegal groups." The text makes the Army of Novorosssiya an illegal group that needs to be "withdrawn." Moreover, the use of the word "withdrawn" as opposed, for example, disbanded or removed, implies that these "illegal groups" are be withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine, but, once outside of Ukraine, they don't need to be disbanded or dissolved--all this helps to paint these forces as Russia's forces--one of the crucial points which seem to have eluded Russian diplomats.

It is also helpful to compare the text with the attempted positive spin put on it by RT.

Here is the text itself, point 4:

"On the first day following the withdrawal to begin a dialogue with respect to the modalities of the local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions,” as well as with respect to the future operation of these areas on the basis of the Law.
Immediately, and not later than 30 days from the date of signing of this document, to adopt a resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine with the specification of the territory covered by the special regime provided for in the Law of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions”, [such territory] to be based on the line set out in the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014."

Compare with RT's "Point 4":

4. "Kiev and the rebels will negotiate the terms for future local elections in the rebel-held areas, which would bring them back into Ukraine’s legal framework. Kiev would adopt legislation on self-governance that would be acceptable for the self-proclaimed republics." http://rt.com/news/231667-minsk-ceasefire-deal-breakup/

Telling is also (with others) the difference between what the text actually says and how RT presents it in Point 11.

Point 11 as it is:

"Passing of a constitutional reform in Ukraine with the entry into force by the end of 2015 of a new constitution, which shall incorporate decentralization as a key element (taking into account the characteristics of certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions, to be agreed upon with the representatives of these areas), as well as, before the end of 2015, adoption of permanent legislation with respect to the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions in accordance with the measures specified in Note [1]"

Note 1: .... participation of local governments in the appointment of the heads of prosecutorial bodies and the courts in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions; ... establishment of units of People’s Militia by order of local councils with the goal of maintaining public order in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions;
the powers of local council deputies and officers elected in early elections, to be set by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in accordance with this law, may not be terminated."

RT's "Point 11": "Keiv will implement comprehensive constitutional reform by the end of the year, which would decentralize the Ukrainian political system and give privileges to Donetsk and Lugansk. The privileges include language self-determination, the freedom to appoint prosecutors and judges, and to establish economic ties with Russia."

In his brief press conference after the talks, Putin confirmed that Kiev categorically refused as a matter of principle to have any direct talks with the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, limiting itself to talks to Russia with the help of its allies, Germany and France.

Importantly, in his statement for the press, Putin pointed out that, at this very moment, the most critical issue is the fate of the encircled 6,000-8,0000 Kiev troops in the Debaltzevo cauldron. Poroshenko denies that they are encircled. The Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics demand their surrender and disarmament. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_vGK63sbiks


According to Oleg Tzarev, the best that may be said about Minsk 2.0 in favor of Putin and Russia is that 1) "Russia has moved out of the frame of the conflict; It will be now hard to present the war in the eyes of Western society as a conflict between Ukraine and Russia;" (Россия вышла за рамки конфликта. Войну в глазах западного общества теперь очень сложно представить как войну Украины и России.), and that 2) Russia is now "playing on the same team within the European concert" (страна выступает в одной команде с европейским концертом). http://oleg-tsarev.livejournal.com/94289.html

Putin as the chess champion he is played his moved brilliantly. He foresaw a long time ago what the junta and its Western allies would want to see Russia committed to and, planning his agreement with it several moves ahead, he pulled off precisely that.

It would be also fitting if Moscow now invites Poroshenko and the representatives of the Kiev regime's troops for the Victory parade at the Red Square on May 9. It would not even be amiss if the celebration of Victory Day were then renamed in the way in which Kiev wants to see it as a Day of "Reconciliation." As Oleg Tzarev put it, Russia is "on the same team" and this partnership of the elites has been reconfirmed.

Back in the 1990s, Brzezinski identified Ukraine as the US designated "bridgehead" into Eurasia or the Eurasian Balkans which is to lead to Russia's disintegration. And since the masters of the universe are also dabbing into occult, it was not without a bit of irony or inside joke that they chose as a lever for securing this bridgehead to use not only an updated tactic already tried with Slobodan Milosevic, but they also called the tool to achieve "the Normandy format" or the "Normandy group" called so after the US-led formation of a bridgehead into Europe in June of 1944 and the celebration of this feat last year where Putin was made to recognize the legitimacy of Poroshenko and the Nazi junta, which he represents. The New "Normandy" was, moreover, completed in Belarus where the unconstitutional dissolution of the Soviet Union was signed on December 25, 1991 by a troika of then still formally Soviet leaders, who were in fact by virtue of the very act fully anti-Soviet already.

If Minsk 2.0 were to be Minsk 1.0, but not just somewhat repackaged, but at this time also enforced and implemented, then the Kremlin (taking a cue from Starikov, for example) would have to declare Russian patriots, including Strelkov, to be "the outlaw party of war" and change the regime in Russia to make it compatible with (the restored "partnership" with) the Kiev junta (and the Empire), possibly in the spirit of Ivan Ilyin's right-wing "conservatism." 

The originally Norman invasion of England in 1066 (thus going in the opposite direction than that of 1944) was also important in that respect that it brought feudalism (or a new, "modern" form of serfdom or slavery) to the country.

As in Minsk 1.0, US diplomacy is skilfully orchestrating and controlling the Minsk talks by leading and pulling the strings from behind

El Murid​ does have a point when, like others, he also emphasizes the elementary political and geopolitical fact that neither the Kiev regime nor the people's republics of Donbass are really sovereign or independent, which the "Normandy format," which officially excludes the people's republics also shows and confirms. The fact that Moscow agreed or had to agree on this, thus making the fact of absent sovereignty all but self-evident, also says a lot about the character of the Minsk process and the agreements that are being made. In this connection, El Murid also emphasizes (again) the interesting fact that the real boss and power broker behind the Kiev regime (and also behind EU vassals, Germany and France) is officially missing in Minsk as well. It is the US. But the apparent absence of the US there has different reasons than the ostensible slighting and demotion of the people's republics of Donbass, which are for the Kiev's Banderite regime "terrorist entities." The apparent absence of the US is allowing 1) the West to drive home their meme that the conflict is really just between Ukraine and Russia with France and Germany just trying to be good, concerned mediators and 2) to reserve for the US freedom of action, for, unlike Russia which is a signatory of the Minsk Agreements and thus obliged to fulfill them, the US is not bound by anything which it made and makes its vassals, Germany and France, and its colony, Ukraine, sign in Minsk or impose on Russia and, via Russia, on the republics of Donbass. US diplomacy is and remains the best imperial diplomacy money can buy today.

http://el-murid.livejournal.com/2241717.html

On the splendid idea of demilitarization of much of the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics under Minsk 2.0

RT reports: "The creation of a demilitarized zone in southeast Ukraine and the start of a peace dialogue between Kiev and the rebels are to top the agenda of the ‘Normandy Four’ talks in the Belarusian capital, Minsk, on Wednesday, a source told RIA Novosti. During the talks, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Germany and France are expected to insist on Russia taking responsibility for controlling the establishment of the demilitarized zone in southeast Ukraine, the source added. Meanwhile, Russia believes that it’s the OSCE that should be responsible for the establishment of the demilitarized zone. Those proposals were voiced by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande during talks with Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Friday, the source said. Russia’s permanent representative to the OSCE, Andrey Kelin, told RT that the idea of a demilitarized zone in southeast Ukraine “does exist.” “But we need more specification: How large will it be? What kind of weapons may be kept inside this zone? I feel that one may come to a result that it should be totally weapon-free zone with only police or those who are having sidearms,” he said."

The West dusted off the idea of "demilitarization zone," which were used to a great effect against the Serbs in Bosnia and is applying it to Donbass. Those who remember might recall the "demilitarization" of Igman Mountain, that is, undoing the effects of the almost decisive Serbian offensive. As I was told back then from a Serb working for the Bosniaks, if the gains of the Serb offensive had not been reversed in that way, the Serbs would have won the decisive battle of Sarajevo.

Back then, of course, the West insisted that the Serbs withdraw their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo, which greatly facilitated the later Bosniac offensives. Now, the "peace" idea is that the defenders of the cities (Donetsk, Gorlovka, and Lugansk ) withdraw their heavy weapons from around these cities. One has also to admire the additional cleverness of the Western initiative, which is that Russia should be the one who would enforce such demilitarization zones on the Donetsk and Lugansk Poeple's Republics--obviously in the interest of Kiev and NATO. Judging from the news, Russian diplomats seem to like the idea as much as they supported similar initiatives with respect to the Serbs back then in the 1990s. History is ironic.

When it comes to demilitarization (of much of the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics), one needs only to ask very simple, basic questions:
1. To whom is such demilitarization in this case (in this case, complete withdrawal from positions) more advantageous--to the defender or to the side preparing for eventual attack and offensive?
2. Would such demilitarization stop the ongoing Nazification of the Ukrainian state or would allow it to continue?
3. If one looks at the size of the territories at stake and if one considers the question of the viability of the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics as functioning entities, who would benefit more from such demilitarization (with the DM zones being possibly as wide as 70 km)?
4. Is it necessary in order to prevent the continuous shelling of Donetsk, Gorlovka and other towns by the junta that the militia, which defends these cities, withdraw from these cities and leave them undefended?
5. Did not Yanukovich also demilitarize and remove his forces first and before he was removed--and also under an agreement and guarantees of the same Germany and France?

Politics never canceled this basic axiom: who has boots on the ground and the monopoly on violence on the given territory also holds power over the given territory.

Demilitarization does make sense in certain cases an example of which is Korea where the demilitarized zone marks not only an effective border between two states, but also a defensible border without being or amounting to effective demilitarization of either of the two states.